Ⅲ. Joint Research Report
Overview: Regional Security Symposium 2014 Joint Research Presentation

Results of joint research were presented, followed by a discussion with attendees.

Date: March 17, 2015 (Tuesday) 14:00-17:00
Venue: Meeting Room M, 4F Okinawa Municipal Jichi-kaikan
Number of Attendees: 59
Presenters:

Session 1: U.S. Political Process Regarding Marine Corps in Okinawa
Shinji Kawana, Instructor, Faculty of Law, Kinki University
Ayae Shimizu, Ph.D Student, Graduate School of Political Science and Economics, Meiji University
Shino Hateruma, Researcher, Research Section, Regional Security Policy Division, Executive Office of the Governor, Okinawa Prefectural Government
Kousuke Saitou, Project Instructor, Yokohama National University Research Initiative and Promotion Organization

Session 2: Study on Strengthening Self-help, Mutual Help and Public Help to Enhance Okinawa’s Support Receiving Capabilities
Yuki Sadaike, Project Assistant Professor, Center for Integrated Disaster Information Research, Interfaculty Initiative in Information Studies, University of Tokyo
Tomoaki Honda, Senior Visiting Researcher, Keio Research Institute at SFC
Hironobu Nakabayashi, Fellow, Research Section, Regional Security Policy Division, Executive Office of the Governor, Okinawa Prefectural Government

Session 3: Comparative Study on Cross-Border Regional Cooperation
Hironobu Nakabayashi, Fellow, Research Section, Regional Security Policy Division, Executive Office of the Governor, Okinawa Prefectural Government

[Summary of Discussion at the Symposium]

In Session 1, several questions were asked about how the three elements—strategic imperatives, budget constraints, and political legitimacy—impact the present and the future. One person asked “if the will of the people in Okinawa are currently influencing the U.S. political process in the context of political legitimacy,” and the answer was “the U.S. is discussing how best to reduce the burden.” Another asked “what kind of future is there for the bases as both Japan and the U.S. face more serious financial restraints,” and the respondent said that there is a trend for the U.S. to ask its ally to bear the burden of relocation, and this answer was supported by the U.S. military base policies in the past as cited by the presenter.

In Session 2, questions were asked about resilience. To the question of “what is the difference between resilience and mutual help,” the presenter answered: “the two share something in common conceptually, but resilience is a concept that will lead the debate on crisis management worldwide for the foreseeable future, and that is the trend now. That is why crisis management must be understood in alignment with this concept.”

In Session 3, one person asked “how do the military and private sectors cooperate within the framework of Europe’s regional cooperation, in the area of disaster prevention?” The answer was: “Such cooperation should be coordinated in and by each member state, and there is no general EU system that specifies a method of cooperation between the military and private sectors.”
(1) Research Title
U.S. Political Process Regarding Marine Corps in Okinawa

(2) Research Description
The research focuses on two periods—from the 1960s to 1970s, and from the 1990s to 2000s—when there were important policy changes concerning the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to relatively compare the U.S. Marines from two viewpoints, first looking at the U.S. political process itself and how it impacts bases outside of Okinawa Prefecture. This attempt will give shape to the structure of Okinawa’s base issue, which continues to be in existence to this day, from its outer edge. The research then takes a renewed look at the political process regarding U.S. Marines by considering the following three elements: strategic imperatives, budget constraints, and political viability, in order to promote further understanding of U.S. Marines in Okinawa.

(3) Co-Researcher
Shinji Kawana
Instructor at Faculty of Law, Kinki University. Ph.D. from Aoyama Gakuin University in international politics. Formerly a researcher at the Research Institute for Peace and Security.
Overview and Chapter 1

Kousuke Saitou
Project Instructor at Yokohama National University Research Initiative and Promotion Organization. Ph.D. from Tsukuba University in international politics and economics. Formerly a temporary researcher at the Tsukuba University.
Chapter 4 and Final Chapter

Ayae Shimizu
Currently in the doctoral program at Meiji University (international politics and economics). Formerly an assistant in the Department of Politics and Economics, Meiji University.
Chapter 2

Shino Hateruma
Chapter 3
Overview
The U.S. Marine Corps has forwardly deployed the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF), one of three Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF). The MAGTF is an independent tactical force comprised of four integrated units (command, ground battle, air battle, and logistics) whose purpose is to maintain full readiness in case of a contingency. The III MEF Command oversees the 3rd Marine Division, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and 3rd Marine Logistic Group. The III MEF deploys a force of 19,000 (almost half of the number of U.S. forces in Japan) in twelve locations, of which ten are located in Okinawa (Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield, Camp Schwab, Camp Courtney, Camp Foster, Camp Hansen, Camp McTureous, Camp Lester, Camp Kinser, and Camp Gonsalves). Other units are deployed to MCAS Iwakuni and Camp Fuji, and another III MEF unit of about 5,000 are stationed in Hawaii.

How did U.S. Marines having such capabilities come to be stationed in Okinawa after World War II? Recent research is bringing this issue to light. The 3rd Marine Division returned to the CONUS after World War II. However, it was reorganized into a new strategic reserve unit when the Korean War started in June 1950 and deployed to Camp Gifu and Camp Yamanashi in mainland Japan in August 1953. Later, the 3rd Marine Division was relocated to Okinawa between February and March of 1956 and eventually sent to take part in the Vietnam War after 1965. The present III MEF Command was organized at that time, and the 3rd Marine Division, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and 3rd Marine Logistic Group were placed under its command to form the organizational backbone. After Okinawa’s reversion to Japan in May 1972, the possibility of a fundamental consolidation and reduction of U.S. Marines in Okinawa was considered, but no significant changes were made. After 1988, the III MEF Command has established itself as the only expeditionary force continuously deployed on the frontlines outside the continental U.S.

If the U.S. Marines’ historical development unveiled in prior research is set along a “vertical axis,” the purpose of this research report is to transpose a spatial or geographical “horizontal axis” to visualize from different perspectives the full picture of the set of issues related to U.S. Marines in Okinawa—issues long pending for both Japan and the U.S. In other words, this is an attempt to relativize U.S. Marines in Okinawa from the periphery of Okinawa. Needless to say, U.S. Marine military bases and installations in Okinawa are part of the United States global base system, and each component of the network, including Okinawa, is linked to other components. How then, does the structure of U.S. Marines and their bases in Okinawa relate to other U.S. bases in mainland Japan and the Western Pacific? Do they all share the various political difficulties faced in Okinawa, or do they differ in that respect? If so, how? Prior research has not sufficiently shown this relative viewpoint when attempting to understand such issues.
III. Joint Research Report: U.S. Political Process Regarding the Marine Corps in Okinawa

For this reason, this research selects two periods that are particularly important in understanding the nature of the issue of present day U.S. Marines in Okinawa and considers the policy change process as it relates to U.S. Marines in Okinawa in both periods from the U.S. perspective. The first period is from the late 1960s to the 1970s, when the U.S. is believed to have established its basic posture for the U.S. Marines in Okinawa after Okinawa’s reversion. During this period, the U.S. was confronted with an urgent need to formulate a post-Vietnam strategy in the face of a newly emerging strategic environment and also to manage détente, including normalization of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and China. This was also a period when the U.S. and Japan were negotiating the specific terms for Okinawa’s reversion. The second period is from the early 1990s until the 2010s. Very soon after the end of the Cold War, Washington became skeptical about the presence of U.S. Marines in Okinawa, and the Okinawa rape incident, the sexual assault that happened in 1995 urged the U.S. to take measures, one of which was relocation of MCAS Futenma. This issue has still not been settled, and both Japanese and the U.S. governments have had their hands full managing the situation throughout the new millennium. The two periods form a turning point for the group of contemporary issues derived from the U.S. Marines presence, and, therefore, analysis of the two periods holds certain significance in clarifying policy change mechanisms in the context of U.S. military base politics.

This research considers the political process as it relates to U.S. Marines in Okinawa deployed in that particular geographical and temporal space by focusing on the following three elements: strategic imperatives, budget constraints, and political viability of bases, as well as what weight the U.S. has assigned to these elements. The term “strategic imperatives” in this research refers to issues that are comprehensively evaluated by U.S. policy makers (particularly the Department of Defense and military) from the standpoints of ability to manage specific threats as well as feasibility and efficiency of a given strategy. Budget constraints define the national defense budget and ultimately impact the efficient allocation of bases and troops. Political viability of bases is a concept representing the amount of political and social resources required by a host country and local government to host such military installations. High political viability means high political support in each layer of the host nation for accepting such installations, and low political viability signifies that support is relatively low. This research assumes that the recognition for three elements of U.S. in the two periods affected the scale of U.S. Marines deployed to Okinawa and the structure of their bases.

This research report has two parts. Each part is consisted of a thesis (Chapter 1 and 4) and a report (Chapter 2 and 3). The chronological scope of Part 1 extends from the late 1960s until the 1970s. Specifically, this part examines the historical process, through which the original structure of the U.S. Marines developed after the Okinawa reversion, by shedding light on realignment of U.S. military bases in mainland Japan, an issue which emerged in the late 1960s (Chapter 1). Then, the following chapter sorts through the reversion process for revising the Military Bases Agreement in the Philippines in the late 1970s (Chapter 2) so that arguments of more general significance presented in Chapter 1 may be considered. The examination in Chapter 1 reveals that how the U.S. recognized the political viability would affect the process of realigning bases for U.S. forces in Japan including Okinawa. The conclusion, as it will be made clear in this research, is that the
base structure of U.S. Marines after the Okinawa reversion (particularly the capability enhancement of MCAS Futenma) was constructed as a result of the impact on a need to recover the political viability of bases in mainland Japan. In addition, behind the enhancement of U.S. Marines bases in Okinawa beginning in the late 1970s was the issue of abandoning Taiwan as the other side of the coin of U.S.-China normalization. The process of transforming the capabilities of U.S. bases in Okinawa after the reversion was not formulated within on account of Okinawa’s geographical and military conditions but rather as a “by-effect” of political change in mainland Japan and the East Asian region, which have a complementary relationship in the base system.

Part 2 covers the period from the early 1990s until the 2010s. Here, U.S. domestic discussions related to the U.S. Marines in Okinawa are sequenced first, from the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s until the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report (December 1996) and zeros in on the root of the “Futenma Issue” persisting to this day (Chapter 3). In the process, the U.S. policy logic, which attempted to find a solution to this long-lasting policy issue between Japan and the U.S., is identified, and how its manifestation in the relocation plan of U.S. Marines in Okinawa to Guam (October 2005) was determined as well as how it changed over time (Chapter 4). What Part 2 reveals is the issue of evaluating political viability of bases, which forms one of the foundations for U.S. policy decisions, and the issue of balancing strategic imperatives and budget constraints, which determine the influence of political viability. Since “Futenma” surfaced as a political issue between Japan and the U.S., the need to recover political viability of bases in Okinawa pushed U.S. policy makers to consistently spend more political resources to resolve it. However, the impact of the political resources spent largely depended on the strategic environment and financial situation of the U.S. at the time. Furthermore, the packaging of the relocation to Guam (i.e. Relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko being a condition for Marine Corps’ relocation to Guam) and its eventual delinking were affected in no small measure by the issue of profit distribution within Guam.

On the whole, this research report provides comparative angles to promote understanding of the issue of U.S. Marines in Okinawa after WWII. The Marine Corps-related issues that the governments of Japan and the U.S., as well as Okinawa, have to deal with were formed as a result of interaction within the U.S. overseas base system—the product of a non-linear political process.
Pressure to Withdraw of the USMC in Okinawa and the Counteraction—Coherence with the Mainland Base Realignment Process—

Shinji Kawana
Instructor, Faculty of Law, Kinki University

Summary

The purpose of this paper is to answer the question: “Why did the U.S. Department of Defense plan to withdraw the Marine Corps from Okinawa in 1968 to 1969, and then drop the plan eventually?” As is well known, the U.S. Department of Defense planned a large-scale U.S. military base alignment and consolidation plan of Okinawa and mainland Japan at the end of the Lyndon B. Johnson administration in December 1968. The plan included ideas for realigning and consolidating air bases in the Kanto Plain, closing the Sasebo installation, and building Yokosuka into a homeport, suspending operations at Itazuke, and also closing the Oji Hospital. As for the U.S. bases in Okinawa, the plan also called for suspending operations at Camp Butler in all practical terms, which would include closing Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (MCAS Futenma). However, this plan to withdraw and reduce the U.S. Marine Corps presence in Okinawa was never executed in the 1970s or the following years. Instead, the capabilities of MCAS Futenma were enhanced.

To answer the question, this paper focuses on the U.S. perception of three elements of (1) strategic imperatives of these bases, (2) budget constraints, and (3) political viability of U.S. bases in Japan including Okinawa, and focuses on the issue of mutual interaction between bases in Okinawa and those in mainland Japan.

The conclusion is that, from 1968 to 1969, the U.S. began formulating a realignment plan for its bases in mainland Japan and embarked on designing a long-term, fundamental concept for base realignment. The former was the Johnson-McCain plan drafted primarily by the U.S. Embassy and U.S. Pacific Command. The latter was a large-scale realignment plan put forth by the inside of the Department of Defense, which called for closing MCAS Futenma and withdrawing the U.S. Marine Corps from Okinawa. The Department of Defense began working on the latter plan in 1968, prompted by increasing budgetary constraints and the need to manage reduced political viability of bases in mainland Japan. The budget constraints were the result of pressure to cut the defense budget as well as an adverse balance of international payments. This trend was accelerated by Executive Order No. 703, which sought to reduce the defense budget. The need to recover political viability resurfaced after the catalytic event of an F-4 Phantom crashing into the Kyushu University campus in June 1968. For the U.S., ignoring protests and movements against U.S. bases and U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in Japan meant to jeopardize the security relations before its automatic extension. Additionally, the plan to withdraw the U.S. Marines from Okinawa, including the closing of MCAS Futenma, was seen as a “device” to keep Okinawa as a repository for mainland bases for political benefit.

However, after 1969, the Department of Defense faced significant resistance from
within the military and its policy underwent a complete change with measures initiated to enhance the capability of U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa and MCAS Futenma. One reason behind this reversal was also the need to recover the political viability of mainland bases. Facing serious pressure for withdrawal at the time to close the Naval Air Facility Atsugi (NAF Atsugi) in Kanagawa Prefecture, the Department of Defense selected Iwakuni and Futenma as locations for the transfer of aircraft stationed at Atsugi and conferred on Futenma Air base, the role of serving as a major base for a helicopter unit. The helicopter unit’s activity at MCAS Futenma was limited during the Vietnam War, and even after the deployment of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing in the 1960s (only four helicopters were deployed in 1969). However, the Department of Defense proposed a plan in September 1969 to commence deployment of 80 helicopters to Futenma, and, in total, deployed 106 aircraft to Futenma including fixed-wing aircraft. This was the turning point that triggered enhancement of MCAS Futenma’s capabilities and transformed their character qualitatively in the 1970s and beyond.

The realignment policy around this period for the U.S. base system in Japan was a process in which the realignment plan was initiated primarily because of the necessity for working within budget constraints and also for recovering the political viability of the bases in mainland Japan and was drastically modified after the U.S. military raised questions about strategic imperatives. The realignment plan for the U.S. Marines in Okinawa can be seen as a process through which a mechanism of interaction with the mainland base system was in place, in addition to the above three factors. For example, one reason for enhancing MCAS Futenma’s capabilities was to ensure coherence with the NAF Atsugi, which specifically refers to readying Futenma to serve as an alternative facility for NAF Atsugi. Such a manifestation can be understood as a way to recover the political viability of air bases in the Tokyo Metropolitan area.

In consideration of all these elements, the process through which the U.S. Marines in Okinawa were realigned from 1968 to 1969 was not the result of a recalculation of strategic imperatives, but rather a process for adjusting and recouping the political viability of the entire U.S. military base system in Japan.
Strategic Importance of U.S. Military Bases in the Philippines: U.S. Asia Strategy Since the Carter Administration
Ayae Shimizu
Ph.D Student, Graduate School of Political Science and Economics, Meiji University

Summary
The purpose of this chapter is to examine what status the U.S. State Department and Department of Defense conferred on its U.S. military bases in the Philippines in the late 1970s. When the Vietnam War ended in 1975, U.S. military bases in Asia were situated in Okinawa and other locations in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Guam. However, the U.S. realigned its Asia strategy as the security environment in Asia changed in the late 1970s. This chapter focuses on the U.S. bases in the Philippines, which are a requisite element in considering how the U.S. presence should be maintained in Asia, and reviews how the U.S. State Department and Department of Defense wanted to position them in the process leading up to signing the amended Military Bases Agreement (MBA) in 1979. This chapter discusses the period from 1977 until the amended MBA was signed in 1979, in the following three stages.

Stage 1 is the negotiations on amending the MBA in 1977. President Carter launched human-rights diplomacy after he took office in 1977, and was critical of President Marcos’s dictatorial rule in the Philippines. The Carter administration began to specifically address the U.S. bases in the Philippines in April 1977, three months after Carter took office. At that time, the administration expressed its intent to commence negotiations, not to maintain U.S. bases in the Philippines, but to pursue amendment of the MBA in order to reduce their number. In the early period of the Carter administration, the U.S. was reluctant to maintain its bases in the Philippines. To find a solution, First Lady Imelda Marcos of the Philippines visited the U.S. in October and met with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke. Imelda Marcos requested support for national defense, and also presented the Philippine position on the U.S. bases, including topics such as base sovereignty and criminal jurisdiction.

Stage 2 runs from late 1977 until early 1978, the period when the U.S. was negotiating amendments to the MBA in alignment with its Asia strategy. Six months after the president took office, the Carter administration’s Asia strategy had practically come into a deadlock with no sign of success. Carter’s human-rights diplomacy was straining relationships between the U.S. and Asian countries, and the administration needed to find a breakthrough. On the other hand, the Soviet Union’s military power had been extending its influence and the threat was close to reaching Asia. To keep the Soviets in check, the U.S. considered it best to approach China and normalize diplomatic relations as early as possible. However, in order to do so, the U.S. needed to withdraw its troops from Taiwan and that would not only set back U.S.-Taiwan relations, but the mere possibility of such a
move evoked significant concerns and dissatisfaction from other countries in Asia. As confrontation between the U.S. and its Asian allies grew, the U.S. urgently needed to improve relations with its allies and to strengthen a framework of cooperative.

Base negotiations between the U.S. and the Philippines officially began in November 1977. The principal topic of the negotiations were: the Philippine request to reassume complete sovereignty of U.S. bases on its soil, which was the main point of contention between the two countries, base use fees, economic and military support, agreement terms, and U.S. obligations to defend the Philippines. The U.S. eventually accepted the Philippine requests and the two sides agreed to place U.S. bases in the Philippines under a Philippine Commander.

Stage 3 is the U.S. policy change and signing of the amended MBA. On August 24, 1978, the U.S. presented its specific Asia strategy to alleviate Asian countries’ concerns, in Presidential Review Memorandum No. 43 (PRM-43). The purposes of PRM-43 were threefold: to affirm the foreign or external presence of the U.S., reconstruct the regional balance, and promote economic development. With PRM-43, the U.S. attempted to regain the trust of Asia and bring stability to the region. The PRM-43 policy change paved the way for the U.S. and the Philippines to sign the amended MBA for U.S. bases in the Philippines on January 7, 1979. This amended agreement confirmed the strategic importance of the Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base for both countries.

U.S.-China normalization highlighted the confrontation between the U.S. and Soviet Union. That same year, Carter’s policy to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea was dropped. In this way, the military balance in East Asia shifted in the late 1970s because U.S. troops were withdrawn from Taiwan in order to normalize U.S.-China relations, while, at the same time, a decision was made to maintain U.S. bases in the Philippines, and large-scale military exercises were conducted at U.S. bases in Okinawa in light of the situation. The new U.S. Asia strategy placed high strategic value on U.S. bases in the Philippines, not only because of their geographical, military, and political value, but also their presence came to be interlocked with U.S. bases in other parts of the world due to the shifting military balance in Asia.

Although the topic is not referenced directly, this chapter also considers the status of U.S. bases in Okinawa and mainland Japan around that time. In Asia during the late 1970s, the U.S. State Department and Department of Defense viewed U.S. bases in Okinawa and mainland Japan as important forward deployment bases, just as important as the Philippine bases, because U.S. bases in Okinawa, mainland Japan and the Philippines were all operating within the framework of U.S. Seventh Fleet.
U.S. Internal Discussions through Agreement on the Return of Futenma Air Station in 1996: Focusing on Discussions outside the U.S. Government
Shino Hateruma
Researcher, Research Section, Regional Security Policy Division, Executive Office of the Governor, Okinawa Prefectural Government

Summary
The purpose of this paper is to discern how discussions developed in the United States beginning in September 1995 when an elementary school girl was sexually assaulted by three U.S. servicemen until December 1996 when the U.S. and Japanese governments agreed on the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report, which included return of the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) Air Station Futenma. By focusing on this period when no concrete policy had been established on either the relocation of Futenma or an alternative facility, it is possible to grasp U.S. awareness of military base issues in Okinawa. Moreover, it has been suggested that think tanks have an influence on the policy-making process in the U.S. Experts outside government may become involved in this process after a change in administration, and it is therefore useful to understand what discussions took place among such figures. To investigate statements and opinions voiced by senior U.S. government officials and experts outside government, this paper employs open resources, such as press releases, articles in academic and professional journals as well as newspapers, and other sources between September 1995 and December 1996 in an attempt to outline the logic and issue points demonstrated.

During SACO consultations, senior U.S. government officials asserted the policy of maintaining 47,000 troops in Japan, recognizing that anti-base protests in Okinawa were extending to mainland Japan and the Government of Japan as well as that there was a necessity for reducing and relocating U.S. military bases in Okinawa. Their statements were consistent with the East Asia Strategy Report released in February 1995 prior to the incident. The report endorsed the idea that the U.S. commitment to Asia-Pacific contributed to regional stability and economic development and thus emphasized a policy of maintaining a presence of 100,000 troops. As for the necessity of such a force, some senior officials mentioned risks associated with North Korea and the ambiguous situation in China.

Experts outside government paid attention to the Okinawa base issue and engaged in vigorous discussions concerning the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa. Three types of arguments are evolved. First, some experts argued that the U.S. Marine Corps presence in Okinawa should be examined based on political considerations. Assuming that leaving the anti-base protests in Okinawa unresolved would impact the U.S.-Japan security relationship, they believed it was necessary to reconsider the U.S. presence in Okinawa, Japan and East Asia. While some suggested consolidating and reducing U.S. bases in Okinawa in keeping with the current situation, others queried the possibility of relocating the Marine Corps from Okinawa to the U.S. after pointing out that equipment and capabilities were not suited for rapid deployment.

Second, there was a discussion on examining the Marine Corps in Okinawa based on a military perspective, which was presented mainly by military personnel who had served in Okinawa. They pointed out the inefficient troop arrangements and proposed the deployment be reviewed. For instance, a retired marine mentioned that there would be no
problem reducing the number of bases and troops if U.S. ensures the minimum capabilities necessary for responding to crises. A non-commissioned officer voiced criticism that the Marine Corps in Okinawa had problems with unit operation and the training environment.

Third, as a counterargument to the two discussions described above, some experts formulated an argument for maintaining the Marine Corps presence in Okinawa. Together with points put forward by the government officials, these experts showed concern that removing the force from Okinawa would lead to neighboring countries misperceiving the situation and decrease quick-response capability. From a broader perspective, some even argued that the U.S. Marine Corps presence in Okinawa represented as U.S. power and symbolized its commitment.

In summary, three points are represented in discussions promoted by U.S. government officials and experts outside government. The first is its underlying logic. An overview of the entire discussions demonstrates two different logic flows. One is the argument that leaving anti-base sentiment in Okinawa unresolved would allow it to expand throughout Japan, which would decrease national support for the U.S.-Japan alliance and endanger its maintenance; thus, the argument goes, it was necessary to review the Marine Corps deployment in Okinawa. The other is the argument that a force reduction following anti-base protests would send the wrong message to Japan’s neighboring countries and accelerate regional instability, and, therefore, the U.S. should not change drastically the posture of U.S. forces in Japan, including that of the Marine Corps in Okinawa.

The next point is the threat assessment gap. Government officials and those who argued for maintaining the Marine Corps status quo in Okinawa indicated that it was important to have 47,000 U.S. troops in the Asia-Pacific region to address any destabilizing factors, such as North Korea. However, other experts underestimated the extent of such factors as threats, and proposed the possibility of reducing troop size.

Lastly, there was a difference in military priorities. In discussions that suggested the Marine Corps presence in Okinawa be reviewed, some experts pointed out that the Marine Corps’ deployment in Okinawa did not satisfy military operational requirements due to the lack of equipment and training opportunities as well as the limited training area. On the other hand, those who supported the status quo did not mention such tactical level problems, but instead focused on the strategic importance of the Marine Corps presence in Okinawa and its contribution to regional stability in the Asia-Pacific region.
Summary

This chapter traces changes in U.S. policy logic to address how, in the 2000s, the U.S. formulated the policy logic for relocation of the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (MCAS Futenma), how it was linked to the U.S. Marines relocation from Okinawa to Guam, and why the finished package of these two plans ended up being delinked. To answer these questions the chapter focuses on the issue of strategic imperatives on the international system level and their relationship to political viability in a country hosting U.S. military bases, both of which are popular topics in previous research, and also identifies the impact of U.S. domestic policy factors, which have often been overlooked. These factors intertwine and compose the policy logic for base relocation in the U.S. domestic policy and budget making process. From this viewpoint, the chapter presents the following two arguments.

First, the basic logic behind U.S. base policy in the 2000s has been profoundly affected by the balance between strategic imperatives and political viability. It can be said that this structure itself has been stable even though strategic and political circumstances may change drastically. As developments up to the SACO Final Report indicate, the Futenma relocation plan emerged from a foregrounding of the political viability issue due to the sexual assault in 1995. However, later when the U.S. began considering realigning its Asia-Pacific strategy centered on Guam, discussions developed about the relocation of Futenma Air base, the U.S. Marines relocation to Guam and the packaging of them in the military strategy context. As is well known, changes of military environment in the East Asia region, such as the rise of China and circumstances in North Korea, played a role in this move. Packaging the Futenma relocation and the U.S. Marines relocation to Guam was seen as a leverage to solve both the threat issue and the problem of political viability quickly and simultaneously.

However, in reality, the issue of political viability in Okinawa created a situation, which made the implementation of this package difficult. As Guam’s strategic importance increased, it was not favorable from the perspective of the U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy to have the Futenma relocation issue become a bottleneck and halt the realignment process. It can be understood that from the viewpoint of U.S. strategic imperatives, under the circumstances it was necessary to prioritize the reinforcement of military capability in Guam by delinking the two issues.

Second, U.S. domestic policy factors affected in no small part the initial packaging of base relocation issues and the eventual delinking. The policy logic behind delinking, in particular, was manifested in debates on budget constraints and Guam’s infrastructure.
From a budgetary standpoint, the U.S. recognized the benefit of Japan’s host nation support to its overseas deployment, as has often been pointed out. In addition, Japan and the U.S. had agreed to discuss sharing cost for the relocation to Guam, and this value was growing in times of austerity. Furthermore, while redistribution of limited resources under budget constraints was an issue, a rebalancing strategy in the Asia-Pacific region was proposed. This brought the issue of military force realignment centered on Guam into the foreground as an important policy matter. In other words, the motive for accelerating the U.S. Marines relocation to Guam was intensified not only by strategic imperatives, but also the necessity of coping with budget constraints.

One of the factors contributing to the heightened motive to prioritize the relocation to Guam by way of delinking was a change in the significance of Guam for the U.S., not only from the perspective of military strategy, but also public policy in local context after the package had been finalized. Infrastructure development in Guam was a much desired requisite in terms of military buildup on one hand, yet, on the other hand, there was a political issue of developing a civilian infrastructure that was associated with measures for military capability enhancement from Guam’s point of view. Such issues were deliberated in the Department of Defense as well as the Congress, and, over time, implementation of the Guam relocation plan took on considerable importance from the standpoint of local infrastructure development as well.

In summary, the process of packaging Futenma Air Station relocation with the U.S. Marines relocation from Okinawa to Guam in the 2000s and its eventual delinking can be understood not only through the balance between strategic imperatives and political viability, but also the mix of U.S. domestic policy factors, including budget constraints and infrastructure development. At the same time, as discussions up to this point have already suggested, it must be pointed out that these independent factors formulate the policy logic for the package and its delinking, by combining with and chaining one another in some areas.
Joint Research B:
Study on Strengthening Self-help, Mutual Help, and Public Help to Enhance Okinawa’s Support Receiving Capabilities
Specially Appointed Professor Itsuki Nakabayashi
(Meiji University Graduate School of Political Science and Economics) et al.

(1) Research Title
Study on Strengthening Self-help, Mutual Help, and Public Help to Enhance Okinawa’s Support Receiving Capabilities

(2) Research Description
The study will identify areas of improvement in terms of self-help, mutual help, and public help among people in Okinawa as well as disaster-related organizations in Okinawa by exploring the issue from the following angles: 1) self-help and mutual help of individuals and communities, 2) public help of prefectural and domestic organizations, and 3) public help through international cooperation.

The aim of the study is to contribute to the enhancement of Okinawa’s support receiving capabilities overall.

(3) Co-Researcher
Itsuki Nakabayashi (Engineering)
Specially appointed professor at Meiji University Graduate School of Political Science and Economics. Ph.D. in architecture from Tokyo Metropolitan University. Formerly a professor of Tokyo Metropolitan University Graduate School and Dean of Urban Science Department.

Introductory chapter

Yuki Sadaike (Literature)
Project assistant professor at the Center for Integrated Disaster Information Research, Interfaculty Initiative in Information Studies, the University of Tokyo. Ph.D. in human systems from Hokkaido University. Formerly an assistant professor at the Institute of Seismology and Volcanology, Hokkaido University.

Chapter 3

Tomoaki Honda (Policy and Media)
Senior visiting researcher at Keio Research Institute at SFC. Ph.D. in policy and media from Keio University. Formerly involved in surveying and consulting of earthquake and tsunami countermeasures in Japan and worldwide as a researcher of the crisis management group at Tokio Marine & Nichido Risk Consulting Co., Ltd.

Chapter 2

Hironobu Nakabayashi (Policy and Media)
Fellow at Regional Security Policy Division, Executive Office of the Governor, Okinawa Prefectural Government. Ph.D. in policy and media from Keiko University. Formerly employed at Japan’s Independence Institute Inc.

Chapter 1
Introduction Chapter

1. Regional Characteristics of Okinawa Prefecture in a Time of Disaster

Japan is an island nation, and Okinawa Prefecture is composed of a group of inhabited islands large and small. Okinawa Island (1,208 km²) is seventh in size behind the four islands on the mainland including Honshu, and the two islands in the northern territories. Okinawa Island and its island chain, Ishigaki Island and the Sakishima island chain around it, and the Daito island chain are interconnected with one another by thirteen airports in the region and numerous sea routes. Nationally, its land area, 2,230 km², is the fourth smallest, its population of 1.4 million is ranked thirtieth, and its population density of 610 per km² is the ninth highest. There is a trend of population concentration shifting toward Okinawa Island, and because of this, many islands are confronted with an issue of an aging and declining population.

Okinawa Prefecture is the most typhoon-prone in Japan and has historically suffered earthquake and tsunami damages as well. Because the prefecture is composed of many islands, each island becomes isolated every year when a typhoon approaches or strikes. Isolation in a time of disaster is unavoidable, but that itself does not become an issue, except in the case of emergency medical response. The level of self-reliance of islanders is high. Historically, houses in Okinawa used to be made of wood, had roofing tiles stabilized with plaster so they would not be blown away by a typhoon, had low eaves, planted a windbreak forest nearby, and came with natural stone walls with just the right spaces designed to reduce the wind impact and allow the wind to travel above the eaves. However, the use of concrete blocks became prevalent after the war because lumber was scarce, concrete had a price advantage over imported lumber, and it was much stronger against typhoons; it became a new standard in construction. For this reason, concerns have been raised about the issue of seismic capacity of these buildings in the city area where buildings are highly concentrated, being more than the issue of fire protection in a time of disaster.

On the other hand, damage from a tsunami could be catastrophic. The Meiwa tsunami (Yaeyama tsunami) in 1771 was such a devastating blow to the Sakishima island chain and its periphery that it became a national crisis for the Ryukyu Kingdom. Efforts were made to build a new village and restore the rice paddies rendered useless by seawater, but the environmental damage caused by the tsunami led to an onset of malaria that nullified such efforts and many villages were left deserted. A great majority of settlements and urban areas of islands are located along the coast, and many of the thirteen airports located on key islands are also along the coast on lowlands, thus rendering it highly vulnerable to flooding in the event of a tsunami. If port accessibility is affected by the disaster at the same time, the isolation of some islands could be prolonged for some time under a condition more severe than it would be under a typhoon. A situation in which the issue of receiving
Joint Research Report: Study on Strengthening Self-help, Mutual Help and Public Help to Enhance Okinawa's Support Receiving Capabilities

Support becomes important for the affected and the disaster-struck area is certainly in times like these—earthquake coupled with a tsunami in close proximity. At the same time, global warming has created mega-typhoons, which in turn has been creating storm surges of substantial damage: one must not forget that this may also create a situation where receiving support would become a critical issue.

2. Relationship Between Support Giving and Receiving Ends in Disaster Response

Disaster measures in Japan are systemized based on the Basic Act on Disaster Control Measures that was enacted through lawmaker-initiated legislation 54 years ago in 1961, to build on the learnings from the damage done by typhoon Vera (typhoon Ise-wan); it happened 16 years after WWII, when local municipalities were beginning to have more autonomy under the Local Autonomy Act. Each prefecture instituted its own “Regional Disaster Management Plan” and each local municipality within a prefecture did the same to build a system of disaster response on the regional and municipal level. Disaster measures in the context of regional autonomy means that it is the first responsibility of towns and villages, or “basic municipalities”, to respond to the needs of the affected residents and the affected area. If the situation is beyond the municipality’s capabilities, the municipality may request support from the respective prefecture, and the prefecture may also request support from the central government if the impact of the disaster extends prefecture-wide and compromises the prefecture’s capabilities. The principle of regional autonomy dictates that a request for support must be placed first in order to receive support. Under this principle, a set of procedures for support request was developed, to be handled by the respective local government, but the Basic Act on Disaster Control Measures did not envision the support receiving side of the equation—specifically, how the support received from the outside would be delivered effectively to those in need.

The Nankai earthquake in 1946 presented enormous difficulties for regional governments in terms of disaster response and the effective delivery of aid. This led to the enactment of the Disaster Relief Act to enable more support from the central government, and the law mandated a framework to provide relief to the affected and give support to the affected prefecture by dispatching a disaster relief team since the self-defense force was not even in existence at the time. However, the law did not consider how to accept the team and receive support effectively.

The affected municipality is often limited in its capacity to deal with a disaster and quite a few have requested outside support. In fact, outside support was provided in many post-war disasters. However, it was not until the Great East Japan Earthquake in particular, which devastated prefectures Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima (nullifying their administrative capabilities) and also affected other regions as far as Hokkaido and the Metropolitan Tokyo area, that support receiving capabilities of the affected municipality was seen as an important issue.

3. Definition of Support Receiving, and the Subject/Principal of Support Giving and Receiving

According to the Kojien (Japanese dictionary), the word “o-en” (general noun of Japanese means “backup”) is defined as: 1) to help, save, or reinforce, and 2) to cheer and provide an emotional uplift. The word “shi-en” (general noun of Japanese means “support”)
The importance of support by disaster relief volunteers was recognized in the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, and since the Chuetsu Earthquake, in addition to the physical support provided to the affected area through private volunteer efforts, people have been realizing the significant role non-affected areas play in the form of cheering and providing encouragement to the reconstruction efforts. Indeed, this is actually driving the on-site reconstruction efforts and uplifting morale of the affected in the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake. In twenty years since the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, the scope of support has expanded beyond the scope set by the disaster-related laws after every disaster.

Today, support comes in the form of people, goods, money, technology, information, and system; in other words, human resources, supplies, funding, skill, aid, and administration. There are those who provide this support, and those who receive this support. To whom and what should be provided? Who is the principal? Who is responsible for delivery of support, and who is on the other end to receive it?

Support providers are civilians, corporations, civilian organizations, experts, and governments in non-affected areas, and support recipients are the affected (civilians and corporations) and the affected area (community and local government). The relationship between these principals (actors) is described in Table 1. The relationship between support providers and the type of support to be provided is described in Table 2. Table 3 shows the relationship between support providers (as per Table 1) and support recipients in terms of support type.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provider</th>
<th>Civilian</th>
<th>Corporation</th>
<th>Civilian Organization</th>
<th>Expert</th>
<th>Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People Affected</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Affected</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>△</td>
<td>△</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>△</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporation Affected</td>
<td>△</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>△</td>
<td>△</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Affected</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affected Community</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>△</td>
<td>△</td>
<td>△</td>
<td>△</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affected Local Government</td>
<td>△</td>
<td>△</td>
<td>△</td>
<td>△</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

○: Primary subject of support by each principal  △: Subject of incidental support
### Table 2: Support Providers and Type of Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principal Support</th>
<th>Civilian (local resident)</th>
<th>Corporation (industrial group)</th>
<th>Civilian Organization (social welfare council, NPO, NGO)</th>
<th>Expert (skill &amp; talent)</th>
<th>Government (municipality, central government)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People (human resource)</td>
<td>○ Volunteer</td>
<td>△ Volunteer</td>
<td>○ Volunteer</td>
<td>○ Disaster medicine care and welfare</td>
<td>○ Disaster-related affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goods (supplies)</td>
<td>△ Relief supply</td>
<td>○ Relief supply &amp; logistical stockpile</td>
<td>△ Relief supply</td>
<td></td>
<td>○ Provision of relief supply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money (funding)</td>
<td>○ Relief money</td>
<td>○ Relief money</td>
<td>○ Relief &amp; support money</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information (aid)</td>
<td>△ Dissemination of information about the area</td>
<td>△ Dissemination of information about the area</td>
<td></td>
<td>△ IT/IC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology (skill)</td>
<td></td>
<td>○ Provision of industrial technology &amp; support</td>
<td></td>
<td>△ Advisor</td>
<td>○ Provision of specialized skill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System (administration)</td>
<td></td>
<td>△ Donation of equipment and materials</td>
<td></td>
<td>△ Advisor</td>
<td>○ Administrative support system</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

○: Primary subject of support by each principal  △: Subject of incidental support
Table 3: Relationship Between Support Providers and Recipients

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>People Affected</th>
<th>Area Affected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civilian (local resident)</td>
<td>○ (volunteer &amp; aid)</td>
<td>△ (volunteer &amp; aid)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporation (industrial group)</td>
<td>△ (relief money &amp; supplies)</td>
<td>○ (technological support &amp; supplies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Organization (social welfare council, NPO, NGO)</td>
<td>○ (relief money &amp; supplies)</td>
<td>△ (activity support &amp; technology)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expert (skill &amp; talent)</td>
<td>○ (medicine, housing, information)</td>
<td>△ (aid &amp; information)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>△ (evacuation support &amp; assistance)</td>
<td>○ (evacuation support &amp; assistance)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

○: Primary subject of support by each principal  △: Subject of incidental support

How do support recipients receive support provided by providers? There are ways to “receive support” effectively. Its definition might be “to request, receive, and distribute support from the outside in the event it becomes difficult for the affected principal to control the disaster on its own, in order to control the situation.” The definition of “support receiving capability” might be “the ability of the affected principal to request support appropriately, receive it swiftly, and distribute it properly in order to effectively control the disaster.” Support receiving capability can be improved by developing human resources, managing information, and building a system that works.


In order to develop one’s support receiving capability to control the disaster and care of the affected and the community, one needs to correctly understand the support needs of the affected and the community, and project/simulate the change in support needs as the disaster develops so that people can request the support required in advance. Development of human resources is the foundation that makes this happen. It is also absolutely necessary to build and enhance a centralized information management system to understand what support is needed and where to match the available support (provider) with the needs (recipient) to enable expeditious, accurate, and fair distribution. Local resources, even when utilized at a maximum capacity, cannot fulfill all the needs in certain

This is why information management for support receiving has to be done, in principle, by the affected municipality that has the extensive knowledge of the affected area. Local public institutions must project a disaster situation on its own and develop a BCP (business continuity plan) that outlines priority operations that require administrative resources in order for the respective institution to continue to operate and serve its role. Institutions have to simulate a difficult situation in which they have no choice but to receive outside support based on a BCP, know which resource will likely be in short supply in that situation, and manage the current information about that resource.

In addition to understanding the support needs in a disaster before it occurs, there is also a need to enhance the system/infrastructure to correctly understand the situation of the affected area to request the required support with accuracy and speed, enable the area to receive that support swiftly, distribute the support properly to those in need, and establish a better framework to effectively respond to a disaster. This function should be established to complement and support the disaster countermeasures office ran by the affected municipality.

5. Importance of Three Layers of Support Receiving in Okinawa Prefecture

The disaster countermeasures office in the affected area is basically structured in two layers: one operated by Okinawa Prefecture and another by the affected municipality in question. It is important that the prefecture’s office is aware of potential need for support providing and receiving between municipalities. Because Okinawa Prefecture is composed of numerous remote islands, it is important for each municipality’s disaster countermeasure office to be aware of the amount of resources the affected community has, the extent of damage done by the disaster, and potential needs for support (type [quality] and scale [quantity]). Without this crucial information regarding support providing and receiving, accurate, fast, and effective support receiving cannot be realized. In order to deliver (and enable the receiving of) support expeditiously, it is ideal to be able to procure such support on the island instead of procuring it from some remote location. Specifically, if we know the remaining resource volume (volume in stock minus volume affected), and also the volume available for support (remaining resource volume minus regional demand), and decide with confidence that the required support can be procured internally, then more resources can be sent to aid the municipalities with a higher degree of damage. If regional demand exceeds remaining resource volume, the island needs to receive support from the outside. The ability for a community/region to cope with a long lead time until it receives support from the outside will ultimately determine its support receiving capabilities.

The understanding of support availability and volume of support required is absolutely necessary to deliver and receive support in a practical manner. A three-layered structure of prefecture, municipality, and community is ideal in this sense.

Given that Okinawa Prefecture is located at the southwestern tip of Japan, and its closest prefectural capital (Kagoshima City) is 600 km away, it is important for Okinawa to
prepare a system of mutual support and support receiving capabilities to save its citizens in the time of a disaster. However, other than mainland Okinawa, every municipality in the prefecture is composed of multiple remote islands, and it is not easy to facilitate inter-municipal mutual support and support receiving activities within the prefecture since they rely on transport by air and sea. Efforts to enhance support providing and receiving capabilities would need to consider this geographic characteristic. To be specific, each municipality needs to have a good understanding of the level of support availability and support need in its respective community, and in ordinary times, develop human resources, upgrade its information management system, and improve the support receiving capabilities overall. Effective support receiving at the municipal level and also the prefectural level requires a three-layered support receiving system with a strong base layer.

6. Significance of Self-help, Mutual Help, and Public Help in Okinawa

Because many of the municipalities in Okinawa Prefecture are islands and do not have a land route connection to one another, they are generally “independent”, but a severe climate condition may force them into “isolation” as well. But this is precisely why they are highly self-reliant, and they are resilient enough that being in isolation does not create an immediate problem. Speedy delivery and receiving of support are not easy given Okinawa Prefecture’s regional characteristics, so in order to be resilient in the face of a disaster and overcome it with timely support, it is of utmost important for each region to enhance its self-help capabilities. Japan’s population is aging and this trend is especially evident on islands: authorities should develop an information network to recognize and control medical and welfare needs in a disaster and build a system that enables expeditious support providing (Okinawa Prefecture) and receiving (municipality); yet, what is important at the root is to further strengthen the self-help initiatives by individuals. It is through this type of initiatives that more individuals manage to escape from or reduce the damage of a disaster, and these individuals will in turn be able to help others in their neighborhood to provide mutual help. Building a support providing system in a community should also be seen as building a support receiving system in that community as well.

It is through the process of building this sort of community support receiving system that one will see and be able to understand support receiving needs (who needs support), support availability (who can provide support), remaining resource volume, and its support availability in that given community. Fast and appropriate support receiving can only be done if one has a clear understanding of the type of support that is required and how much.

Okinawa's support receiving enhancement starts from self-help efforts of individuals and that gives birth to mutual help within the community as a result.

Enhancement of support receiving capabilities in the context of public help offered by Okinawa Prefecture is the following: improve the prefecture’s medicine and welfare system in a disaster situation to better respond to the municipality’s support receiving needs, support self-help and mutual help enhancement initiatives in communities to extend the lead time for support receiving as long as possible, and prepare in advance and build a system for information management and support receiving to request support needs outside of the prefecture, to enable effective support receiving and distribution, and enable swift delivery of support overall.
7. Conclusion: Basic Direction of Support Receiving Capability Enhancement in Okinawa Prefecture

Okinawa Prefecture’s basic direction of support receiving capability enhancement is the following: 1) People and business operators in Okinawa should improve their self-help capabilities and that in turn will improve the mutual help capabilities of the community. A system for support receiving that enables a correct understanding of each community’s support needs, identification of support availability, and optimized distribution of support should be built, 2) Municipalities on islands should centrally manage information and enhance their on-site mutual help capabilities to be resilient and self-reliant in a disaster and build a system to receive medical and welfare needs from the outside, 3) Explore opportunities to partner with other prefectures within Japan, the self-defense force, U.S. forces in Japan, and other countries in Asia in the area of disaster response and control. A large disaster will almost certainly strike Okinawa Prefecture sooner or later, and the prefecture should develop a solid support receiving system with self-reliance and mutual help as the two backbones, so that being in isolation in a disaster will not be an issue.
Study on Okinawa’s Crisis Management Initiatives and Attitude of Okinawans Consideration of Approaches to Improve Capabilities for Receiving Capabilities

Hironobu Nakabayashi
Fellow, Research Section, Regional Security Policy Division, Executive Office of the Governor, Okinawa Prefectural Government

Summary
Okinawa Prefectural Government (OPG) compiled and released the Okinawa 21st Century Vision Plan in 2010, which outlined the Okinawans’ vision for the prefecture by 2030. One of the five key ideals is to be an island that enables a warm-hearted, safe, and secure life. Enhancement of crisis management is considered an indispensable part to make this ideal a reality.

Okinawa is an island prefecture built on tourism, and some part of prefectural border is also the national border. This uniqueness manifests in the area of crisis management as well. OPG has a responsibility to respond to various crises occurring within the prefecture and secure the safety of its citizens and visitors in accordance with the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act and the Civil Protection Law. To fulfill this responsibility, OPG needs to secure self-governing crisis management capabilities since Okinawa is an island prefecture that hasn't be connected with other prefectures by land. This is not limited to capabilities that deal with typhoons and other disasters that occur regularly in Okinawa. For example, in case a big tsunami like OPG is simulating on February 2013 strikes, Okinawa would need to receive various forms of support from within and outside of the prefecture to respond to the crisis. However in order to maximize the effectiveness of support Okinawa would need to have capabilities for receiving support effectively in addition to its own response capabilities to manage a crisis situation.

The purpose of this paper is to identify the characteristics of OPG’s crisis management and the attitude of Okinawans towards it, clarify the prefecture’s current initiatives, and raise issues and challenges. The paper then considers approaches OPG needs to employ to improve its crisis management capabilities from the viewpoint of the support recipient.

According to the comprehensive crisis management survey conducted by OPG in 2011, Okinawa’s characteristics in terms of crisis management are the following seven points: 1) It is located in the middle of the East Asia and Pacific region and is at the tip of Japan, 2) it is an island prefecture that has many remote islands in a vast administrative area, 3) it has a subtropical marine climate with typhoons occurring regularly, 4) as tourism-oriented prefecture, it accepts many domestic and foreign visitors, 5) due to being an island prefecture, its transportation access from the outside is limited, 6) 10% of the prefectural area is taken up by U.S. military bases, and 7) geopolitically, it confronts tense international relations situation.

In response, OPG needs its own crisis management system with considering three
background: 1) Because being an island prefecture makes it hard to receive outside support, Okinawa needs to have measures in place to contain a situation that could potentially spread widely in a short span of time as well as to protect tourists, 2) given its geographical limitations as an island prefecture, Okinawa needs to institute a crisis management policy that leverages the transport and delivery capabilities of U.S. forces and the Japan Self-Defense Forces, and 3) while preparing for a potential contingency with the prefecture bordering other Asian countries, Okinawa needs to maximize its geographical advantages and cooperate with other countries. All these considered, what OPG needs for improving its crisis management is to overcome its vulnerabilities as an island prefecture, as a tourism-oriented prefecture built on tourism, and as a prefecture on national borders, and reflect those special characteristics in its crisis management. In terms of receiving support, Okinawa needs to consider its uniqueness as an island prefecture and “overcome its vulnerabilities” by enhancing its stock of supplies and developing key locations as well as “improve efficiency” through planned development of roads and port access and strengthening command and coordination capabilities.

On the other hand, in the survey conducted by the prefecture regarding Okinawans’ attitude towards disaster and its prevention, it became evident that deference between areas about attitude and awareness of residents. For example, among the crisis management features mentioned in the disaster prevention plan, mainland Okinawans believed that measures focusing on the population concentrated in the lowland along the coast were the most important, while those in remote island areas like the Miyako areas and the Yaeyama areas believed that more needed to be done to solve the issue of remoteness and how the islands are scattered in a vast area. Additionally, respondents in Yaeyama expressed strong concerns about large tsunamis and typhoons, while those in the interior of mainland Okinawa showed more concerns regarding a potential U.S. military aircraft accident: Okinawans in different areas expressed concerns about different crisis events.

This regional gap between areas was relevant to a degree regarding topics on receiving support as well. For example, only 1.2 to 3.1% of mainland Okinawans have ever experienced a complete lack of daily goods, while in remote islands areas have up to 26.9%. As for initiatives that Okinawans are expected to work on in relation to receiving support, the survey result suggested there is more room for improvement. For instance, the percentage of Okinawans who knew the concept of “self-help, mutual help, and public help,” which has become an important concept in recent years, was significantly lower than the national average measured before the Great East Japan Earthquake. In terms of stockpiling supplies, a post-earthquake monitor survey in Tokyo revealed that 78.3% of respondents had critical supplies such as food and water stocked, but in Okinawa, only 20.8% of respondents had any type of disaster prevention measure in place, and only less than 60% of the 20.8% had critical supplies stocked.

An analysis of raw data from the survey about Okinawa residents awareness about
III. Joint Research Report: Study on Strengthening Self-help, Mutual Help and Public Help to Enhance Okinawa’s Support Receiving Capabilities

crisis as above, Survey showed that Okinawans who have supplies stocked tend to have a slightly higher awareness regarding disaster prevention: understanding a disaster prevention map, for example, compared with those without any stock. This shows that in addition to encouraging improvements in specific areas, improving the comprehensive crisis management capabilities—self-help capabilities—of Okinawans is a valid and effective approach.

Keywords: Island features, receiving support, hub building, command and coordination, self-help, mutual help, public help
Resilience and Public Help in Okinawa’s Disaster Prevention Preparing for Emergency Relief in a Large-Scale Disaster and Recovery
Tomoaki Honda
Senior Visiting Researcher, Keio Research Institute at SFC

Summary
Great East Japan Earthquake and Focus on Resilience

In the Great East Japan Earthquake, the areas affected by the tsunami and the nuclear incident faced the collapse of their administrative function. Despite that, disaster victims did not steal or riot, and the way they helped one another to confront the tragic disaster together left a lasting impression on the world, and their disaster resilience garnered enormous attention. Furthermore, those in the Metropolitan Tokyo area who were unable to go home due to the earthquake on March 11 lined up until very late in the evening to use public transport, which experienced a substantial delay, and the way people cooperated in planned outages without a complaint was remembered as the robustness of Japan. People remember the way the affected stood up and did not back down in the face of a large-scale disaster whose impact exceeded beyond our wildest expectations.

The incident gathered attention on the need to not only minimize damage by being aware of our vulnerabilities, but also develop a pliable ability to face, while simultaneously fend off damage, in order to improve our disaster prevention capabilities. In various discussions currently taking place about improving disaster prevention capabilities, the concept of resilience, or the ability for the affected to cooperate in the face of a substantial damage, is being stressed more than ever.

Different people have different definitions of the word resilience, but the definition that best describes the characteristics after the Great East Japan Earthquake, from the viewpoint of public help, is “to encourage citizens to unite and take action voluntarily.” What this means is that in the prevention, emergency, recovery, and mid- to long-term reconstruction phases, respectively, locals who live in the affected area have to act voluntarily, from beginning to end, to rebuild the living environment and foundation. This would require the assister-side to think about measures and initiatives needed in each phase. At the same time, this approach requires them to develop resilience in their everyday lives and strengthen it to enhance preparedness.

Okinawa’s vulnerability to disasters is a topic that has been discussed from many angles, and a lot of recommendations have been made: most of them seem to agree that Okinawa’s unique vulnerability is that it is an isolated island. Naturally, how Okinawa efficiently acquires support from the outside is a topic when discussing how to improve Okinawa’s disaster prevention capabilities, particularly how public help should be positioned. This report argues that the concept of resilience, which is garnering a significant level of attention in recent years, brings a viewpoint that is of benefit,
Resilience Improvement Through Okinawa’s Public Help System

One of the imminent tasks in terms of disaster prevention that was identified by recent disasters such as the Great East Japan Earthquake and Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan) in the Philippines in 2013, whose scale exceeded beyond anybody’s imagination, is the need to secure locations for rescue activities. When roads become inaccessible on islands, airport functionality becomes a key. This functionality is not limited to hardware such as airport enhancement, but also includes the ability to coordinate an enormous volume of supporters and relief supplies and securing the manpower to make that happen: the locations are needed to efficiently deliver support to the affected from the outside. Furthermore, local assistance is indispensable in delivering the fruitions of activities by supporters from the outside, who have little knowledge of the local situation, and where there is also a need to coordinate such activities. This work cannot be handled by municipal employees alone, and local assistance is absolutely necessary. Okinawa Prefecture will also need to encourage voluntary participation by Okinawans to develop measures to deliver outside help to the affected in cooperation with the prefecture, the JSDF, and the U.S. military. In that sense, guidelines on public help to improve the ability to receive help must promote voluntary initiatives by Okinawans, and these initiatives are necessary to build a resilient system.

All things considered, if one is to consider Okinawa’s public help in the context of regional security—a concept that is said to dissolve the dilemma between national security and human security, and connect them—the purpose of this connection is not the connection itself, but rather it is to secure a process to enable Okinawa’s ability to respond to disasters with the connection in mind through various initiatives participated by Okinawans, municipalities, Okinawa Prefecture, the Japanese government, and the U.S. military. In other words, the development and advancement of these initiatives result in a fully connected, resilient disaster prevention system in Okinawa, and Okinawa Prefecture’s public help should be set up to be delivered to enable this process. This collaborative process is the essence of Okinawa’s regional security, which is a concept that links national security and human security.
Summary

1. Background of Study

Okinawa Prefecture is regularly hit by typhoons, and for that reason, there is a “disaster culture” in the prefecture that covers the entire spectrum, from pre-disaster preparation to post-disaster recovery. Houses are built with bricks or reinforced concrete, roofing tiles are stabilized with plaster, and when a typhoon nears, people make sure to clean everything around the house and stay inside unless it is absolutely necessary to go out. They have learned from years of experience dealing with typhoons, and this culture is being passed on from generation to generation.

On the other hand, although the rate of disaster occurrence in Okinawa is not clear, the last disaster that caused tremendous damage in Okinawa is the Meiwa Great Tsunami (Yaeyama Tsunami) in 1771. In addition to various ancient documents and tradition, the remains of disasters such as the tsunami stone on the east coast of Ishigaki Island in Ishigaki City, which was designated as a natural monument in 2012, are still in existence to this day. Because of this, the Meiwa Great Tsunami is a disaster that could easily be taught and passed on to next generations using text records and other tangible material. However, there are many views regarding tsunamis other than the Meiwa Great Tsunami, and it is not entirely clear as to the rate of tsunami occurrence in Okinawa.

This “disaster culture” tends to create in areas regularly struck by disasters, and an illustrative example of an area having a tsunami disaster culture would be the Sanriku coast region. On the other hand, it would be very difficult for areas that seldom experience disasters to create and hand down a disaster culture unless they orient their awareness towards it—like it is being done in the affected areas of the Great Hanshin Earthquake—and make continuous efforts to create and hand down such a culture.

This study focuses on the tsunami disaster culture of Okinawa Prefecture; the rate of tsunami occurrence is not exactly known, but if one strikes, it could potentially have a devastating effect. The study first identifies how past tsunami experiences are accepted and positioned in tsunami affected area, how those experiences are passed down, and then discusses how their disaster culture could be used in the current initiatives in disaster prevention and reduction (particularly education on disaster prevention). As the foothold for the discussion, this paper looks at how the memories of tsunami are handed down in Okinawa.
2. How Tsunami Information is Succeeded in Okinawa

Passing on the memories of tsunami disasters primarily in the following ways: 1) oral tradition, 2) through events associated with past disasters, 3) through tangible material, 4) through exhibitions at museums, etc., and 5) through education on disaster prevention. Studies on passing down tsunami memories in Okinawa are done in diverse areas including history, ethology, anthropology, geology, and seismology. This paper gives an overview of prior studies for 1) oral tradition, 2) passing down through events associated with past disasters, and 3) handing down through ancient documents and disaster remains.

For 1) oral tradition, Akamine (2008) analyzed information on three regions—mainland Okinawa and surrounding islands, Miyako, and Yaeyama—after collecting archival documents on tsunami and “oil rain.” One common element in all three regions in terms of tsunami traditions is the dugong, so-called “the fish that speaks” and how it relates to man. For 2) passing down through events associated with past disasters, Aso has been studying on events associated with past disasters by observing the relationship between ceremonial events and disasters in the era of modern Ryukyus. His 2013 study suggests that the first action the Ryukyu Kingdom took for the 1771 tsunami was the mourning ceremony for Yaeyama, and that it was held in part to ease the psychological pain of the survivors. Also, a 2008 study by Akamine describes the background of Napai, which is a tsunami prevention ritual that is still being held every March of the lunar calendar, primarily in the Uruka and Tomori settlements of formerly Gusukube Town. As for 3) archival documents, studies have been done based on historical documents such as the Report in the impact of the Tsunami and the correspondence about the response of the disaster, which were produced in Yaeyama in 1771 and then submitted to the Ryukyu Kingdom government. For example, Tokuno (2013) points out how settlement relocation efforts after the 1771 tsunami were not successful overall based on the study of archival documents. As for the “Tsunami Stone” remeins, which is an illustrative example of tsunami heritages, there have been studies to uncover its historical trail through oral tradition and other efforts to shed light to its origin by dating the material on the stone surface (mainly coral). Makino (1998), who has studied numerous tsunami stones, stresses the need to preserve the stones, which are gradually decaying or being removed due to land development projects.

3. Conclusion

This paper gave an overview of prior studies on handing down tsunami memories in Okinawa focusing primarily on 1) oral tradition, 2) through events associated with disasters, 3) archival documents, and disaster heritages (tsunami stone remeins). Since there are many initiatives to hand down a disaster culture in Okinawa, there is a need to identify the relationship between tsunami memories efforts and a disaster culture through literature study and on-site study. In the process, the author will attempt to compare Okinawa with other regions (primarily Hokkaido) that have records of oral tradition and tsunami prevention ritual, and clarify the uniqueness of Okinawa’s tsunami culture.
III. Joint Research Report: Study on Strengthening Self-help, Mutual Help and Public Help to Enhance Okinawa’s Support Receiving Capabilities

References


Joint Research C:
Comparative Study on Cross-Border Regional Cooperation
Professor Kumiko Haba (International Politics, Economics and Communication, Aoyama Gakuin University) et al.

(1) Research Title
Comparative Study on Cross-Border Regional Cooperation

(2) Research Description
Many of the issues associated with untraditional security, such as disaster and infection, are an enormous impediment to the development of the region; they are issues that many hope will be solved through increased awareness and cooperative efforts. In this context, a comparative study on regional cooperation in the area of untraditional security was done between Europe and cross-border regions in Southeast Asia. These studies will identify the role Okinawa Prefecture should play to bring stability to the region.

(3) Co-Researcher
Kumiko Haba (International Politics and Economics)
Professor of graduate school of international politics, economics and communication at Aoyama Gakuin University. Master's and Ph.D. in international affairs from Tsuda College. Group 1 Member of the Science Council of Japan. Formerly an instructor, assistant professor, and professor at Hosei University.

Introductory chapter
Junichi Shibuya
Instructor at Faculty of Social Science, Hosei University. Researcher at the Ohara Institute for Social Research. Ph.D. coursework completed with a degree at Hosei University (social science). Formerly a special researcher (municipal policy for foreign residents) employed by Kawasaki City. Field of specialty: regionalism/regional integration in Asia and immigration.

Chapter 1
Hironobu Nakabayashi (International Affairs)
Fellow at Regional Security Policy Division, Executive Office of the Governor, Okinawa Prefectural Government. Ph.D. in policy and media from Keiko University. Formerly employed at Japan’s Independence Institute Inc.

Chapter 2
Introducory Chapter
1. International Environment Surrounding Okinawa

A historic power shift is developing in our modern society. The power that Europe and the U.S. have is shifting in the direction of Asia. In the process of this shift, what was thought of as modern by developed countries is being shaken in many ways, and a new international order is about to emerge in the 21st century.

One of the representative researchers who first advocated this concept of power shift, Alvin Toffler, explained power in three elements: Military power, economic power, and intellectual power. Intellectual power in this context is almost equivalent to scientific and technological capabilities.

The root of this territorial insecurity is uncertainty caused by the shaken state of developed countries' modernity, against the backdrop of the power shift. Developed countries are beginning to plateau, and emerging countries are growing faster. China in particular has been leveraging its incredible economic resources to upgrade its military and invest overseas. The U.S.-led expansion of capitalism is called the Washington Consensus, but more recently the phrase Beijing Consensus is being used to mean China-led economic policy. Indeed, China has been actively investing and providing financing in Asia, Africa, and more recently Ukraine.

Emerging countries of the global era are challenging developed countries, and the one being challenged is psychologically shaken, which is causing a political tension. Joseph S. Nye commented on this issue at a seminar: “Do not fear. Fear creates tension, and that adversely affects security. We should not fear, but see it as an opportunity.” Indeed, the U.S. seems to be viewing Asia’s growth as an opportunity and trying to benefit from it by having a closer relationship with Asia and China.

Globalization is not a phenomenon that applies to modern day, but what makes the 21st century globalization stand out is its competitiveness. The EU announced in 2000 through the Lisbon Strategy that it would enhance its competitiveness and education. Competitiveness has always been an important factor since Europe and the U.S. modernized, but today what constitutes competitiveness has changed. Competitiveness used to be constituted by a strong military, an economy, and technological capabilities, but competitiveness in today’s world is constituted by the following three elements: low labor cost, low price products, and a giant market. Profits are driven by cheap labor cost and products, in addition to an expanding market. A giant market naturally means a huge population, and in the 20th century, low labor cost, low price products, and a huge
population were together seen as a symbol of poverty. However, Toffler’s intellectual power drove scientific and technological developments and turned these three elements from a symbol of poverty into competitiveness.

In that sense, in today’s globalization where competitiveness is of the utmost importance, it is safe to say that we live in a time of intelligence. What is required of us in such a time is to promote the development of technological capability, regional cooperation, and FTAs, and distance ourselves from military confrontation or instability of any form. The U.S. is well aware of this, and that is why they are employing a kind of duplicity (double standard) by maintaining its economic ties with China while also maintaining military ties with its friendly nations. President Obama’s biggest pledge for the second term is two million new jobs and doubling exports, and he knows that economic cooperation with China, not military cooperation, will make this a reality.

2. Growth of Emerging Countries and Japan’s Challenges

In fact, China’s economy is still growing massively. In 2010, China’s GDP was 5.8 trillion dollars compared with Japan’s 5.4 trillion dollars. China did pass Japan, but the gap between the two was not large at the time. However, while Japan’s GDP for 2013 (announced in June 2014) dropped a trillion dollars from the 2012 figure of 5.9 trillion dollars to 4.9 trillion dollars, China recorded an astounding 9 trillion dollars, up about 1.5 trillion dollars from 2012. What was once a marginal GDP gap between Japan and China is no longer: China’s GDP in 2013 grew to more than half of that of the U.S. (about 17 trillion dollars), and the gap between Japan and China is becoming larger by the day.

The growth of emerging countries, including China, after the fall of the Lehman Brothers is simply remarkable. While countries like the U.S., Japan, and the United Kingdom posted negative growth numbers from 2008 to 2009, China and India maintained a 7% growth in the same period. They continued to grow, and in 2010, China and India grew by 10% and 8% respectively, while the EU and the U.S. only managed a 3% growth. A change in social class that comes with growth is also important. In a decade, the middle class in Asia grew from 100 million to a billion in 2010. Also in China, about a quarter of a household’s income, or about half of its GDP is said to be savings, which is being invested. As a result of this growth, which is partly driven by the expansion of the middle class, the regional cooperation within Asia from an economic standpoint will have more impact compared with the EU or the U.S. in 2015. This essentially means that Asia will not only be a market for production, but is on course to become a market for consumption on a global scale.

As for Japan, it is confrontational with just about all of the neighboring countries over the Senkaku Islands, Takeshima/Dokdo, and the Northern Territories, and the issue is how to solve this situation. It would be very difficult for Japan to make an economic comeback by leveraging the growth in Asia unless this situation is solved.

What is important here is regional stability and cooperation, and by mutual cooperation, ASEAN countries, with Japan, China, and South Korea in the mix, will have an economic power equal to that of the U.S. One study revealed that Asia’s intraregional
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trade now exceeds 60% and is closing in on the EU’s 65%. This shows that economic cooperation in Asia has already developed to the EU level.

If a confrontation is inevitable between the two governments—Beijing and Tokyo—perhaps a region should become the center. If such a case, Okinawa’s role as a hub would be extremely important. If a regional economic zone could be developed somewhere close to Taiwan, South Korea, and the Korean Peninsula, Asia should drive such an effort with confidence that it could potentially become the best in the world. As stated earlier, the middle class in Asia exceeds a billion now, and about 10% of that is said to join the affluent population in the future. That means there will come a time where 100 million people, almost equal to Japan’s entire population, will join the wealthy class in Asia and buy everything they want in the world. Perhaps Japan should build cooperative relationships with neighboring countries with this middle class of a billion people as the foundation.

3. Regional Cooperation in East Asia and the Potential of Japan and Okinawa

As stated, regional cooperation in Asia is developing, but not in a way Europe did before it. Regional integration in Europe is quite simple. One example is NATO: the EU solidifies its economic cooperation within this framework, while in the area of security, the U.S. and Canada also take part. On the other hand, it is said that there is no regional cooperation in Asia equivalent to NATO but it does have thirteen organizations including ASEAN. The U.S. participates in six of those organizations (APEC, ARF, Six-Party Talks, ASEAN+10, ASEAN+8, EAS) and most of them were established in the 21st century. The EU and Russia are also active participants in Asia’s regional cooperation. Russia claims itself to be a part of EuroAsia, and the U.S. believes that having ties with Asia will bring benefits as it continues to get closer to Asia very fast through initiatives like a rebalancing policy.

Another difference between Europe and Asia regarding regional cooperation is that Europe has established institutions by field for internal purposes. Everything including the Eurozone, the Schengen Area (enabling cross-border travel without a passport), and economic zones is inside the EU. In contrast, Asia’s regional cooperation goes beyond Asia to include the U.S., the EU, and Russia.

The author believes this is the 21st century model of regional cooperation. The U.S., Latin America, and the EU are trying to grow economically by establishing ties with the outside world. Every country and region will prioritize its ties with Asia from here on forward. In this context, development of Asia-model regional cooperation is a subject worth further research.

I believe that it is extremely important to build and maintain pluralistic regional cooperation, to be specific. That is because in order to keep Asia stable and bring prosperity to it, what is important is economic integration, not political integration.

The challenge, however, is that there are only three organizations (ASEAN, ASEAN+3, and SAARC) that are Asia-proper among the thirteen organizations. Since almost all of them are practically being led by the U.S., Europe, and Russia, perhaps there is a need to strengthen an Asia-proper cooperative mechanism. In 2015, ASEAN+10 will begin to
impact political cooperation of ASEAN. The relationship between Japan, China, and South Korea is quite likely the worst in Asia, but it should be recognized that improving and stabilizing this relationship would pave the way to the formation of an economic zone U.S. approaches.

Today, it is no longer about the choice between the Japan-U.S. alliance or Asia. Since the U.S. is attempting to resurrect its economy by strengthening its ties with Asia, there is no reason for the U.S. to object if Japan employed a similar policy. The U.S. shows a duality and treats economy and security separately, and the same can be seen between China and South Korea, as well as China and Taiwan. Given the situation, Japan should act similarly. Japan and Okinawa have the opportunity to build a bridge between the East and the West.

Instead of engaging in a confrontation with China, Japan should cooperate more with China and South Korea economically, and Okinawa should resurrect its regional economy and leverage its “soft” power like culture, arts and entertainment; development of a cooperative relationship is what the U.S. and Europe want in a framework of regional cooperation. In the age of power shift, it is important to co-exist and mutually prosper, not confront one another.

4. Role of Japan and the Significance of Study

What would be the role of Japan in such a framework? One answer is to strengthen the third power (intellectual power), and enhance the capabilities of think tanks and the “soft” power. There are thousands of think tanks in Europe and the U.S., and universities, regional communities, government officials, and the media all take part in discussing what the country needs to develop further. People in Asia are studious and intelligent, but there are no think tanks operated in collaboration. Perhaps there is a need to collaborate and think with China, Taiwan, and others for the development of Japan and the region. Citizens may take an initiative to build an Asian think tank network.

In addition to economic cooperation, it is also important to cooperate with China and other countries and regions in untraditional security areas like food safety, disaster measures, and infection control, by utilizing Japan’s technological capabilities. This needs to be done as soon as possible because with China’s astounding growth rate, once China passes Japan in military power, economic power, and scientific and technological capabilities, China would no longer need Japan. This is why it is extremely important for Japan to propose what it can do now.

When we think about the power shift in our global society and the potential of regional cooperation in Asia that comes with it, our joint research (comparative study on cross-border regional cooperation) provides great insights into how Okinawa and Japan should act.

This joint research produced two papers. Shibuya’s paper on regional cooperation in Southeast Asia discusses various issues in the border region between Laos and Thailand, with the Mekong River lying in between, in the context of regional economic development and building of regional cooperation. The paper also describes how the relationship between the rich Laos and the poor Laos is gradually changing as Laos emerges as an
industrial nation, and with this change, more people are starting to move within Laos instead of the one-directional movement from Laos to Thailand seen in the past. A dramatic regional development like this is proof of the power shift and the dynamism in Asia. Shibuya's paper also discusses various challenges the dynamism has created. Human trafficking and other issues relating to immigrant workers are issues that have to be shared and solved with all regions concerned, and more profound studies need to be done to better understand them.

Another paper by Nakabayashi describes the EU's system for development and the specifics of its policies in the areas of civil protection to safeguard citizens' lives and assets in the face of a large disaster. As stated earlier in this very paper, regional cooperation dedicated to a certain function is what Europe does best. At the same time, the topic of Nakabayashi's paper deals with preceding cases in Europe in the area of untraditional security, which is an area where more deeper cooperation is desired in Asia: it provides many insights into how regional cooperation should be shaped in Asia.

The two papers are common in that both mention the plurality of regional cooperation. Shibuya's paper discusses not only economic cooperation between the governments of Thailand and Laos, but also in the Mekong River region between the borders and the attributes of people that travel between the two countries, and also touches on various actors of ASEAN. Nakabayashi's paper also points to the fact that in addition to the EU's civil protection function, local municipalities, volunteer organizations, and various other actors have developed and improved their own civil protection capabilities to form another solid pillar.

Additionally, both papers also mention the similarity between the environment surrounding Okinawa and that of their respective region. At a glance, Okinawa, Southeast Asia, and Europe seem so far apart in scale and situation, but if we narrow our focus and observe through an expert's filter, many similarities can be seen. These similarities give Okinawa the insights required to develop within East Asia and establish its own unique position and role.

In conclusion, I would sincerely hope that this study would create an opportunity to further the research on Okinawa Prefecture's regional cooperation.
Summary

Unlike the European cases that are often used for comparison, regional integration in Asia has to be understood as a whole concerning a wide variety of layered frameworks. This could be a coordinated initiative involving a number of nations, or it could take shape as a sum of memorandums of understanding between two nations. The Asian regional integration was formed this way, but the reality is that compared to political cooperation between governments and regional development such as creating an economic zone, it is difficult to say that enough attention is being paid to the social side of the issue, such as how a cross-border regional society is created as a result of such regional integration. In the past, regional integration in Asia was about promoting nation-state integration like ASEAN during the Cold War and was characterized by a tendency to avoid the emergence of a cross-border regional society. However, through globalization and currency crises after 1990, it has come to be understood as a region with a certain degree of societal integration regardless of whether it has an established system or not—so called “de-facto regionalization.”

This paper studies such regional integration in Asia, including underdeveloped countries like CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam), particularly the Mekong region case that has many border regions, and considers how a cross-border space—regional society—is created by integration, and what type of change occurred, by observing how people move.

A particular consideration will be placed on the border region between Thailand and Lao PDR. Since the 1990s, four international bridges, connecting the two countries‘ borders, have been built through various international and regional cooperation. Three road networks, known as economic corridor, have been built to connect cities and towns that were otherwise vulnerable, enabling movement of people and goods. Interest in the economy of the Mekong region is extremely high now, and in fact, there are affluent people who have achieved business success in the border region. However, increasing concerns have been raised about undocumented migrant workers, human trafficking, and cross-border crimes behind the scenes.

This paper first gives an overview of the economic cooperation in the Greater Mekong Sub region, which is a regional cooperation framework that forms the critical component of
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such regional development. Then, considers a variety of movement of people in the border region in terms of business, migrant workers, tourism, and human trafficking. The primary interest is to understand what this movement of people represents and its social and economic impact on the regional society. Another interest is what type of governmental negotiation, government system, and municipal initiatives are in place to enable this kind of movement. Consideration will be made about what knowledge we can gain from these elements and the impact the Asian regional integration has on regional societies and border regions.
Summary

As evident in the Great East Japan Earthquake, disasters and crisis situations today tend to be larger in scale and more devastating. According to the United Nations Secretariat for International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), the total amount of damage caused by disasters in 2000 was $46 billion, but in 2011, it exceeded $363 billion\(^1\).

This increase in scale and the level of devastation has had a broader impact than ever before, and regional cooperation for crisis management is becoming very important as a result. Today, cooperation is not limited among domestic municipalities and those between a municipality and the central government or among neighboring countries; its scope has expanded to include inter-border cooperation among municipalities and also between a municipality and the government of another country—in short, cooperation today is very diverse and complex with various players from different levels participating. This type of regional cooperation developed into regional integration in Europe, eventually giving birth to the European Union (EU).

This paper has two purposes. The first purpose is to describe the organization of the EU's crisis management initiatives and how they were developed. This will identify prior cases of regional cooperation in the area of crisis management.

The second purpose is to consider a specific vision for crisis management that Okinawa should or could adopt based on the EU’s cases.

For the first purpose, the EU's crisis management initiatives can be summed up as the following. The EU uses the policy term “civil protection” to mean crisis management and institutes various measures to protect its citizens. The EU and its member states believe civil protection is a system “...for preventing and protecting against natural or man-made disasters” (Article 196 of the Lisbon Treaty). It is defined within the EU framework that primary responsibility and authority in terms of civil protection rest with each member state, and the EU’s civil protection (hereinafter “EUCP”) was established in the late 1980s to complement the civil protection efforts of the member states.

However, the EU in the new millennium is pursuing its own response capabilities in addition to its complementary role. After the 2004 Sumatra Earthquake, the EU adopted a civil protection module system that required member states to have sufficient personnel for initial response and stockpile supplies in the case of a large scale disaster. Today, this

\(^1\) UNISDR. The Economic and Human Impact of Disasters in the Last 12 Years, 2012.01.10.
initiative is taken one step further as the EU is developing its own civil protection assets.

Crisis management capabilities in multiple levels within the region are being developed to be more robust as the aforementioned initiative is being complemented by an aid program for municipalities and other organizations specialized in the implementation and/or research of crisis management measures. This also includes international cooperation among municipalities based on the concept of cross border cooperation (CBC).

With amendments to the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act in June 2012, prefectures are, in addition to their existing role: coordinating among organizations and agencies, expected to take over disaster prevention work of local municipalities on a need-basis. In response, the second purpose of this paper is to consider the significance of Okinawa Prefectural Government (OPG) adopting the initiatives of the EU, which is a “regional” international organization, but this requires some explanation.

The EU and OPG have different roots, course of development, and scale, but in the context of the EUCP as stated earlier, the role in crisis management the EU is currently seeking matches the role OPG is expected to play after the amendments to the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act. That is to say, both the EU and Okinawa Prefecture 1) cover a diverse and relatively vast region, 2) have a primary mission of cooperation and liaising among various entities, and 3) need to implement initial response measures on behalf of the entity originally responsible for them on a need-basis.

In addition to these perspectives, the EUCP implements various initiatives, through training and aid programs, to facilitate and optimize international cooperation and collaboration. Okinawa, through disaster prevention training and related opportunities, can engage in mutual learning with other Asian regions and share crisis management concepts and approaches as well as safety culture. At the same time, it should explore international cooperation opportunities on the municipal level as well as a local agency level (e.g. fire department) in order to contribute to the improvement of the crisis management capabilities of East Asia as a whole. These efforts should make OPG’s response more effective in the face of a large disaster.

Keywords: EU civil protection, civil protection mechanism, cross border regional cooperation, crisis management
IV. Research Report

Find out more about the research findings as the following website:
http://okinawa-institute.com/en
IV. Research Report: Special Seminar

Disaster Restoration and Community Building: Executing Disaster Restoration and Preparing for Restoration
Itsuki Nakabayashi
Specially Appointed Professor,
Meiji University Graduate School of Political Science and Economics

Specially Appointed Professor Itsuki Nakabayashi of Meiji University Graduate School, who specializes in urban disaster prevention and disaster restoration was invited to speak at a seminar in the Okinawa prefectural building on October 7, 2014, which was attended by a group of 30 prefectural officials from various departments. The summary of the event is as follows:

A big fire in Sakata Town in Yamagata Prefecture in 1976 ravaged the beautiful townscape in one night, and the sheer shock of that event was the beginning of my work in the area of disaster prevention and mitigation. The term “Preparing for reconstruction” in the subtitle means preparing for reconstruction before a disaster strikes, in addition to the disaster prevention and mitigation efforts. In the past, people thought they could only begin to consider disaster reconstruction after the fact: now the importance of preparing for reconstruction with the aid of damage simulations, in addition to various disaster prevention and mitigation measures, is evident.

Three earthquakes above level 7.0 on the Japanese scale have struck the Honshu region in the past 20 years. The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake was a typical earthquake occurring directly below a city, and it resulted in the biggest urban reconstruction efforts since the World War II. Nine years later, the Niigata-ken-Chuetsu Earthquakes hit the villages inhabited by many elder citizens. The disaster was a huge stress for them: the number of earthquake-related deaths was nearly four times larger than the number of deaths occurring as a direct result of the disaster. The 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake took almost 18,700 lives due to the tsunami, and almost three thousand are still said to be missing to this day. Since and including the Hanshin Earthquake, disaster-related deaths have been officially recorded in the three aforementioned earthquakes, and a great majority of deaths are of the elderly.

Various types of damages are being envisioned, whether it is the Nankai Earthquake (an earthquake produced by strain on the earth’s crust along the Nankai Trough or Tokyo Inland Earthquake, but nobody can anticipate where the next disaster will occur. That is why Japan, as a country, has to build strong communities with sound earthquakes and/or typhoon measures. Three initiatives are important: efforts to prevent disasters in the first place (disaster prevention), minimize the damage once a disaster strikes (disaster mitigation), and pre-disaster arrangements to expedite the reconstruction process (reconstruction preparation). A community has to have these three initiatives to be disaster-resilient.
Community building has to be executed with region-specific issues and initiatives as the foundation, and in this sense, it varies from community to community, but there is a common element in building a safe community with sound disaster prevention measures. As a reference, a table that summarizes the initiatives being taken nationwide in terms of disaster prevention and mitigation, as well as reconstruction preparation, is provided. The columns represent five categories including communities from family to neighborhood association, and also municipality. The rows represent 250 items in two categories that are required to build a disaster-resilient community: improvement of physical disaster prevention capabilities and enhancement of human disaster prevention capabilities.

What is important in disaster prevention practice is training people and facilitating opportunities.

Even if a system is created to give out subsidies or grants, it will not be successful without motivated people. That is why it is critical to facilitate opportunities, or specifically, events for them to think about disasters as a community issue, to get them motivated.

Currently, apart from disaster prevention training, a new initiative is being undertaken in Tokyo to consider ways to build a new community through reconstruction, and this is called reconstruction training. This will spawn various ideas and concepts, which could be used to tackle issues that the traditional approach (discussions based on the traditional model of disaster prevention and community building, and the need thereof) could not make a breakthrough on.

Tokyo is preparing an urban development vision and plan for the next 20 years based on damage simulation, and this plan includes a reconstruction process that will be made available to the people of Tokyo. However, officials of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG) are reassigned every three years, and preparatory work tends to get forgotten in that process. Reconstruction training was started to solve this problem, and all reassigenees are required to take this training, especially the urban development unit. Since 1998, seventeen urban reconstruction training sessions have been held for TMG officials. Over 1000 officials have participated, and many of them have gone on to participate in reconstruction training with people in various communities as an extension of their disaster readiness enhancement initiatives. These grassroots initiatives are manifesting into reconstruction manuals for wards and cities, and even ordinances in some cases—a new phase in disaster prevention efforts.

On the other hand, the National Resilience Act (Basic Act for National Resilience Contributing to Preventing and Mitigating Disasters for Developing Resilience in the Lives of the Citizenry) was passed by the Abe administration, and their national resilience basic plan was released last year. Also, a resilience basic plan for prefectures and municipalities is being developed as a model study. This law is such as an umbrella of all related plans, and a higher-level resilience plan is going to be prepared in the next 5-6 years in each region that supersedes the regional disaster prevention plan and long-term comprehensive plan. This is going to be the starting point in the government’s efforts to strengthen communities nationwide.
In a way, this resilience plan is a preparation for reconstruction itself. There are many things to keep in mind regarding reconstruction preparation, but in disaster reconstruction, it is important to accelerate “trends.” In a community that is well prepared for reconstruction, a disaster will only help to accelerate reconstruction and even create new development opportunities. On the other hand, many communities in Japan are struggling with a declining population, and a disaster in these areas would only accelerate the aging of the population. How can this trend be accelerated in a positive manner, and how can we leverage this situation? That is going to be the key to our resilience building and preparation for reconstruction. If we plan ahead to vigorously build communities that can excel even with a declining population, we should see these communities be vigorous through the reconstruction process even after a disaster. It is also important to consider how to secure safety, ensure recovery of the affected, maintain the communal society, history, and culture, and create a positive trend. Reconstruction training is about dispelling the curse that is the reality, and we have to think about what is required after we free ourselves of the curse.

Having strong initiatives in terms of disaster prevention, rehabilitation, and reconstruction to enhance readiness would expedite the reconstruction process and significantly reduce indirect damage as well. It would also leave the community enough strength to get back on its feet. “Envision” the ideal reconstruction process beforehand and “create” the steps to make it happen. It is important to refine these two creative abilities to better anticipate and be prepared for a disaster.

(Q&A Session after Presentation)

An official affiliated with the Hospital Affairs Division asked what some things to keep in mind are when considering construction of a new medical facility. The speaker pointed out the importance of securing lifelines, such as electricity and water, air transport (e.g. helicopter), and having a solid business continuity plan.

An official affiliated with the Executive Office of the Governor asked if it would be possible for tourists to participate in reconstruction preparation as well. The speaker said that tourists would need to be able to help themselves in principle, but those concerned need to consider what hotels and their affiliates can do in terms of mutual support to ensure business continuity, and what the government can and cannot do.
The speaker first expressed her intention to explain the historic turning point in the global environment using the concept of power shift and considered the roles Japan and Okinawa could play in it.

The power shift in the early 21st century (the transition of power), from the West to Asia, has had seven turning points. First is 9.11, which was when terrorism and security issues barged into our civil society, and it led to the war in Iraq. No. 2 and 3 are the fall of the Lehman Brothers and the Euro Crisis (European debt crisis), respectively, which exposed the vulnerability of developed countries on a global scale. No. 4 is the Great East Japan Earthquake. The fact that a country with advanced technologies like Japan could not overcome nature raised doubts about the meaning of modernization itself. No. 5 is the sustained economic development of Asia, including China and India, even as developed countries struggled in the financial crisis. No. 6 is the global expansion of economic free trade agreements beyond traditional ideological confrontation, such as the one between China and Taiwan. No. 7 is the heightening tension in Asia due to territorial disputes and the rise of nationalism. Through this process of a power shift, a new international order is beginning to take shape.

According to Alvin Toffler, the power in a power shift has military, economic, and intellectual aspects, and these aspects drive modernization: the intellectual aspect is considered the most important in the 21st century.

Like Japan, which has territorial uncertainties over the Northern Territories and the Senkaku Islands, East Asia is becoming more unstable as well. Europe fought for two thousand years over territorial claims, but there has not been any war since World War Second, and their effort was rewarded with a Nobel Prize. Even bitter rivals Germany and France stopped fighting, and the biggest reason for that is the freeze on territories and borders. Since the two countries agreed to co-manage the resources, there has not been a
single war in 70 years. Taking a lesson from this, Xi Jinping visited President Putin and declared his intention not to engage in a conflict within 6,000 km from the Russian border. As a strategy, tabling is the best security strategy that does not require use of military power.

Currently, the relationship among Japan, China, South Korea, and Russia is very tense. Nationalism in each country is heightening, and one misstep could very well trigger a civil fervor that cannot be contained by the government, although not as much as the assassination in Serbia that eventually triggered the First World War. We have to think about how to preempt such chaos before it manifests itself.

As emerging countries gain more grounds on developed countries in the power shift, the hunted becomes psychologically unstable, and a political tension mounts. However, instead of strengthening their adversarial relationship against what they fear, the U.S. sees this as an opportunity. In fact, President Obama has stepped closer to Asia and closed the gap with China and is benefiting from it.

In the 20th century, cheap labor, cheap products, and massive population were symbols of poverty, but BRICs turned these into a competitive edge by leveraging their intellectual power. What is most symbolic, are the 100 yen stores: Japan, not being able to accept immigrants, is losing its global competitiveness. This is driving the expansion of black companies (companies in violation of labor laws) and the working poor. Japan has a population of 100 million today, but it is expected to decline from now on.

In the era of knowledge and intellect, we are expected to promote technical skills, regional cooperation, and FTAs. Adding Japan, China, and South Korea to ASEAN countries would create a GDP very similar to that of the U.S. Europe and the U.S. used to account for about 70% of the world’s GDP, but adding ASEAN countries plus Japan, China, and South Korea would create an almost equilateral GDP triangle, and the significance of regional economic cooperation is enormously increasing. The middle class in Asia increased from 100 million to 880 million in the past decade, and in 2015, through further regional economic cooperation that extends beyond the traditional framework presented by Europe and the U.S., Asia is expected to be a global consumer market.

Given this situation, it is not the time for Tokyo and Beijing to be engaged in a confrontation. Pride always gets in the way and creates a conflict when discussions are held between governments. Instead, regions should play a central role, and in this sense, Okinawa’s role as a hub is extremely important. Promoting not political integration but economic integration will bring stability to Asia and help its development to prosper further. Asia should develop and enhance proper cooperative structure and Japan and Okinawa should become a bridge between Asia and the U.S.

Lastly, I would like to propose a case study regarding settlement. France and
Germany suffered 30 million casualties in the World War Second. After the war, the two countries started 1 million French and German youth homestay exchange project. The project sent youths to the country of their adversaries immediately after the devastating war that took the lives of their fathers and mothers. Through the homestay project, the youths saw and understood that fathers and mothers they stayed with were just like them, sincere and good-natured, and in many cases, they bonded like a family. Today, it is estimated that about 8 million people have two sets of parents through this program, which is helping to drive the current cooperative relationship between France and Germany. Perhaps Asia could learn a lot from this episode.

Some say that the development and prosperity of Asia will save the world should it fall on its knees. I sincerely hope that Okinawa will play a central role to make that happen.

(Q&A Session after Presentation)

An official in the Social Welfare and Public Health Department asked what kind of effort is needed to solve the territorial dispute between Japan and China. Professor Haba said it is important that Japan first needs to identify what China really wants, and considering China's growth speed, suggested doing what it can do as soon as possible. Further, she said that Japan has to engage in various forms and levels of economic cooperation and also assume a proactive role in untraditional security fields, like food safety, disaster countermeasures, and epidemics, by leveraging its advanced technological capabilities.
The purpose of this paper is to raise issues, from the viewpoint of counter-terrorism measures, needed to be solved as we progress toward the 2020 Tokyo Olympics in six years.

Many of us know that the 1972 Munich Summer Olympics became the target of a terrorist attack, otherwise known as the Black September Incident, when the Palestinian radical group raided a number of members of the Israeli team at the Games. Japan is not unrelated to this sort of threat. It has been reported that, according to a testimony by a top Al-Qaeda official captured by the U.S., Al-Qaeda once considered an attack on the FIFA World Cup Korea-Japan in 2002.

Methods, targets, and perpetrators of Terrorist activities have wide varieties. Because of this, there are various types of terrorism, and discussions and studies about terrorism can be done with several approaches. This paper started from the approach of quantitative analysis to consolidate the trends of modern terrorism with the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) in the U.S. According to the records stored on the GTD, the ‘unknown’ cases (cases which perpetrators of terrorism are unknown) accounted for 108 out of the total of 643 in 1970, or about 16.8%, but cases falling under this category exceeded 50% for seven years in a row from 2004. In 2007, 2,112 cases out of 3,236 cases in total were in this category, or about 65.3%, and the quantitative analysis suggests that it is becoming increasingly difficult to read into the background of modern terrorism.

In East Asia, major target of terrorism until the early 1990s was Japan, but since then, the trend has shifted toward China (see graph). As an overall trend, the number of terrorism cases has been in decline after it hit a peak in the 1990s, but an increase was observed in China a year before and after the Beijing Olympics in 2008. Japan needs to pay close attention to this fact as it prepares for the Tokyo Olympics in 2020.
The uncertainty of the organizational background of terrorist attacks that is seen in quantitative data can be understood through the concept of “networks and radicalization,” which is a qualitative characteristic of modern terrorism. After 9.11, the relationship between terrorism and networks in the context of “terrorist using communication networks” and “networking among terrorist organizations” has been pointed out frequently. In recent years, members of these network-enabled organizations have formed weak ties, and through mass messaging on the internet, it is considered that contact points between the general public and terrorist organizations have been increasing. Furthermore, through the information and communication network, it is relatively easy for the perpetrators of terrorist attacks to acquire tools and materials to produce weapons, information necessary to produce those weapons, and intelligence required to select a target. As a result, in some cases we are seeing individuals that are deprived of an organizational background (lone wolves) be influenced by a specific philosophy or message that make them resort to a radical activities of terrorism. This is known as the “radicalization of the individual”, and it is a widespread social phenomenon among the youth that goes beyond terrorism.

It would seem that those in Japan do not see a potential terrorist attack as a realistic threat, but that is merely because it has not surfaced in a way the society could recognize as an act of terrorism. In fact, there have been cases in Japan that could be considered as “radicalization of the individual”. The Akihabara massacre incident in June 2008 and its copycat crime, the serial assault incident at a Mazda plant in June 2010, are two typical cases. This paper considers the background of how an individual is radicalized, based on
insights gained from the defendant's statements in the "Kuroko no Basuke" intimidation case. This is a case in which the author of Kuroko no Basuke (manga) and his affiliates were sent a series of threats from October 2012 to December 2013. The suspect was arrested in Tokyo on December 15, 2013, and the defendant confessed to the crime at the first trial hearing and presented a statement detailing the circumstances leading up to the crime and his motives. The statement described how the defendant had a major inferiority complex as he envied those who achieved success and how much self-affirmation he gained through his criminal act—"I never braced myself and passionately in my entire life," he said. "If one has nothing to lose, including relationships and social status, there is no psychological resistance to committing a crime", and this is a state of invincibility, or the "Invincible Man," that enables people to commit such a crime: it is a dangerous state that spawns radicalized individuals in Japan (Japanese lone wolves).

The best way to prevent crimes by the "Invincible Man" is to take measures to prevent people from becoming one in the first place. Countries are focusing on the preventive approach as an important element in counter-terrorism (prevention of citizen’s radicalization and turning terrorism) from this viewpoint.

Japan did recognize the importance of the preventive approach in its “Action Plan for the Realization of Society Resistant Crime” in 2008, but this concept was not seen in the “Strategy for realizing Safest Japan” that was released in 2013. Despite the environment, Japanese society needs to be more self-aware and employ a preventive approach.

Because Japan is less familiar with terrorism, it tends to think that counter-terrorism is a special policy. Indeed, there are many unique initiatives in counter-terrorism, but at the same time, our daily efforts to build a safe and robust society occupy a large role in counter-terrorism. As the importance of the preventive approach increases, this trend is only expected to be reinforced further.

The Tokyo Olympics 2020 should not be a transient event but should be seen as an opportunity to build a better society. This paper concludes with pointing that preparing the Olympics and tackling social issues with such vision in itself will be effective measures of counter-terrorism.

Keywords: Terrorism, radicalization of the individual, “invincible man,” preventive approach
On July 1, 2014, the government announced, upon a cabinet decision, its intention to further enhance security-related legislation to enable Japan to better handle gray zones: an Infringement that does not Amount to an Armed Attack, expand the role of its international peace keeping operation, and exercise its right to collective self-defense, among others. Even in Okinawa, where 74% of U.S. military facilities in Japan are concentrated, there are concerns along with active discussions regarding the impact of this Cabinet decision. The purpose of this paper is to consider the impact of the Cabinet decision on Okinawa Prefecture, primarily the impact of the decision to enable the exercise of the right to collective self-defense.

The government, through the Cabinet decision, presented Newly determined three conditions for the “use of force” as measures for self-defense permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution: three new requirements to use force for the purpose of self-defense, and stated that it would allow the exercise of its right to collective self-defense as long as it meets these requirements.

It is likely that consideration regarding how this Cabinet decision might impact Okinawa will revolve around the improved handling of gray zones as well as Japan’s collaboration/cooperation with U.S. forces. It is difficult at this point to evaluate the situation surrounding the handling capabilities of gray zones because capability enhancement of the police and coast guard has been ongoing for some time prior to the Cabinet decision, and an amended draft of laws concerning the expeditious mobilization of the self-defense force to ensure public security has not yet been made available.

On the other hand, Japan’s collaboration/cooperation with U.S. forces might include asset protection, maritime security, air defense, missile defense, and protection of facilities and zones. Asset protection in this context means protection provided to U.S. forces by the Self Defense Force (SDF) when they operate together. This may make Japan a party to an unexpected contingency if the mission scope becomes too broad in the future, and for this reason, the situation needs to continue to be monitored in particular.

Concerns have been raised numerous times about the Cabinet decision and the possibility that Japan might find itself drawn into a U.S.-initiated war. Additionally, those in Okinawa are concerned that the decision might raise the risk of Okinawa becoming a target of foreign assault or terrorist attacks.
The U.S. welcomed the Cabinet decision and raised ballistic missile defense, counter-proliferation, counter-piracy, peace keeping operation, and other broad range of military exercises as the areas they expect Japan to be more proactively involved in. These are areas that have been mentioned in documents mutually agreed by the governments of Japan and the U.S., including the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. However, until now the assumption was that Japan was not able to exercise their right to collective self-defense, and since that has changed completely, the nature of requests by the U.S. may change in the future.

For example, counter-proliferation effort, which is the cause that led the George W. Bush administration to start the war on Iraq, is a sensitive area. Counter-proliferation efforts by the Obama administration now are focused on cargo inspection and financial measures, and collaboration in this area between the two countries may go only as far as forcing a stopped ship inspection at sea for the time being. However, even the Obama administration does not deny the role military force plays in counter-proliferation efforts, and in reality they seriously considered using force when the Syria's Assad regime used chemical weapons.

In this sense, one cannot deny the possibility that the U.S. expects Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defense to participate in a war like the one in Iraq, and that is why Japan may be pushed to exercise the right against its will in the future. There are countries in the past, like Great Britain in the Vietnam War and Germany in the Iraq War, that refused the request by the U.S. to deploy military force, and Japan will need to take this under consideration to make a sound and appropriate decision.

One of the risks for Okinawa is becoming a potential target for foreign assault or terrorist attacks: First of all, there are only a handful of countries that have the capability to directly attack Okinawa, and their potential attack on Japan is a risk that is already identified and considered as a contingency for Japan and its periphery.

Also, an analysis using the global terrorism database revealed that terrorist acts in Japan are concentrated in Tokyo. As for terrorist attacks targeting U.S. bases in Okinawa, which is a risk unique to Okinawa, there have been very few terrorist attacks on military installations and personnel in a developed country due to that country's exercise of the right to collective self-defense.

In sum, while there is a concern that the Cabinet decision to allow the exercise of the right to collective self-defense raises Okinawa's risks in the future, one cannot definitely say it has had an immediate impact on the lives of Okinawans.

However, this only means that the burden Okinawa is already shouldering on a daily basis and the risk associated with a contingency in Japan and its periphery will not increase dramatically.

At the same time, it must be pointed out that just because the impact on Okinawa is small, it does not mean the impact on Japan as a country is small. Generally, the JSDF
tends to deploy overseas more mainland troops than those stationed in Okinawa, and in that sense, if there are casualties, the impact may rather be much larger in mainland Japan.

The Okinawa 21st Century Vision Plan states that the prefecture aims to become “an island where people can live safely, comfortably, and in fulfillment,” and “an island of interaction and harmony that is open to the world.” Okinawa needs to consider the potential impact of this Cabinet decision not only as Okinawa’s issue but rather an issue of Japan as a whole.

Japan employed suppressing and defensive policies after World War II, and even now this approach basically has not changed. This means that even if Japan finds itself in a military confrontation with another country in some unfortunate situation, Japan does not have any offensive strategy that would enable them to occupy the enemy’s capital and bring down the opposing regime, or destroy the enemy’s strategic foundation to force their surrender. As a result, Japan will fight an uphill battle in a war of attrition if it ever involves itself in a military confrontation with another country.

With these premises, it is only natural for the Japanese government to remove oversights related to the security framework as much as possible, and pursue a security policy that is effective, efficient, and robust. However, if the need for this is indeed high, the government must patiently explain to the people the transparent exercise of the right, the need for such legislation, and also provide to friendly nations a thorough and persuasive explanation of Japan’s position, benefit, and the limitation of the right.

Keywords: Right to Collective Self-Defense, Right to Defend Own Legal Interest, Asset Protection, ISR Activity, Counter-proliferation
As of April 15, 2014, the situation in Ukraine is quite grim and the possibility of a divided nation does not seem far from reality. At a glance, issues arise on the other side of the Eurasian continent seems unrelated to Japan or Okinawa, which is merely a municipality within it, but its impact on Okinawa is in no way small in the context of international politics.

A pro-Western group’s protest triggered by the announcement on November 21, 2013, by then-President Yanukovych to suspend talks concerning a pact with the European Union gained a significant momentum over time, resulting in many casualties in January 2014.

After the Yanukovych regime collapsed in February 22, Crimea, which has a large proportion of Russian-Ukrainian residents, began calling for the independence and annexation of Crimea into Russia. Russia decided to militarily intervene on March 1.

With armed groups thought to be Russian forces quickly seizing control of the Crimean Peninsula, a local referendum was held on March 16 to decide whether to approve the annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea into Russia. An overwhelming majority voted in favor of the annexation.

With this added momentum, Russia seized complete control of the Crimean Peninsula by March 23.

Russia’s relationships with the U.S. and Europe rapidly deteriorated, resulting in Russia’s suspension from G8, and sanctions, including the ban on issuing visas for dignitaries and asset freezing, were placed on both sides.

Pro-Russian activists continue to occupy government buildings in Eastern Ukraine, mainly in the province of Donetsk and Russia has placed their military forces close to the Ukrainian border. The tension continues to mount.

The U.S., Europe, and Russia all seem to want to avoid a decisive military confrontation, but there seems to be no common ground in sight since Russia’s intention is to make Ukraine a part of the federation, and the U.S. and Europe want to expand the rights of minority ethnic groups, including Russians, in Ukraine.

The fact that Crimea was annexed into Russia practically by force instantly raised concerns toward Russia among countries in Eastern Europe. Expectation for a stronger NATO presence, particularly the presence of U.S. forces was raised in Eastern Europe.

While the U.S. has no choice but to respond to these voices, concerns are beginning to be raised for the decline of influence of the U.S., as it has not been able to find an effective solution to the worsening situation.

This decline might prompt China to act more provocatively in the East China Sea.
IV. Research Report: Study on the Situation in Ukraine

If it becomes difficult to reduce the size of U.S. forces in Europe, it would give more reasons for the U.S. to maintain their bases in Japan, particularly since it receives a host nation’s support budget to its benefit, and this in turn might stall the efforts to reduce the base burden borne by Okinawa.

Ultimately, the situation in Ukraine raises concerns, like China’s increased activities in the East China Sea and the stalling of base reduction efforts, which are issues Okinawa cannot ignore.

It is very important for this situation to be resolved as soon as possible to buffer such concerns. While Okinawa should look forward to the Japan-Russia summit meeting this fall for the government’s breakthrough in this situation, it should also carefully observe its own situation in the context of international affairs that is likely going to be increasingly more uncertain and unpredictable, and it should unendingly consider the role Okinawa should play in that context.

Keywords: Crimean Peninsula, Donetsk, NATO, U.S. Forces in Europe, Senkaku issue
On April 28, 2014, the United States and the Republic of the Philippines signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). It enables U.S. forces to use military bases in the Philippines, construct structures, and perform pre-positioning. Through this agreement the U.S. forces contributes to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. It is partly reported that this agreement represents the U.S. return to the Philippines; however, it is rather an expansion of access due to the U.S. forces having already conducted joint exercises in the Philippines.

The military relationship between the U.S. and the Philippines has a deep history. As early as the beginning of the 1900s, two large bases, Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base, were constructed and used by the U.S. forces. After the independence of the Philippines in 1946, the two countries signed the Military Base Agreement (MBA) in 1947 and the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1951. Since then they had negotiated over the conditions of the MBA, which resulted in U.S. compensation to the Philippines and the expiration of the MBA in 1991, and so on.

After the democratization of the Philippines in 1986, the country established a new constitution that imposed strict conditions for allowing the presence of foreign military on its land. In 1990 the U.S. and the Philippines started negotiations on the MBA but reached a deadlock. The eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in 1991 damaged Clark Air Base and since the expected repair cost was too high for the U.S. to continue running the facility, the U.S. decided on returning it to the Philippines. Within that year, the last negotiation covered the expiration period of Subic Naval Base and the compensation. Acknowledging the negotiated outcome, the two governments signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security. However, the Philippines Senate rejected the ratification of the treaty so it had no effect. The MBA became invalid and the U.S. forces withdrew from Subic Naval Base in 1992.

Yet in 1998 the two countries signed the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) that enabled the U.S. forces port visits and temporary stay within the Philippines. The Philippine Senate approved the agreement after discussions over a year. Since 2000, the U.S. and the Philippines have conducted joint exercises and training. These joint activities included the construction of infrastructure and schools, medical assistance and so on for improving social order, especially in southern Philippines.

As noted above, there was a period when the U.S. did not station its forces in the Philippines but the two countries resumed practical military cooperation activities after that. The EDCA is supposed to enhance the Philippine’s military capability to deal with
IV. Research Report: An Outline and Background of the U.S.-Philippine Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement

internal and external issues through multilateral assistance from the U.S. The purpose of the agreement is to promote interoperability, modern military capability building, maritime security, maritime domain awareness, and humanitarian assistance and disaster response.

According to the EDCA, the U.S. forces will not be stationed in the Philippines but visit there on temporary and rotational basis. The two countries will determine the size and service of the U.S. forces to be deployed, the period of rotational deployment, and bases to be used. The EDCA stipulates which party bears costs on managing the bases, and who possesses the right of construction on and the ownership of them. Additionally, it respects the Philippine Constitution that prohibits bringing nuclear weapons into the country. The VFA is applied to the status of the U.S. military personnel through the activities under the EDCA.

It is possible to see that the agreement was made in the context of Chinese assertive actions in the South China Sea. Since the 1970s China and Vietnam had military conflicts a couple of times in the area. In 1995 China constructed a building on the Mischief Reef, which the Philippines lay claim to. China’s blocking Filipino ships and gaining effective control over disputed islands intensified the confrontation between China and the Philippines in the past couple of years. Although the Philippines has been apprehensive about the situation, due to the small defense budget and the lack of equipment, it is difficult for the country to handle domestic and international security issues on its own.

As for the influence of the EDCA on Okinawa, the U.S. has denied any. Yet in the condition where the U.S. forces are maintained as they are now in East Asia, if troops stationed in Okinawa are rotationally deployed to the Philippines, it might lead to the reduction of burden on Okinawa. Continuous attention should be paid to how the EDCA is implemented. On the other hand, looking at the bigger picture of the East Asia region, the EDCA may not bring a positive result. If China considers that the defense cooperation of the U.S. and the Philippines erodes its core interests, it may take countermeasures rather than inhibit its assertive behavior. It is important to continue thinking of the U.S. presence in Okinawa through following the situations in the East and South China Seas as well as U.S. strategic and operational movements.

Link to the full paper (as of March 31, 2015)
V. Appendix
Appendix: 3rd Okinawa Asia-Pacific Partnership Forum
Main Forum Presentation Documents

・Presentation Document:
Masao Kurokawa, Vice Governor of Kanagawa Prefecture

神奈川県の基地対策について

神奈川県副知事 黒川雅夫

内容

1. 神奈川の基地の現状と課題
2. 基地問題への取組
3. 米軍との協力関係の上に立った取組

米軍基地の状況

神奈川県の米軍基地の特徴 その1
【人口密集地域に基地が集中して所在】

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神奈川県：米軍基地の特徴

平成26年10月1日現在

V. Appendix: 3rd Okinawa Asia-Pacific Partnership Forum
Main Forum Presentation Documents

神奈川の米軍基地の特徴 その2
【在日米軍の枢要な基地が集中して所在】

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・原子力空母ジョージ・ワシントンが配備されている |
| キャンプ座間 | ・在日米陸軍司令部所在地
・米陸軍第1軍団前方司令部が所在 |
| 厚木基地 | ・空母艦載機が本拠としており、大きな騒音被害が発生 |

厚木基地

神奈川の米軍基地の特徴 その3
基地従業員数

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(平成26年3月31日現在)
V. Appendix: 3rd Okinawa Asia-Pacific Partnership Forum
Main Forum Presentation Documents

神奈川の米軍基地の特徴 その4
【旧日本軍時代からの基地が多い】

主な旧日本軍時代からの基地
横須賀基地...旧海軍横須賀基地工廠・鎮守府
横須賀補給艦...旧海軍横須賀基地工廠
横須賀基港基地...旧陸軍横須賀基地
東京警備隊基地...旧陸軍基港基地
横須賀基地...旧陸軍訓練場
横須賀基地...旧海軍厚木飛行場

内容
1. 神奈川の基地の現状と課題
2. 基地問題への取組
3. 米軍との協力関係の上に立った取組

基地問題に関する重点要望項目
（神奈川県基連関係県市連絡協議会）
I. 米軍基地の整理・縮小、早期返還の推進
II. 厚木基地における航空機騒音の解消
III. 美国基地内事故による原子力災害対策の強化充実
IV. 日米地位協定の見直しを行うとともに、その運用に
についての透かしい改善
V. 住宅防音工事等、騒音対策の充実
VI. 国による財政的措置及び各種支援策の充実
（※標及施設関係9市で構成）

近年の取組の主な結果
I. 横浜市内6施設の返還方針の合意（平成16年10月）
  → 小柴駐屯地施設・富岡倉庫地区・深谷通信所・返還
II. キャンプ座間への一部返還
  → 平成16年5月の再締協議に盛り込まれ、平成23年10月の日米合同委員会で合意
III. 相模総合補給施設の共同使用
  → 平成18年5月の再締協議に盛り込まれ、平成24年6月の日米合同委員会で合意

V. Appendix: 3rd Okinawa Asia-Pacific Partnership Forum
Main Forum Presentation Documents

【厚木基地騒音対策協議会】
これまでの主な結果
Ⅰ 空母艦載機の夜間着陸訓練(NLP)の硫黄島での実施
→平成3年8月、硫黄島での初の訓練、平成8年以降可視的実施

Ⅱ デモンストレーションフライの廃止
→平成14年5月、在日米軍司令官が廃止を表明

Ⅲ 空母艦載機の移駐
→平成18年5月の再検討協議により決定。平成25年10月3日の日米安全保障協定委員会の共同発表で、平成28年度までと3年の期間を確認

【渉外関係主要都道府県知事連絡協議会（渉外知事会）】
内容
1. 神奈川の基地の現状と課題
2. 基地問題への取組
3. 米軍との協力関係の上に立った取組

【環境の管理に関する政府間協定に関する事項】
基本的な考え方

①基地の整備縮小返還
②基地周辺住民の安全、福祉の推進
③基地周辺環境の確保
④基地周辺の連携の推進
V. Appendix: 3rd Okinawa Asia-Pacific Partnership Forum
Main Forum Presentation Documents
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・Presentation Document: Norio Tomonaga, Mayor of Sasebo City
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