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Okinawa Prefectural Government
Executive Office of the Governor
Regional Security Policy Division
Research Section
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*The contents of this report are based on the information at the time of the forums and when the survey studies were conducted.
Introduction: Hirokazu Nakaima, Governor of Okinawa Prefecture iii

I. Okinawa Asia-Pacific Partnership Forum
“Peace and Security in East Asia”
Opening Remarks: Hirokazu Nakaima, Governor of Okinawa Prefecture 7
Keynote Lecture: Kurayoshi Takara, Vice Governor of Okinawa Prefecture 8
Session 1 History and Current Realities of Security in East Asia 11
Session 2 Report from Okinawa—History, Current Realities and Future Surrounding Okinawa’s Various Exchange 19
Session 3 Okinawa’s Role for Peace in East Asia 31
Session 4 Panel Discussion 37

“Crisis Management and Regional Cooperation in Island Territories”
Experts’ Presentations 41
Summary of Panel Discussion 55

II. Survey Report
In Regards to the Survey on Okinawans’ Impression of China
   Akio Takahara, Professor, the University of Tokyo 61
   Mamoru Akamine, Professor, the University of the Ryukyus 65
Survey on the International Exchanges 69
Foreign Media Primary Survey 79
Okinawa Residents Crisis and Contingencies Awareness Survey Overview 83

III. Research Report
Study on Improving Okinawa Prefecture’s Comprehensive Crisis Management 88
Case Study: Boston Marathon Bombings
   Hints for Okinawa’s Crisis Management 90
Study on the Special Secrecy Law—Background, Overview and Issues 92
Study on the Opinion Poll on the Image of Japan in the United States
   Commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 94
A Case Study on the Relocation of U.S. Overseas Bases: Spain 96
A Case Study on the Relocation of U.S. Overseas Bases: The Philippines 98

IV. Appendix
Okinawa Asia-Pacific Partnership Forum “Peace and Security in East Asia” 102
Okinawa Asia-Pacific Partnership Forum “Crisis Management and Regional Cooperation in Island Territories” 117
Okinawa Asia-Pacific Partnership Forum Other Related Documents 133
Survey on Okinawans’ Impression of China 149
Okinawa Residents Crisis and Contingencies Awareness Survey 163
Introduction
Hirokazu Nakaima
Governor of Okinawa Prefecture

On this occasion, we present our research findings concerning the regional security policy in Okinawa following last year's effort, and I would like to thank everyone who cooperated.

Okinawa is deeply involved in many important security issues confronted by Japan, the United States, and Asian countries, Okinawa Prefectural Government is expected to carefully consider the security environment behind these issues.

Chapter I includes highlights from the rational and open discussions from an academic perspective held at the Okinawa Asia-Pacific Partnership Forum by experts from Japan, Mainland China, Taiwan, and the U.S. on the themes of "Peace and Security in East Asia" and "Crisis Management and Regional Cooperation in Island Territories."

Chapter II contains commentaries on China-related survey results by Professor Akio Takahara of the University of Tokyo and Professor Mamoru Akamine of the University of the Ryukyus, as well as findings of surveys on foreign media and the awareness of the people in Okinawa.

Chapter III contains summaries of papers written by our research fellows.

These contents are the individual analyses and writings of the above experts and do not necessarily represent the views or policies of Okinawa Prefectural Government. However, their ideas and opinions contribute significantly to the development of our ability to form prefectural policies to reduce the burden of U.S. bases on Okinawa. Again, I would like to deeply appreciate for the cooperation.
I.

Okinawa Asia-Pacific Partnership Forum

“Bankoku Shinryo Bell”
Okinawa Prefectural Museum & Art Museum Collection

“Bankoku Shinryo” means “bridge between nations”, and it comes from the Bankoku Shinryo Bell. The inscription reflects the spirit of an age when the Kingdom of Ryukyu flourished as the crossroads of Asian trade.

Find out more about the Okinawa Asia-Pacific Partnership Forum at the following website:
I. Okinawa Asia-Pacific Partnership Forum

Table of Contents

“Peace and Security in East Asia”

Opening Remarks: Hirokazu Nakaima, Governor of Okinawa Prefecture ............ 7
Keynote Lecture: Kurayoshi Takara, Vice Governor of Okinawa Prefecture .......... 8

Session 1 History and Current Realities of Security in East Asia
Daqing Yang, Associate Professor, George Washington University ................. 12
Narushige Michishita, Associate Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies ............. 13
Yinhong Shi, Professor, School of International Studies, Renmin University of China .......... 14
Cheng-Yi Lin, Fellow, Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica .......... 15
Summary of Discussion ......................................................................................... 16

Session 2 Report from Okinawa—History, Current Realities and Future Surrounding Okinawa’s Various Exchange
Susumu Asato, Director, Okinawa Prefectural Museum and Art Museum .......... 20
Mamoru Akamine, Professor, the University of the Ryukyus ......................... 22
Yoshiyuki Uehara, Chairman, Okinawa Convention and Visitors Bureau .......... 24
Eiji Chinen, Head Director, Okinawa Industry Promotion Public Corporation ... 26
Susumu Matayoshi, Director General, the Executive Office of the Governor, Okinawa Prefecture ....... 28

Session 3 Okinawa’s Role for Peace in East Asia
Akio Takahara, Professor, the University of Tokyo ........................................ 32
Mike Mochizuki, Professor, George Washington University ...................... 33
Chuan-Tiong Lim, Associate Fellow, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica .......... 34
Summary of Discussion ......................................................................................... 35

Session 4 Panel Discussion
Summary of Panel Discussion .............................................................................. 38
### “Crisis Management and Regional Cooperation in Island Territories”

#### Crisis Management Effort in Okinawa Prefecture: with a View from Regional Cooperation

Hironobu Nakabayashi  
Fellow, Research Section, Regional Security Policy Division,  
Executive Office of the Governor

#### Crisis Management and International Cooperation of China

Linsheng Gu  
Operating Director, Institute for Disaster Management and Reconstruction  
Sichuan University · Hong Kong Polytechnic University

#### Crisis Management in Island Territories: A Case Study of Typhoon Response in Taiwan

Liang-Chun Chen  
Visiting Professor, Department of Urban Planning and Disaster,  
Ming Chuan University  
Director, Taiwan National Science and Technology Center for Disaster Reduction

#### Critical Infrastructure Protection and Disaster Management

Chung-Young Chang  
Professor and Chair, Department of Public Affairs, Fo Guang University  
Director, Center for International and Public Affairs Study (CIPAS)

#### Crisis Management of the Island

Yasushi Aoyama  
Professor, Meiji University Graduate School of Governance Studies

#### Summary of Panel Discussion
Okinawa Asia-Pacific Partnership Forum
“Peace and Security in East Asia”

Opening Remarks
Keynote Lecture
Opening Remarks

Hirokazu Nakaima
Governor of Okinawa Prefecture

I would like to give a few words on the opening of the Okinawa Asia-Pacific Partnership Forum.

I am very happy to have many prominent experts from various countries and regions here in Okinawa today. I would also like to thank the experts in Okinawa who will be presenting on a wide range of fields, including history, culture, academia, tourism, and economy, and I would like to extend my appreciation to all the people who helped to make this Forum possible.

In the “Okinawa 21st Century Vision” that Okinawa Prefecture formulated in March 2010, the prefecture proclaimed its commitment to “leverage its regional characteristics to be a place where trust is built among Asia-Pacific nations among others, and also a place where various types of security including cultural and environmental measures are created, in order to contribute to Japan’s peacemaking efforts.”

Peace and stability in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific are absolutely indispensable in order to make this vision. Okinawa Prefecture has no choice but to be involved in a wide array of issues because the region faces many security and crisis management issues.

It is our intent to listen to opinions from various angles, study and analyze the background, and deepen the discussions on regional security to solve the military base issues.

It is also our wish to prepare a place to promote regional dialogues and mutual understanding here in Okinawa.

Today, experts on history and security have come together to engage in rational and open discussions from an academic perspective.

This initiative will continue next year as well. Okinawa Prefectural Government would like to reflect the findings and results in our policy making, as well as make the information widely available for all to see.

It is our sincere wish that this Forum will help Okinawans and people in neighboring regions by serving as a reference when considering regional exchanges in the future.
First, I would like to extend my respect and appreciation to all the outstanding experts and researchers from Japan, the U.S., China, and Taiwan for making this Forum possible.

I would like to briefly talk about the expectations and wishes Okinawa Prefectural Government has as the facilitator and organizer of the Okinawa Asia-Pacific Partnership Forum. We facilitated this forum as a place to discuss and debate openly and freely various issues to achieve peace and stability in East Asia as well as the entire Asia-Pacific region. Okinawa Prefecture, a mere municipal government in Japan, has a definite purpose in organizing this forum. Currently, Okinawa is the focal point of two extremely important international relationships for Japan: Japan-U.S. and Japan-China. The U.S. military base issue, represented by the MCAS Futenma relocation issue, remains a difficult problem that concerns the way the Japan-U.S. alliance should be operated. The confrontation over the Senkaku Islands has damaged the relationship between Japan and China and has been negatively affecting the public sentiment toward each other. I believe these two issues differ in nature and background but are nevertheless issues of grave concern for the region of Okinawa.

The position of the Okinawa Prefectural Government headed by Governor Nakaima on the issues of Senkaku Islands and Futenma are as follows.

First, Okinawa Prefectural Government takes a position that the Japan-U.S. alliance is important for Japan’s national security, and Okinawa Prefectural Government supports the alliance and understands the presence of U.S. military bases, which are necessary for the alliance’s operation. However, Okinawa does not condone frequent accidents and incidents caused by the fact that U.S. bases in Japan are concentrated in Okinawa, as this situation is creating great anxiety to Okinawans.

Okinawa Prefectural Government also believes that both Japanese and the U.S. governments should make efforts as swiftly as possible to organize the bases to reduce their presence and improve the situation by reducing Okinawa’s burden. The relocation of MCAS Futenma is symbolic in this regard. The question is what should be done with the extremely dangerous military installation located right in the middle of a town? The governments of Japan and the U.S. have agreed to relocate it to Henoko, Nago City to remove the danger. Okinawa Prefectural Government is not against this proposal itself. We do recognize it as an idea. However, is the proposal realistically achievable within the framework designed by...
the two governments? It is easy to see that the process will cause a lot of confusion and require much more time. Being fully aware of the danger of MCAS Futenma, we believe its relocation to Henoko faces a tough hurdle and moving it to a suitable location in mainland Japan instead is more realistic. We have been advocating that this approach is the best way to deal with concerns and dissatisfaction among Okinawans. We believe it is the responsibility of both the Japanese and U.S. governments to stabilize the Japan-U.S. alliance itself by greatly reducing Okinawans' burden and concerns over the U.S. military bases and facilitating a better understanding of and trust for the bases.

We are also concerned with the picture of confrontation over the Senkaku islands in recent years between Japan and China that have over several thousands of years of history together. Japan-China relations are not just a bilateral issue, but also the issue of great importance to East Asia, the Asia-Pacific region, and ultimately the rest of the world. We believe that, instead of escalating the confrontation, it is important to ease the tension by facilitating mutual dialogue and understanding, solve the issue centering on the Senkaku peacefully, and stabilize the relationship between the two nations. A stable relationship between Japan and China based on trust is clearly beneficial to Okinawa.

Next, I want to briefly talk about a historical background of critical issues for Okinawa's future as Okinawa has its own exchanges with China in history over 500 years.

Back when East Asia was stable, Okinawa enjoyed growth of its own. The Ryukyu Kingdom was established, and it engaged in trades and exchanges with various countries and regions, including those we now call Japan, China, South Korea, North Korea, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Indeed, Okinawa was the crossed that tied East Asia and Southeast Asia together. Okinawans in 1458 left a message of "Bankoku Shinryo," to say that Okinawa played a role as the bridge that connected various Asian regions. Records from that time stress that regions connected through the ocean toward north, south, east and west were families, brothers and sisters.

However, Okinawa's position and characteristics changed once East Asia entered a time of conflict and became unstable. One example is about 400 years ago, when Okinawa was under the strong influence of Japan. Nevertheless Okinawans at the time tried to maintain its own distinct presence while being dependent on Japan and China, two major powers. Sai On, a leader in those tumultuous times, stated that "the journey is extremely difficult and the path is rough, but as administrators of the Ryukyus, our will and vision will enable us to overcome obstacles." However, Okinawa was annexed by Japan 130 years ago. Additionally Okinawa underwent a harsh and cruel war about 70 years ago that resulted in its separation from Japan and being under U.S. control. Later, Okinawans campaigned to revert to Japan and eventually became members of Japanese society again about 40 years ago.
Although Okinawa is a region that constitutes a part of Japanese society, its historical background is significantly different from other regions. Because of this, it is a region where Japanese identity and Okinawan identity coexist. Okinawa remains what it is today relentlessly seeking a way to thrive based on these two identities.

Okinawa Prefectural Government is currently conducting various projects in accordance with the “Okinawa 21st Century Vision” it developed. One of its basic concepts is that Okinawa is not merely the southernmost region in Japan but is a vanguard region open to neighboring Asia and should grow on its historical experience to maximize its potential.

In a paper I wrote 13 years ago, I once expressed the vision Okinawa should realize that "Japan ends here in Okinawa, and Asia begins. Asia ends here in Okinawa, and Japan begins." For Okinawa to fulfill its goals and visions it set out for itself, Okinawa needs to go beyond its historical experience as well as the ideas and values that are based on it, and vigorously and continuously refine its thinking with an objective eye. Does the power of our words have the logic and ground to convince many others? We must keep on asking ourselves this question.

As a part of this process, we believe we should collect and analyze accurate information on peace and security issues surrounding Okinawa, understand points of discussion from multiple viewpoints, and position ourselves to make the right judgement and decision and take appropriate action. To this end, it is necessary to learn from the knowledge and experience of highly qualified experts and researchers, both domestic and international. That is the purpose of the Okinawa Asia-Pacific Partnership Forum. It is a place for us here in Okinawa to learn.

As Governor Nakaima said in his opening remarks, the results of this Forum will be used as a reference for Okinawa Prefecture's regional security policy. We also hope that the Forum will stimulate and help the understanding of experts from various circles who are in attendance. Foreign affairs and security issues are generally said to fall under the sole jurisdiction of the central government, but Okinawa, being the focal point of Japan-U.S. relations and Japan-China relations—major issues of Japan—believes it should assume a role of its own by approaching various security issues from the regional viewpoint of Okinawa. We are determined to do this, and this Forum is the very first step.

Today’s Forum will discuss issues from many angles and opposing viewpoints, but opinions will be expressed as free individuals. Furthermore, the territorial rights issue over the Senkaku Islands will not be addressed. We expect ideas and opinions to be exchanged freely but in a reasonable manner. We facilitated this forum with the objective for us to mutually understand our positions, similarities as well as differences, and to build trust among us. This may be slightly different from what the prefectural government usually does, but employees of Okinawa Prefectural Government are committed to better understand the situation they are in, and use that knowledge in our administration. We want to share the issues we find with Okinawans and try to find a solution together. Thank you.
Okinawa Asia-Pacific Partnership Forum
“Peace and Security in East Asia”

Session 1
History and Current Realities of
Security in East Asia
Importance of history

- Current realities are consequences—both intended and unintended—of history.
- Lessons of history can shape current and future realities.

Power and Culture—a useful pair of lens to examine East Asian security

- Power—economic and military
- Culture—internal (e.g. strategic culture) and external (soft power)

1. Traditional era (15th-mid-19th centuries): the long peace
   a. tribute system—China’s economic power, potential military (land), Sinic culture—guaranteed security in maritime East Asia in contrast to Europe
   b. exception: Wako piracy, Manchu vs. Korea
   c. exception: Hideyoshi invasion of Korea—Conquest by Satsuma

   a. rise of Westphalian state system and “survival of the fittest”
   b. coming of the West—stopover in Ryukyu for treaties,
   c. rise of Japan—accepted “international terms”—use of international law in 1874 expedition, 1910 annexation of Korea
   d. WWII—reached peak of bitter experience—Battle of Okinawa, a-bombs
   e. Cold War—nuclear weapons, wars nearby (Korean War etc.)

3. Present (1970s –) Transitioning to a new security paradigm?
   a. Third wave of globalization since 1971
   b. “economic/ecological inter-dependence,” “human movement/acculturation,”
   c. total war between great powers unthinkable, but actual or threat of limited war still possible.
   d. new norms: “humanitarian intervention,” “law and justice”

4. Okinawa as an anchor of new East Asia security
China’s Actions in the Region and Japan’s Response
Narushige Michishita
Associate Professor,
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies

Please go to page 102 for relevant document.

◆ China’s Actions in the Region
  • China’s policy objective is to create a new regional order conducive to its national interest
  • Military measures to achieve its goals:
    1) Build anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities to keep the U.S. at bay
    2) Forcible acquisition of some of the disputed islands
  • Not likely to result in a high-intensity conflict, but small-scale crises are almost inevitable
    e.g.: EP-3 incident on the Hainan Island in 2001 Chinese frigates locking fire-control radar on Japanese naval vessels in 2013

→ Crisis management is critical. The issue is how to deal with China's diplomatic use of military force short of outright armed aggression, and strategic offensive combining military, diplomatic, and legal tools.

◆ Japan’s Response
  ※ 2 assumptions: 1) Japan cannot compete with China alone; 2) Dealing effectively with China's peacetime military-diplomatic offensive is crucial

1. Asymmetrical approach in Japan’s defense buildup: Increasing the number of submarines to counter China's aircraft carriers
2. “Dynamic Defense Force”: Emphasize patrol and surveillance activities as well as training and exercises
3. Establish a National Security Council (NSC): Emphasize scenario-based simulations
4. Expansion of regional partnership

→ The United States, Japan, South Korea, Southeast Asian countries, Australia, India should work together in order to maintain balance of power in the region, which can be disrupted by rising and increasingly assertive China.

• To do this, Japan should 1) strengthen defense cooperation, 2) bolster capacity-building efforts, and 3) increase strategic use of official development assistance (ODA).

→ Stable balance of power in the region will prevent irresponsible hardliners in China from gaining an upper hand and, therefore, will contribute to China’s national interest. We must remember what happened to Japan in the first half of the 20th century.
China’s New Leadership: Prospects for Foreign Policy and the China-U.S. Relationship

Yinhong Shi
Professor, School of International Studies, Renmin University of China

The talk will cover the following short parts:
1. China’s new leadership: balancing tensions in formulating foreign policy
2. Predictors of China’s foreign policy direction
3. On a new China-U.S. great power relationship
4. The issue of strategy: the path to a “Final Settlement”
5. An ominous alternative
6. The initial reality: Xi-Obama summit in Sunnyland.

The most important points will be:

How can China strike the difficult balance between its different strategic requirements? And how can those strategic requirements overcome the domestic and international pressures and restraints? These will be the primary challenges for China’s new leadership as it grapples with shaping policy toward the United States and its neighboring countries.

There is a lesson to be learned from having taken the abstract, or even romantically philosophical, notion of “mutual strategic trust” as the central concept for China-U.S. relations over the past few years. The next phase should be one where there is a relatively more traditional, and therefore more realistic, relationship between China and the United States, in the direction of preventing, controlling, and reducing substantial rivalries.

For a peaceful “Final Settlement” between China and the U.S. in the longer future, which should be characterized first of all by power-sharing on the notion of selective preponderances or advantage distribution, the political leadership and highest level policy-makers of both countries should overcome the many domestic and international interferences and, different from their practice in the previous years, pursue the more strategic practice of big gives and big takes.

In light of the present situation, the more ominous alternative, an intensifying of China-U.S. strategic rivalry leading gradually to general confrontation or even conflict is, unfortunately, the more likely one. Especially, the dissonance in strategic/military fronts is surely not absent of the possibility of future paralysis in China-U.S. Relations. If it is only to prevent this outcome, the two great powers across of the Pacific should do much more and much better in the future years.
On the status of Okinawa, Chiang Kai-shek proposed a joint administration of the U.S. and the Republic of China (ROC) commissioned by international organization at the 1943 Cairo Conference. However, in the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty, the U.S. was designated as “the sole administering authority” in the Ryukyu Islands. In 1962, President Chiang regarded Kennedy’s statement on Okinawa as a part of Japanese territories without prior consultation with the ROC was an insult to him. John Holdridge, a U.S. NSC staff, concluded in 1969 that the ROC wanted to “stall [the reversion of Okinawa] by calling for a plebiscite to be held to confirm the wishes of the Okinawan people.”

After the Emery Report of 1969, the ROC turned its attention to Diaoyutais/Senkakus and was prompt to sign three contracts with U.S oil corporations such as Gulf (1970/7), Oceanic (1970/8), and Clinton (1970/9) in joint exploration and exploitation surveys north of Taiwan. Taipei further insisted that the Daioyutai Islands constitute an integral part of the sovereign territory of the ROC “by reason of geographical location, geological structure, historical association, and, above all, by reason of the long and continued use which the inhabitants of Taiwan have made of these islets.” For Chiang, it was not possible for a military solution of the Diaoyutai dispute and he considered a legal settlement in the International Court of Justice if the U.S. transferred sovereignty over the Diaoyutais to Japan. Also, the ROC urged Washington to use the Diaoyutais as US practice bombing area instead of returning them to Japan.

For Presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, the strategic location of the Okinawa Islands could serve a shield for the security of Taiwan. The Ishigaki Island was used as the intermediary stop because of the prohibitions of direct cross-Strait navigation. President Ma has constantly tried to assure the Japanese that Taiwan will not seek cooperation with the PRC in settling the Diaoyutais dispute. In August 2012, Ma proposed the East China Sea Peace Initiative aiming at establishing a cooperation mechanism for exploring resources in the East China Sea. In April 2013, Taipei and Tokyo signed a fisheries agreement after 17 years of negotiations (1996-2013). The agreement provides Taiwan for the addition of three operating blocks, covering a total of 4,530 square kilometers in waters surrounding the Diaoyutais, and raising protested from Okinawan fishermen.

Taiwan may be the only winner of the East China Sea tensions, but finds itself marginalized as power equation has changed. China and Japan should adopt self-constraint measures when exercising parallel jurisdiction in the East China Sea.
Presentations were made on the topic of peace and security in East Asia by Dr. Daqing Yang, Dr. Narushige Michishita, Dr. Yinhong Shi, and Dr. Cheng-Yi Lin, followed by a discussion coordinated by Dr. Mike Mochizuki.

Dr. Yang divided the history of East Asia in three time periods and gave a brief overview of each, then stated that today we are in a new age of globalization that is transitioning to a new way of thinking regarding international order and security and explained the importance of a forum that fundamentally considers the framework of peace and security in East Asia.

Dr. Michishita argued that, because China is trying to expand its influence against the backdrop of its growth in national power, there is a need for crisis management to maintain the power balance in the region and deal with low-intensity conflicts. He further argued that Japan alone has no chance of outcompeting China, and that Okinawa is faced with a dilemma because precaution and monitoring are important during peacetime and Okinawa needs to cooperate with neighboring countries, the burden of the situation tends to fall on the shoulders of Okinawa simply due to its geographical proximity to China. He also explained the enhancement of asymmetric capabilities and the maintenance of dynamic defense capabilities in the context of Japan’s security policy.

Dr. Shi raised various dilemmas China is facing as its national power grows dramatically and stated his opinions on the foreign policy directions of China. He stated that if China’s peaceful growth continues to a sufficient degree, the U.S. will consider more seriously China’s economic, diplomatic, and strategic roles, eventually leading to the U.S.’s acceptance of a peaceful “Final Settlement.”

Dr. Lin explained the post-war policies of the Republic of China and the U.S. concerning Okinawa, how Taiwanese leaders see Okinawa, and the role Okinawa plays in Taiwan’s security. He expressed concerns about the issues surrounding the Senkaku Islands and voiced a need to consider ways to avoid a crisis situation.

The discussion revolved around Dr. Shi’s “Final Settlement” statement. Dr. Michishita stated that a “Final Settlement” would imply the U.S. conceding to China despite being in a better position, and therefore, practically impossible and even dangerous.
Dr. Yang said that like the settlement between Germany and France once bringing peace to Western Europe, creating a new norm and securing its framework will bring about a conclusion different from those the past.

Dr. Lin said that it is very difficult to formulate a long-term solution on the current issue of the tension between Japan and China, but considerations must be made to avoid a crisis situation and also on damage control.

At the end of the discussion, Dr. Shi stated that the transfer and adjustment of power between large countries is not easy even in the globalized world, but there is a possibility to peacefully reach a “Final Settlement.”

(Edited by Research Section)
Okinawa Asia-Pacific Partnership Forum
“Peace and Security in East Asia”

Session 2
Report from Okinawa
History, Current Realities and Future
Surrounding Okinawa’s Various Exchange
History of Exchanges between Ryukyu and East Asia—Mass Relocation of People and Ryukyu-ization

Susumu Asato
Director, Okinawa Prefectural Museum and Art Museum

In this report, I will talk about the body (DNA) and culture of the residents of Ryukyu Islands that were heavily influenced by the mass relocation of people from Japan, and the exchange between the two peoples. I will also consider the Japanization of Okinawa by this mass relocation and the re-Ryukyu-ization that came later.

In the prefecture-wide survey done by NHK in 1978 and 1996, the results revealed that unlike mainlanders, Okinawans had an extremely strong identity. Okinawans found their identity when the Ryukyu Kingdom was established after the homoeologous and homogeneousness era in the Jomon period, but it is widely believed that the identity in its genuine form was created through the Shimazu invasion, forced assimilation of Okinawa by Japan, and the process to unite Okinawa and the rest of Japan as one ethnic people. This historical view was the theoretical pillar that supported the campaigns to promote Okinawa’s reversion to Japan.

However, even after the reversion, the gap between Okinawa and mainland Japan has been growing wider as seen in the U.S. military base issue and the textbook issue. Personally, I believe it is necessary to see the history of the Ryukyus from a different perspective to understand the current state of the Japan-Okinawa relationship. Instead of seeing the history of the Ryukyus from a fatalistic viewpoint like two groups (Japan and Okinawa) having the same ancestor to the viewpoint of finding an identity, and then to that of ethnic unification, I think we should try to understand it as an unsettling waver between Japanization and Ryukyu-ization. In 30,000 years of Ryukyu history, the Ryukyus underwent Japanization twice—once in the early Jomon period and another in the early middle ages—but in both cases, Ryukyu-ization followed. The modern period after the forced assimilation might be considered the third Japanization, but Ryukyu-ization will soon follow in my understanding.

It was discovered recently that the Japanization and re-Ryukyu-ization of the Ryukyus in the early middle ages developed in the following manner: About 1,000 years ago, in the early middle ages, a group of Japanese relocated to the Ryukyus from the Gusuku ruins on Kikai Island and spread all over the islands. They began
to amalgamate with the indigenous Ryukyuans that triggered the Japanization (middle aging) of the people and culture of Ryukyu Islands, ushering in the new Gusuku period. However, this period of Japanization did not last long as the Ryukyus steered toward founding a nation of its own, the Ryukyu Kingdom. Investigations of Urasoe Yodore, the tomb of Ryukyu kings in the early days, revealed that one of the reasons for founding the Ryukyu Kingdom was to maintain the international relationship with countries in East Asia.

When we see the history of the Ryukyus as a history of an unsettling waver between Japanization and Ryukyu-ization, then it is reasonable to think that Okinawa, currently in a phase of Japanization, will steer itself to Ryukyu-ization sooner or later. As a matter of fact, judging by how passionately Okinawans are yearning for their Okinawa identity now, the period of Ryukyu-ization might have already begun.
About 30 or so years ago, I spent five years at the National Taiwan University to work on my Master's degree and another five years to get a Ph.D. What surprised me at first was when I registered as a graduate student, I found a registrant country code for Japan and a separate one for the Ryukyus. I asked an administrative staffer how I should handle this—我当时持日本护照来到台湾，我应该选择日本身份还是冲绳身份呢？工作人员问我父母、祖父母和祖先是不是都是冲绳人，我回答是冲绳人。工作人员告诉我选择冲绳人的身份，所以我以冲绳人的身份在国立台湾大学注册，我记得当时非常困惑，因为当时冲绳刚刚归还给日本，我下定决心要以日本人的身份生活，结果却从一开始就被否认了我的身份。

After the war, the government of the Republic of China did not recognize Japan's assertion of its territorial sovereignty over Okinawa. However, President Chen Shui-bian during his second term abolished the China-Okinawa Cultural and Economic Exchange Association and established the Naha Branch of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office and placed it under the control of its Tokyo headquarters. Many generally see this action as the government of the Republic of China recognizing Japan's territorial sovereignty. However, the Republic of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not made any official announcement on this matter. Similarly, China has never officially recognized Okinawa as Japan's territory. More and more experts in China are arguing as of late that Okinawa is China's territory. The Senkaku issue has brought a tension between Japan and China that lingers to this day, and a significant number of Chinese people believe that an official, political settlement on the matter of Okinawa's affiliation has not yet been reached.

How can we disseminate accurate information about Okinawa to enable others to understand Okinawa's current situation and viewpoint? This is the question we collectively have to make an effort to find an answer to.

The Senkaku issue is also casting a large, dark shadow upon the cultural and academic exchanges between Japan and China in recent years. Last year, in
Beijing, the Symposium on the History of Negotiations between China and the Ryukyus was organized by the First Historical Archives of China. While most cultural and academic exchanges between Japan and China had been canceled in the midst of the Senkaku turmoil, this symposium was held due to the strong request from the Chinese side. It is the same with Taiwan. The National Taiwan University and the University of the Ryukyus are working together in a joint project to republish historical documents from the Kingdom era, and the two are also collaborating with the Palace Museum in Taipei to jointly publish public records. Even when the relationship between Japan and China are in a critical state over the Senkaku issue, the sense of comradeship that was nurtured during the post-war years through people-to-people exchanges is producing valuable soft power, which is being leveraged effectively.

People-to-people exchange is possible even when there is a difficult, political confrontation. It is also possible to take each other’s hand and work on a project/business together. I understand that it is important for us to continue to understand each other; Okinawa needs to disseminate information about itself and raise common historical awareness as well as build and share a sense of togetherness and comradeship to ensure Okinawa’s peace and security. In fact, it is precisely a time like this that more efforts have to be made to this end.
This March, I retired after spending 40 years in the prefectural office. In my latter years, I worked on Okinawa’s various development issues including the military base issue.

We needed to clearly express our basic philosophy and direction on this issue in the “Okinawa 21st Century Vision” that was created in 2012. We identified the keywords of the plan to be “exchange” and “symbiosis” and defined Okinawa in the future as an international city open to the world where people, material, and information travel in all directions. This is the future of Okinawa that can be achieved by leveraging the characteristics or advantages of Okinawa. Our great ancestors travelled all over the seas in Asia and built the history of Bankoku Shinryo, which is a heritage we can all be proud of. Okinawa has a geographical advantage being located between Asia and Japan, and a beautiful natural environment second to none. It is our vision that we build an international hub of exchange where people, material, and information pass through and contribute to the peace and security of Japan and the Asia-Pacific region.

I am going to quote from the United Nations resolution that designated 1967 as the International Tourist Year: "Recognizing the importance of international tourism, and particularly of the designation of an International Tourist Year, in fostering better understanding among peoples everywhere, in leading to a greater awareness of the rich heritage of various civilizations and in bringing about a better appreciation of the inherent values of different cultures, thereby contributing to the strengthening of peace in the world..." The resolution also declares that "tourism is a passport to peace." What will Okinawa do with a passport that is one of the best tourist resorts in the world? What can it do? I believe the answer is an exchange hub of people, material, and information.

The Asian Youth Exchange Program, which began five years ago, aims to expand educational exchange opportunities for youth that will shape the future. Okinawa Institute of Science and Technology Graduate University, that accepted the first group of students last year, is already home to many talented researchers from around the world. In the past, we collaborated with the East-West Center in Hawaii to discuss the establishment of an institution to research human security in a broad sense. There is a need to bring together all types of information and wisdom to continue to deliver and build up results, and to make concepts a reality.
Lastly, I would like to consider the U.S. military base issue from the perspective of tourism as it relates to today's topic. This may be a desk theory from the tourism perspective, but I would argue that, given Okinawa's significance in terms of military strategy and geography, a certain level of logistics capabilities and employment may need to remain. However, the U.S. forces' training and exercise capabilities should be reduced step by step until they are completely removed from Okinawa. The sounds of guns and artillery are not suitable for a peaceful tourist destination. I believe we need to break away from the traditional way of thinking and think outside the box to create a future we want.
Since I finished school in 1962, I have dedicated 51 years of my life to the business world. Today I am going to talk about Okinawa’s economy in the post-war era based on my experience.

We can identify three major economic trends (periods). One was the 27 years spent under the control of the U.S. forces, and during this time, the economy was wholly dependent on the bases. The U.S. forces began building bases after WWII, and Okinawans were directly and indirectly dependent on the bases for subsistence.

The second was from 1972 after the reversion of Okinawa to Japan until the end of the Third Okinawa Promotion & Development Plan which was led by the central government to close the economic gap between Okinawa and the rest of the country. Twenty-seven years of U.S. military control left Okinawa years behind in infrastructure development and its people poorer than the rest of the country, and the plan was to correct the situation.

However, in the Fourth Plan from 2002 until last year, and in the Fifth Plan that started last year, the central focus shifted to economic independence. Perhaps this was because Okinawa's infrastructure had almost caught up to the rest of the country, 30 years after the reversion, but it came at a time when we were still battling hard in the name of an unjust economic gap. It created a situation where "we may come close but will not overtake."

That is what happened in the past, and now I want to talk about the present and the future, particularly Okinawa's overseas ventures and exchange.

The U.S. called Okinawa the Keystone of the Far East because Okinawa is located at the heart of East Asia, but before the reversion, the government of the Ryukyu Islands also discussed the potential of Okinawa being an economic keystone. The thought vanished after the reversion, but when the economy rapidly shifted to globalization after the Cold War in 1991, the discussion resurfaced and people once again began discussing Okinawa's geographical potential to be an economic hub.

ANA's cargo hub business spearheaded the actual movement. Local companies
are exploring ways to expand their business into Asian countries using this hub. Okinawa is well on its way to becoming an exchange hub for Asia's people, material, money, and information.

Additionally, a large trade show is going to be organized in Okinawa next year, and many companies will attend the event to sell various specialty goods of Japan to Asian markets via Okinawa. We want to develop this event and to include foreign companies and their specialty goods in the future to make it a two-way trade show.

The prefecture and the central government have teamed up to support this private initiative by reviewing existing policies and possibly formulating new ones. They are in full support of Okinawa's economic exchange. I sincerely hope that you will also join our cause for Okinawa's brighter future.
The Issues of U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa

Susumu Matayoshi
Director General, the Executive Office of the Governor, Okinawa Prefecture

I am one of the organizers of the Okinawa Asia-Pacific Partnership Forum. I would like this to be an opportunity for us to think about Okinawa Prefecture’s military base issue from various angles and viewpoints, which is one of the purposes of this Forum. As director general in charge, I would like to talk about what I think about daily.

Okinawa Prefecture’s basic stand is that the Japan-U.S. Security Agreement is contributing to the stability of this region, and based on this recognition, Okinawa is working on phased consolidation and reduction of the military bases toward a solution. We understand, of course, that different people in different positions have different opinions on this matter. We also understand that Okinawa’s military base issues have a long history, and numerous people in politics, journalism, academia, and civil movement are thinking very hard about these issues. The prefectural government is fully aware of this as it continues to find a solution to the military base issue.

In 1945, after the end of the war, U.S. forces started to build military bases one by one on the war-torn Okinawan soil. In 1954, the U.S. government issued a policy to forcibly acquire land to build bases in Okinawa, but Okinawa’s legislative body established the four principles of land protection. And Okinawa-wide Protest emerged to object to this forceful land acquisition and to how the land would be used by the U.S. forces. What is important is that the U.S. military bases in Okinawa were built without the consent of Okinawans.

Under the Status of Forces Agreement, U.S. military installations, which are exclusively used by the U.S. Forces, are under the control of the U.S. military, beyond the scope of Japan’s jurisdiction. The problem is that 73.8% of all such installations in Japan are concentrated in Okinawa. On average, including minor cases, there are 25 accidents and incidents of some form every month.

Environmental pollution and noise caused by the bases are unbearable for local residents.

In terms of economy and the bases, Okinawa incurs huge losses in potential opportunity and economic benefits because many bases are located in areas of significant value. While Okinawa’s financial dependency on the bases in 1972—the year of its reversion to Japan—was 15.5% of Gross Prefectural Income, this
number today is down to around 5%, which demonstrates the prefecture's reduced dependency.

The Status of Forces Agreement has never been modified since its conclusion, not even a word, in its 53-year history. The social environment and environmental awareness of 53 years ago are unfit to today's world. That is why the prefecture has been requesting an operational improvement and review of the Agreement.

The government is making efforts, but our understanding is that despite our repeated requests for the reduction of the military base burden, there has not been any substantial tangible progress.

In conclusion, I would like to state that Okinawa's base issues should always be tackled with initiatives that place Okinawans first. Residents of Okinawa should be of the utmost importance when it comes to finding a solution, and the problem of Okinawa having to bear the burden of most bases in Japan should be discussed and debated on a national scale. In this context, I would ask that discussions take place in a fair and just manner.

It is my sincere wish and hope that global peace diplomacy and its effort should continue tirelessly for the peace and security of Okinawa.
Okinawa Asia-Pacific Partnership Forum
“Peace and Security in East Asia”

Session 3
Okinawa’s Role for Peace in East Asia
1. Characteristics of Okinawa
   - History
   - Geography
   - Economy

2. Role of Okinawa I: Centre of an Integrating East Asia
   - Development of communications technology ⇒ movement of things of all sorts beyond borders
   - Political conflict ⇔ integration of economy and society
   - Historical and geographical advantages of Okinawa ⇒ needs to catch up economically

3. Role of Okinawa II: Centre of Gravity for Stability in East Asia
   - Realities of tensions between nations in East Asia
   - Centre of Gravity in the order of power ⇒ foundation for building agreement and trust
   - Centre of Gravity in the order of norms ⇒ stage for dialogue and cooperation
   - Centre of Gravity for emotions ⇒ place for healing and comfort for all
I. Destabilizing Factors in East Asia

A. Persistence of Cold War Legacy Conflicts: Korea and Taiwan

B. Shift in the Regional Power Balance: Strategic Mistrust and the Security Dilemma

C. Territorial Disputes and Competition for Maritime Resources

D. Populist Nationalism and the Unfinished Task of Historical Reconciliation

II. Promoting Peace in East Asia and the Role of Okinawa

A. From Military Deterrence to Mutual Security

B. Crisis Management, Crisis Prevention, and Codes of Conduct

C. Maritime Security as a Common Good

D. Cooperation on “Non-Traditional” Security Issues (Environment, Human Security, Disaster Relief, etc.)

III. Remembrance, Reconciliation, and a Shared Regional History
I. Why Now? · The Changing Order in East Asia

As China’s rapid growth and Japan’s long economic slump set the stage for China to overtake Japan in terms of national power, the friction between the two nations has become more evident, and the order that was built during the cold war era is beginning to change. Okinawa has historically maintained close ties with Japan, the U.S., China, and Taiwan, or the “three major powers plus one” that have always exerted their influence in the East China Sea in some form, and now is the time for Okinawa to take the initiative to leverage its unique soft power—built over many centuries—to make its contribution to create a new framework of peace in East Asia.

II. Why Okinawa? · Four Faces of Okinawa’s Soft Power

Soft power captivates and wins the respect of people through culture and values, contributes to peace of mankind, and positively influences the building of a new regional and world order. It is precisely because Okinawa has seen many glorious and tumultuous times in its history that Okinawa has a unique soft power not seen anywhere else in East Asia. The four faces of Okinawa’s soft power are: History of "Bankoku Shinryyo," diverse and flexible culture, softness of identity, and relentless pacifism.

III. Okinawa’s Role: Leveraging Okinawa’s Soft Power for Peace in East Asia

Okinawa’s task today is to determine how to leverage its soft power to maintain peace in the East China Sea and East Asia. There are three important issues in this context: Becoming self-aware of its soft power and the establishment of a framework to promote the Bankoku Shinryyo initiative, widespread permeation of the influence of Okinawa’s soft power through "three major powers plus one" from all angles, and the use of Okinawa’s soft power as a lubricant to ease the friction between Japan and China as well as other regional conflicts.
Session 3: Summary of Discussion

Presentations were made on the topic of Okinawa's role for peace in East Asia by Dr. Akio Takahara, Dr. Mike Mochizuki, and Dr. Chuan-Tiong Lim, followed by a discussion coordinated by Vice Governor Kurayoshi Takara.

Dr. Takahara stated that Okinawa is expected to assume the role of being the "center of a unifying East Asia" and the "gravity center of East Asia that brings stabilization," with the challenge being how to expand economic ties with neighboring countries and regions as well as how to develop human resources required to make that a reality. He also explained Okinawa's power of relief and its potential as a place of comfort.

Dr. Mochizuki argued that Okinawa can become a new intellectual hub for comprehensive peace and security, and called on Okinawa to contribute in the following five ways: 1) facilitate a shift from military deterrence to mutual security; 2) discuss crisis management, crisis prevention, and codes of conduct; 3) promote the idea of maritime security to protect shared interests; 4) foster international cooperation on "non-traditional" security issues; and 5) promote regional reconciliation about the past through remembrance, memorials, and historical dialogues to develop a shared history.

Dr. Lim proposed the Bankoku Shinryou initiative to contribute to the peace in East Asia using Okinawa's soft power. Dr. Lim described what Okinawa's soft power is and explained that it is important that Okinawa recognizes its soft power as well as establishes a framework to leverage such power that ensures omnidirectional exchange within "three major powers plus 1," along with uses its soft power as a lubricant to ease the tension between Japan and China, and other regional conflicts.

The discussion sought to determine keywords for Okinawa to assume a meaningful role in securing peace and security in East Asia. Dr. Takahara advocated for more research about China, Dr. Mochizuki argued the importance of having a reconciliation process to ease the strategic distrust in the region, and Dr. Lim indicated a need for Okinawa to be more confident and proactively seek to convey to others its values and ways of thinking.

(Edited by Research Section)
Okinawa Asia-Pacific Partnership Forum
“Peace and Security in East Asia”

Session 4
Panel Discussion
Summary of Panel Discussion

In the panel discussion to conclude the forum, panelists Dr. Michishita, Dr. Shi, Dr. Yang, Dr. Chuan-Tiong Lim, Dr. Mochizuki, Dr. Akamine, Dr. Cheng-Yi Lin, and Vice Governor Takara discussed the "Final Settlement" idea proposed by Dr. Shi and also Okinawa's soft power emphasized by Dr. Lim. The panel discussion was coordinated by Dr. Takahara.

Dr. Shi began by elaborating his “Final Settlement” idea. He said that China is not recognized by the U.S. as a major strategic power now, but through a peaceful process like a “Final Settlement,” China will be recognized as a non-hegemonic major power.

In response to this, Dr. Mochizuki said that China is already a permanent member of the UN Security Council with a voice and is already recognized as a major military power. He added that China may be seeking a geographical distinction, and it would be ideal to mutually develop a common concept of security. He also raised a concern that a settlement between the U.S. and China alone might create tension among other nations.

Dr. Michishita said that it would be difficult for the U.S. to accept a “Final Settlement” because China has not accepted democratic and liberal values, and since massive criticism and pressure would certainly surface within China, a “Final Settlement” would be difficult for both sides. He said that a process is needed to expand cooperation and reduce areas of conflict while properly dealing with the military tension and confrontation.

On the topic of the tension in the East China Sea, Dr. Lin proposed a discussion by pertinent members instead of a “Final Settlement.” He mentioned President Xi’s statement in the joint study session held monthly by the Chinese government and stressed the need to discuss this issue carefully, including opinion exchanges by researchers and experts.

Dr. Shi then responded to these arguments. First, he reiterated that the U.S. does not recognize China as a major strategic power. He also said that discussions on democracy and liberalism are gaining momentum in China, but these values must be adopted to suit China. He concluded by stating that a peaceful “Final Settlement” would be beneficial to both countries.

On the second topic of soft power, Dr. Lim explained his view again: Okinawa should be confident about the power it has and use it to its fullest, and it is important that Okinawa plays a role in promoting exchanges in various areas like economy and education among Japan, China, the U.S., Taiwan, and other countries and regions.
Vice Governor Takara indicated a need to determine how to refine the features of Okinawa’s soft power as well as objectively analyze and study how to yield and leverage that power. He also said that as soft power resources change over time, Okinawans have to make an effort to adapt to the change. He continued to explain that in addition to reviewing and fine-tuning individual assets as Okinawa pushes its soft power overseas, a thought has to be given to the overall strategy consisting of a wide variety of players.

Dr. Akamine introduced the example of the War Remnants Museum in Vietnam. When the head director of the museum visited Okinawa, which had been known as the “island of the devil” in Vietnam for decades, he was genuinely touched by Okinawa’s prayer for peace, and the museum’s exhibits began to change afterward. He also talked about the activities of an international academic association that he belongs to as well as the academic paper database of the University of the Ryukyus and stressed the need for Okinawa to develop a capability to constructively and continuously deliver its soft power, not just in one direction, but in a forward-looking mutually-influential manner.

Dr. Yang said that soft power has the power to make people understand, and Okinawa’s geographical and historical uniqueness enables it to share a worldview with its neighbors in the region as well as pose a question on the contemporary issue of state and its territory; thereby making it a suitable location to consider some basic issues. He also said that it may be possible for Okinawa to brand itself as a hub for international exchange and mutual understanding.

To conclude the discussion, Dr. Takara stated that politics and culture are important factors when considering international relations, and the node that binds the two—nationalism—has to be considered as a global issue. He continued to say that the issue of education, including history and peace studies in addition to how we can instill values in people and spread them throughout the society is an important issue that has to be tackled not only by Okinawa but by the entire world.

(Edited by Research Section)
Okinawa Asia-Pacific Partnership Forum
“Crisis Management and Regional Cooperation in Island Territories”
Crisis Management Effort in Okinawa Prefecture: with a View from Regional Cooperation

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1. Foreword: Crisis and Crisis Management

In 2010, Okinawa Prefecture released the “Okinawa 21st Century Vision” (hereinafter referred to as “21st Century Vision”) that contains the visions and goals the prefecture hopes to achieve in 20 years (by 2030).

One of the five visions is “an island that offers comfort as well as a safe and secure livelihood.” In this context, building a strong crisis management framework is considered an indispensable part of the prefecture’s initiatives (an establishment of a safety net for social risks).

Okinawa is an island prefecture driven by tourism whose borders are also Japan’s borders. It has many unique characteristics, and crisis management is no exception.

The purpose of this report is to identify the characteristics of Okinawa’s crisis management, organize the prefecture’s current initiatives and challenges, and consider the future of Okinawa’s crisis management from the viewpoint of regional cooperation.

Based on the Basic Law on Natural Disasters and the Civil Protection Act, Okinawa Prefecture has the responsibility to secure the safety of local residents and others in the prefecture from various dangers and crises occurring within the territorial bounds of the prefecture. However, since Okinawa is an island prefecture geographically separated from other prefectures, it must secure its own autonomous crisis management capabilities.

2. Characteristics of Okinawa Prefecture in Crisis Management

Since 2011, Okinawa Prefecture has been conducting comprehensive crisis management research to make the 21st Century Vision a reality and to strengthen its crisis management capabilities after the Great East Japan Earthquake.

This research showed that Okinawa, as a tourism-driven prefecture whose borders are also Japan’s borders, should reduce its vulnerabilities and leverage its characteristics in its crisis management.

3. Unique Crisis Management Initiatives of Okinawa Prefecture

i) Overcoming Geographical Disadvantages in Disaster Prevention Plan and Civil Protection Plan (Vulnerability of Island Prefecture)

Okinawa Prefecture is a part of the Nansei Islands located southwest of Japan. It is an island prefecture consisting of 160 islands large and small in the vast waters spanning approximately 1,000km east to west and approximately 400km
north to south.

There are regions with remote islands in the prefecture far removed from mainland Okinawa and mainland Japan, which have frequently experienced traffic shutdown due to typhoons, etc.

Because of this, it may not be entirely possible to provide immediate support in remote regions if a large-scale disaster strikes: Okinawa Prefecture seeks to overcome these vulnerabilities typical of an island prefecture with the Okinawa Regional Disaster Prevention Plan and the Civil Protection Plan.

For example, one of the basic principles of the Okinawa Regional Disaster Prevention Plan is to overcome the “conditional disadvantages such as the remoteness from mainland Japan and scattering of remote islands.”

On the other hand, the prefecture’s Civil Protection Plan dedicates a whole chapter on “measures against armed strikes on an island (chapter 13)” to overcome its vulnerabilities as an island prefecture.

ii) Cooperation with U.S. Forces in Okinawa

Approximately 74% of U.S. military installations in Japan are concentrated in Okinawa, and they occupy about 10% of the prefecture’s land. Because of this, the Disaster Prevention Plan calls for cooperation with not just the Self-Defense Force, but also with the U.S. military to secure an additional means of evacuation and transportation from remote islands. There may also be cooperation between the U.S. military and the governments of municipalities where the bases are located, in the context of disaster prevention and crisis management.

iii) Crisis Management for Tourism

Over 5.5 million tourists, domestic and foreign combined, visit Okinawa each year, as the prefecture is fueled and driven by tourism. Tourism is the biggest industry in Okinawa, and the impact of its success or failure is quite significant on the prefecture’s economy.

Because of this, a chapter is dedicated in the Okinawa Disaster Prevention Plan for the handling of tourists.

In addition, after the Great East Japan Earthquake, the prefecture’s Tourism Promotion Division is leading efforts to develop a tourism crisis management model project.


In the 2012 Comprehensive Crisis Management Study, three areas were identified as challenges in the prefecture’s crisis management system: Human resource development, stocking of food and fuel, and the organizational framework and support system.

The Regional Disaster Prevention Plan was amended in March 2013 to include “talent recruitment from the private sector” as a part of the strengthening of prefecture employees’ disaster prevention capabilities, as the prefecture is making

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1 For example, the economic impact of tourism in 2009 was 661.6 billion yen, which accounted for 9.1% of Okinawa’s GDP. Similarly, the employment impact was 72,468 jobs, which accounted for 12.8% of the workforce. Page 20 of *2011 Tourism Guide* published by Okinawa Prefecture, September 2012.
I. Okinawa Asia-Pacific Partnership Forum
   “Crisis Management and Regional Cooperation in Island Territories”

Efforts to secure sufficient personnel. Similarly, the following text was added to specifically improve the stocking situation: “In order to develop a stocking and procurement system of supplies, materials, and equipment, the prefecture and its municipalities shall be aware of the volume of items in stock that are required in emergency and for restoration, such as fuel, generators, construction machinery, regional stock volume, and supplier stock volume. The prefecture shall make efforts, in cooperation with associate organizations and private entities, to stock materials and equipment whose supply may fall short in times of disaster or develop a system that enables swift procurement thereof.

Also, in terms of building a stronger organization and support system, improvements will be made through agency-wide disaster-prevention training.

The prefecture also views access to regions with remote islands a challenge that needs to be addressed, even though this issue does not fall under any of the three areas aforementioned.

5. Outlook: From the Viewpoint of Regional Cooperation

This report explained Okinawa Prefecture’s characteristics, initiatives, and challenges in the context of crisis management. One recurring theme has been what Okinawa should do with its unique characteristics as an island prefecture. Past initiatives basically focused on overcoming vulnerabilities as an island prefecture.

On the other hand, the 2013 Comprehensive Crisis Management Study points to the need to collaborate with foreign countries/regions in the area of crisis management by leveraging Okinawa’s geographical features.

Being an island prefecture, tourism-driven prefecture, and border location prefecture are all linked with one another, and crisis management considered with this association in mind will likely reduce vulnerabilities and enable more effective crisis management.

From this perspective, it is proposed that Okinawa implement the concept of regional cooperation for disaster management and develop a broad-area disaster prevention hub—dedicated to disaster prevention work even during normal circumstances—that can function as a core of the community.
Crisis Management and International Cooperation of China

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Keywords: China, crisis management, emergency management, Sichuan earthquake, international cooperation, regional cooperation

The Chinese government began taking serious initiatives in crisis management when SARS broke out in winter 2002 and its effects lingered until early summer 2003. Not only was SARS the infection devastating enough, but criticism from organizations like the WHO triggered a global credit crunch whose impact was felt throughout China. The event woke up the Chinese government and the Communist Party, and they began taking crisis management initiatives. The Constitution was amended at the National People's Congress in March 2004.

Against this backdrop of crisis management, the national emergency management system was established sometime during the late 2003 to 2008, consisting of the emergency one-manual tri-system plus the Plan. The emergency one-manual tri-system is comprised of a manual for emergency situations, and three systems (regulation, administration, and mechanism). The Plan is the abbreviation of the Sudden Public Incident Emergency Response System Development Plan. The government determines targets, tasks, prioritized projects, and a budget for a sudden public incident.

The Sichuan Earthquake on May 12, 2008 was the fifth biggest disaster in Chinese history. It was the most devastating earthquake China had ever experienced, having the largest area of damage, and no emergency rescue activities in the nation's history proved to be more difficult.

In the context of post-disaster emergency support, livelihood support, and restoration plan, the following 10 points were highly praised: 1) quick formation of the national emergency initial response team, 2) quick dispatch of rescue units and security police, 3) emergency rescue activities anchored by the most advanced technology and equipment, 4) global information disclosure, 5) restoration measures that placed people’s livelihood first, 6) restoration-related regulatory development, 7) acceptance of foreign aid for the first time ever, 8) mutual assistance among municipalities, 9) creation of the restoration plan based on damage evaluation and environmental assessment, and 10) involving volunteers like NGOs, both domestic and overseas, as well as local residents.
I. Okinawa Asia-Pacific Partnership Forum
   “Crisis Management and Regional Cooperation in Island Territories”

   It is safe to say that a disaster learning mechanism is evident in how nations in East Asia deal with disasters like earthquakes. For 1976 Tangshan earthquake, 1995 Great Hanshin earthquake, 1999 Jiji earthquake, 2004 Chuetsu earthquake, 2008 Sichuan earthquake, and 2011 Tohoku earthquake, the restoration plan and policies were drafted with the ones from the past as a reference. It is true that in the context of natural disaster prevention and crisis management in East Asia, especially Japan and China, international cooperation among governments, private entities, NGOs, and other organizations of various levels drive the learning mechanism.

   For disasters and crises concerning the air, environment, and sea in East Asia regions, more focus should be placed on regional cooperation in addition to cooperation among nations. It is necessary to develop a regional cooperation program with improved feasibility to assist the building of an international cooperation framework in various regions. It is also necessary to exchange information on regional crisis management, establish a regional crisis management forum, and build a disaster early warning system in regions.
Taiwan is an island state with a frequent natural disasters, primarily typhoons, water disasters, landslides, mudslides, and earthquakes. Most disasters are caused by typhoons and heavy rain.

On the other hand, mainland Okinawa is closer to Taiwan than Tokyo, and given the relatively similar conditions and strong inter-relationship in the context of disaster environment, both Taiwan and Okinawa stand to incur enormous damage if a large earthquake strikes in the Ryukyu Trench. Climate conditions are very similar as well, especially typhoons and the raining season front. Since Taiwan and Okinawa are close geographically and share a common disaster environment, it is meaningful and even necessary for the two to share their experiences in disaster prevention and cooperate mutually.

After Typhoon Toraji devastated Taiwan in 2001, the Typhoon Pre-Disaster Response System was established. This system has succeeded in reducing typhoon-related disasters after undergoing a few dozen cases of implementation, application, correction, and enhancement. This presentation will explain the Typhoon Pre-Disaster Response System and share some of Taiwan’s experiences for better crisis management in island territories.

Typhoon Toraji in July 2001 and the localized heavy rain that came with it triggered massive mudslides and landslides in the central and eastern parts of Taiwan, devastating the areas and causing more than 200 people to go missing or lose their lives. Citizens urged the government to establish a better system of disaster rescue and disaster prevention methods.

Under the series of disaster prevention science and technology research plans, an initiative to create a hazard map that enables people to predict the amount of rainfall and areas affected based on the direction of the typhoon, as well as potential areas where floods and mudslides might occur, was successful to a degree and this result was organized and ultimately utilized in typhoon disaster prevention, pre-disaster evacuation calls, and disaster rescue.

Effectiveness of the Pre-Typhoon Disaster Response System showed a steady improvement after a few years of application, but the system’s capability has been put to test in recent years by typhoons that brought extremely intense torrential
rain. Typhoon Morakot in 2009, in particular, devastated the southern part of Taiwan causing deep-seated landslides and wide-area flooding, and over 700 people died or went missing as a result. After Typhoon Morakot, the aforementioned pre-disaster response system was enhanced. Specific initiatives include the re-building of a disaster control (emergency) support platform that integrates various information on disaster and disaster prevention as well as the disaster prediction model, the enhancement to communicate information and orders more effectively, and the improvement of the rescue mechanism.

The purpose of the Pre-Disaster Response System is to reduce damages caused by disasters and prevent deaths by taking necessary disaster prevention measures before such disasters occur. However, there are many issues in practice. What is most important is for departments and agencies responsible for disaster prevention to cooperate and work together.

Also, implementing a plan to enhance the community’s ability to prevent disasters will certainly improve the citizens’ overall disaster prevention ability, and this should result in preventing deaths and reducing damages in disaster emergency situations.

Since Taiwan and Okinawa are very close and have similar disaster environments, it is meaningful and even necessary for them to exchange information on disaster management and cooperate mutually. For example, they can exchange technologies and people related to disaster control, share disaster-related data (particularly data collected during the disaster), and build a framework for mutual cooperation in the event of a large-scale disaster. This is why it is important for the two to start communicating before a disaster strikes, and begin cooperating mutually.
1. Background
As the Cold War came to an end in early 1990, the world was just beginning to witness a more complex and dynamic security environment. In addition to increasing man-made disasters such as terrorist attacks that have caused huge economic losses and human lives, natural disasters, often in the forms of earthquakes, typhoons, floods, tsunamis, draughts and others, have also taken their toll across the world.1

As a result and policy response, how to effectively and efficiently manage the disaster of both kinds and successfully perform the task of crisis management, with the relief assistance of neighboring countries, regional intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) if necessary, has become priority issue not only for international community as a whole, but also for governments of all nations at all levels as well.2

In fact, as a policy tool and institutional arrangement for crisis management, Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) has often been regarded as a coordinated, holistic and systemic policy response and capacity-building initiatives that are designed to enhance resiliency, and to prevent, prepare and manage various potential disasters.3

2. The Concept and Practice of Critical Infrastructure Protection
CIP, as a national program, was first officially proclaimed by the US Presidential Directive PDD-63 in 1998, and was legally defined by the Patriot Act of 2001 and broadened by the US Presidential Directive HSPD-7 in 2003 as “the Identification, prioritization, and protection of the physical and virtual systems that are so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety.”4 Since then, CIP continued to be further developed to manage the protection of 18 critical infrastructure sectors and their sub-sectors and critical elements, mainly including energy, water, transportation, information and communication, emergency responders, agriculture, finance, government, and others. In essence, the significance of these critical infrastructure (CI) such as networks, services, systems or assets, can be understood as the lifeblood and backbone of the country that are very much vital to societal sustainability, economic development, public safety and national security.

Like US, all major EU countries and Canada and Australia have also designated a specific government unit or task force at central level to take charge of the CIP policy issues and allocated resources to develop a CIP strategy or action plan to integrate or coordinate national efforts especially with local governments, community, and the private sectors. While it takes inter-agency coordination and
1. Okinawa Asia-Pacific Partnership Forum
“Crisis Management and Regional Cooperation in Island Territories”

whole-of-government approach to mobilize government machinery to engage in CIP, it also requires a mechanism of public-private-partnership to make CIP better work. In fact, community participation and enterprise support, among others, are essential to the success of CIP. The process of CIP is carried out in accordance with the principle of risk management as follows: 1) Setting the goals and objectives, 2) identifying assets, systems and network, 3) assessing risks, 4) prioritizing, 5) implementing protective programs and resiliency strategies, 6) measuring effectiveness.

3. CIP, Risk Management, and Disaster Management
Disaster management shares the same goals and objectives of enhancing resiliency with CIP, and both work to achieve their missions on the basis of risk management. Both CIP and disaster management deem disaster as a continuum that the process of disaster management will include a series of stages of mitigation, prevention, preparedness, prediction & warning, emergency responses, rehabilitation, reconstruction, development and recovery.

It is apparent to note that there is much congruence or overlapping between CIP efforts and disaster management activities. Both all address the importance and necessity of prevention for the threats of disaster and preparedness for the response to disaster should it occur. Both also employ the principle of risk management to better allocate resources to the sectors that face greater risk of disaster. The principle purpose and policy goal of CIP and disaster management have much in common, and their operations and function are often complementary to each other and may be deemed as two sides of the same coin.

4. Challenges to CIP and Disaster Management
Major challenge to the promotion of CIP and disaster management is often indicated as the lack of consistent political will and policy attention of the government and a lukewarm support or indifferent attitude of the community.

It is true that future challenges to CIP and disaster management will be greater in number and more diverse in kind, as the global security environment will only continue to worsen before it gets better. This trend will make the previous three challenges even more urgent and critical as we need to be better equipped and strengthened in order to overcome the challenges from a world of a changing security environment due to the consequence of global climate change and impact of social-political movement.

5. The Significance of Regional Cooperation in CIP and Disaster Management
A successful CIP requires indispensable collaboration & cooperation not only with local partners, but also with other CI sectors of common function in the region. The characteristics of interdependency and interconnection among CI sectors that operates beyond territorial or national boundary makes regional or international cooperation even more important, imperative and inevitable.

In addition to an on-going bilateral cooperation on CIP between Japan and Taiwan that requires more input and support, both sides can also further develop cooperative relations in other CI sectors or regional issues, including marine transportation, public health, and emergency response services, judging from the development of recent tense situation at sea near Tiaoyutai/Senkaku Islands, health implication of regional spread of infectious diseases of avian flu such as H7N9, and historical experiences of disaster management in the Fukushima tsunami disaster & nuclear incident. In fact, it will benefit greater for all if relevant partners of the regional are all invited and involved in the process of risk
management to these matters.

Disaster management cooperation is also one of the few ways and means that Taiwan is able to reach out and fostering its relations with its neighboring countries in the face of China’s diplomatic blockade against Taiwan.

Developing regional cooperation in CIP and crisis & disaster management may start from the forms of mutual visits and field survey, dialogues and forums, seminars and conferences, joint research on program feasibility study, that are instrumental in building up network friendship and mutual trust, sharing information & knowledge and experiences of best practice, and establishing an institutional mechanism to secure cooperative relations and activities among partners. In fact, the previous efforts will also be helpful or useful in reaching consensus and facilitating agreements on cooperation issues. The nature and content of regional cooperation then can move into higher level as necessary and agreed among partners. Signing a memo of understanding or a binding agreement among partners, establishing a formal mechanism or task force within governments, and forming a regional organization are some options that can be considered and adopted as well.

6. Conclusion

Both the establishment of CIP and disaster management require, among others, guidance of the policy, authorization by law and planning with a strategy or action plan, carried out by organization, equipped by technical tools and means, and supported and involved by the community and the private sectors. It will take great efforts and determination to have these elements of requirements in place and put into practice, let alone to further integrate CIP and disaster management into a new institutional arrangement.

However, international experiences regarding the development of CIP and crisis & disaster management systems and cooperation among regional partners may provide some valuable lessons for us. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why we gather here today, sharing our knowledge with each other and looking for a window of opportunity on cooperation issues.

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In 2000, when a series of volcanic eruptions wreaked havoc on the island of Miyakejima, I was one of two vice governors of Tokyo Metropolis, and I was appointed chief of on-site disaster management headquarters. Today I would like to draw on that experience to discuss crisis management in islands.

Miyakejima is an island about 180 kilometers to the south of mainland Tokyo. There are quite a few islands under Tokyo's jurisdiction, and all of them are volcanic. In fact, there are a total of 21 active volcanoes within the boundaries of Tokyo Metropolis, more than in any other prefecture in Japan.

Three major volcanic eruptions occurred in the area under Tokyo's jurisdiction while I was a senior official in the Tokyo Metropolitan Government: two on Miyakejima, with a population of approximately 4,000, in 1983 and 2000; and one on Oshima, an island with a population of about 9,000, in 1986.

Miyakejima is about six hours from the mainland by ferry, and about an hour by air.

Due to natural weather the regularity of the ferry service is about 90 percent, while flight regularity is less than 50 percent.

On the evening of June 26, 2000, I was entertaining a guest from abroad at a restaurant in the heart of Tokyo. A little after 7:30, we were just about to start dinner, when my cell phone rang. It was the head of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government Disaster Prevention Division, calling to tell me that an emergency volcanic alert had been issued on Miyakejima at 7:30 pm. As vice governor I apologized to my guest and went straight back to the office, and from there to a heliport where I boarded a police helicopter and headed to Miyakejima. The first lesson from the Miyakejima eruption was the importance of arrangements for contacting all relevant personnel immediately in the event of an emergency.

By the time my helicopter arrived on Miyakejima the press was already out in force, and microphones were thrust at me from all sides. The questions were not about the eruptions, though. They wanted to know whether I had been in touch with the governor. I answered, "I came here on the governor's orders." Even now, that's all I can say. This is my crisis management.

The second major lesson we learned was the importance of the early response. As soon as I arrived in Miyakejima, I went to the Tokyo Metropolitan Government Branch Office and set up on-site disaster management headquarters in a conference room on the third floor. One key to a strong initial response is getting

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people with a certain level of decision-making power from each organ and agency to assemble at the scene of the disaster.

On the evening of June 26, 2000, after the emergency volcanic alert was issued, the mayor of Miyakemura issued an evacuation advisory for the 2,000 people living on the east side of the island. This was based on data indicating magma movement under the eastern portion of the island. A public elementary and middle school to the north was designated as the evacuation shelter.

Personnel were assembling from every concerned agency and organization, from the Miyakemura municipal government to the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department, the Fire and Disaster Management Agency, the Japan Coast Guard, the Self-Defense Forces, the Japan Meteorological Agency, the University of Tokyo Earthquake Research Institute, and the local health center, as well as the company operating the ferry, the regional power company, and Japan’s major telecommunications firm, NTT. We made it a policy to keep one key person from each of these organizations on hand in the headquarters conference room at all times, day or night. We installed numerous electric outlets and telephone lines in the conference room, including computer outlets. Since we knew Miyakejima was at risk for lava flows from fissure eruptions, we brought in firefighting vehicles and ambulances from Tokyo on a Self-Defense Forces vessel.

After the emergency volcanic alert, a few days passed without any explosive eruptions, and we were told that the magma movement had shifted toward the western coastal area. By the third day or so, the press was clamoring to know long the government would wait before lifting the evacuation advisory. But while the magma may have moved off the island’s west coast, there were still earthquakes swarms shaking the island, and the tremors were strong enough to cause us to hit the brakes when we were patrolling the island by car. On the third day, in the midst of all the clamor, a central government agency declared the island safe. We had no real sense of safety there at on-site headquarters, but the evacuation advisory was lifted with the proviso that "the situation still requires careful monitoring."

After a spate of intense seismic activity on the islands of Kozushima and Niijima to the west, a major eruption began on Miyakejima.

Large eruptions continued through July and August 2000, and during that time the summit collapsed. On August 10, the column of smoke from the volcano reached a height of 3,000 meters.

Altogether, the volcanic ash, rock, and other material emitted from the volcano during those two months, from July through August, is estimated at 22 million cubic meters in volume and 33 million tons in weight.

Ash accumulated on mountainside, and when it rained, the mud came cascading down. The mountain was beginning to collapse.

When the mudslides washed away the road shoulders, the electric power, telephone service, and water supply all came to a halt. Atmospheric conditions often made it difficult to communicate with other parts of the island even with satellite phones. When the on-site disaster management team lost contact with other parts of the island, we would travel back and forth by boat.
at considerable risk.

On August 29 the volcano generated low-temperature pyroclastic flows in two directions. One of those flows reached all the way to the ocean.

These pyroclastic flows were the main reason that the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, in consultation with Miyakemura, made the decision on September 1, 2000, to evacuate the entire island. It was decided that all residents would leave the island for mainland Tokyo over a period of three days, between September 2 and September 4, via any one of the ferries that departed shortly after 2 pm every day.

There were two reasons for taking the evacuation slow. The first was that a hurried evacuation was likely to cause panic and chaos. This is what had occurred in 1986 when the authorities had issued a directive to evacuate Oshima immediately, and it was felt that this time a slower pace was preferable. The second was that the experts were confident that, following the pyroclastic flows of August 29, another release of energy would not occur within the next week to ten days.

We built roads and constructed erosion-control dams one after another. Altogether 57 erosion-control dams were built on the island. When the evacuation directive was lifted, it was not because the eruptions had subsided but because the erosion-control dams had halted the destruction of the island’s infrastructure by landslides and mud flows.

Piers were built as well. After four and a half years, the evacuation directive was finally lifted, and the residents were allowed to return home. Today about two-thirds of the original residents have gone back to live on the island. Since the volcano continues to emit noxious fumes, certain areas are restricted.

Crisis management should be judged not only on the way administrators respond to the immediate crisis but also on whether residents are able to return to their homes and pick up where they left off.

As I see it, emergency management on volcanic islands boils down to two essential elements. The first is evacuation, and the second is restoration of infrastructure and lifeline.
Panelists Dr. Linsheng Gu, Dr. Lian-Chun Chen, Dr. Chung-Young Chang, and Dr. Yasushi Aoyama, with MC Hironobu Nakabayashi, the prefecture's research fellow, discussed in depth the common topics raised during the presentations, and then answered questions from the audience in attendance.

Dr. Nakabayashi reviewed the presentations of each panelist at the beginning, and he asked Dr. Gu, Dr. Chang, and Dr. Aoyama to each elaborate on the need for "self-help"—the ability for individuals to be disaster-aware and help themselves—instead of "public, organizational power."

Dr. Aoyama said that for one to help himself, he would first have to be armed with scientific knowledge, and that is why it is important for people today to be educated. He raised the case of the typhoon that struck the Gulf of Ise in 1959. Over 5000 residents failed to follow the evacuation instructions and died in the incident, highlighting the need for scientific knowledge to recognize danger. He stressed that the most effective form of self-help is efficient evacuation from a danger zone and not just stocking food and water.

Dr. Chang stated that the three basic pillars of disaster control are self-help, regional rescue, and national rescue. He pointed out that while it is important to encourage people to have a fire extinguisher in their homes as well as learn the basic disaster-related knowledge and skills to secure their own safety, many people begin to recognize the need for self-help and how to actually do it when they experience a disaster firsthand. He said that having educational programs, sharing of information, and working together with communities are extremely important for getting people to understand the importance of self-help: although, this requires necessary time and effort.

Dr. Chen said that improving the ability of each resident is one of the most important and needed initiatives to enhance emergency readiness. The power of each resident becomes crucial in emergency situations, like the gathering of disaster information and evacuation, and he reported that in recent years, efforts are being made to raise awareness of disaster prevention in Taiwan in this regard.

Dr. Gu talked about a case where relief goods were sent to the disaster-hit area from many regions and countries after the Great Sichuan Earthquake, but the area had the capability to sustain itself for a month even if it had lost contact with the outside world. He pointed out there is a need to understand the disaster
I. Okinawa Asia-Pacific Partnership Forum
“Crisis Management and Regional Cooperation in Island Territories”

readiness and capabilities of each region, and to treat rural areas like farm villages and mountain communities differently from the urban areas in terms of rescue and relief. He also said that an interest and love for your own community are keys to disaster prevention.

After the first round of panelist comments, the panelists exchanged opinions on tourism safety and how it can be ensured in times of disaster.

Dr. Gu pointed to the need for tour guides to thoroughly understand Okinawa’s potential disasters and crisis management. He stressed the need to educate tourists on the risks of tourism—not just the sense of fun and joy—and the importance of delivering tourists useful information to their mobile devices upon their arrival. He also said that Okinawa as the host needs to understand and be accepting of different cultures and customs of tourists from all over the world.

Like Okinawa, the number of tourists is an increasing trend in Taiwan, stated by Dr. Chen and added that it is important to develop capabilities to deliver information and accommodate various languages, have notices to raise awareness about the potential risks around tourist locations, and improve responsiveness in times of disaster. He also expressed that a manual should be prepared to be ready for any and all situations including earthquakes, typhoons, and traffic accidents.

Dr. Chang talked about initiatives where business entities on their own can ensure the safety of consumers before relying on public institutions like the police, presenting the example of how security personnel are placed at New York’s Times Square. When tourists congregate in a large commercial district, there are more risks in times of natural or human disaster, but people who do business there daily know the area and environment well. Therefore, they can help recognize danger before it presents harm and ensure the safety of others.

Dr. Aoyama stated that the Great Tohoku Earthquake taught us that people need information first and shelter second. Foreign tourists in particular are not proficient in Japanese and have little sense of locality, so the information they access in times of disaster will play a crucial role. He also maintained that it is extremely important to be prepared for disasters that are difficult to predict and to secure evacuation routes and space.

Dr. Gu concluded by urging Okinawa to develop Chinese-speaking workers and help the growth of temporary staffing agencies.

The panelists then answered questions received from the audience. On the issue of disaster prevention chiefs by region, Dr. Chen said Taiwan has central and
regional (provinces and towns/cities) governments, with smaller administrative authorities below that, and the heads and mayors of these administrative authorities are responsible for disaster prevention in their respective areas.

On the issue and challenges of data center business management, Dr. Chang raised two issues concerning information security and system safety maintenance. One is that 80% of obstruction occurs on the premises, so measures are needed against internal threats, and two, precautionary measures such as having firewalls are also needed to protect the system against external obstructions/threats including hacking and viruses. He also said that the data center's location must be carefully considered as well to avoid unnecessary physical damage.

On the topic of quakeproof buildings in China, Dr. Gu responded with the example of the Great Sichuan Earthquake. He said that buildings found in inland China typically use wood and bricks for the lower layers and concrete for the upper layers, making the foundation very fragile and vulnerable. According to Dr. Gu, the government learned its lesson from the Great Sichuan Earthquake that took 90,000 lives, and as a result, has started to create a quakeproof standard and initiatives to raise the awareness of residents. He also mentioned that one of these initiatives included educating inland engineers on modern building technology.

On the topic of rescue/relief measures and transportation in Tokyo in times of disaster, Dr. Aoyama said that domestic and overseas support is assumed, and even though technical support like relief missions and medical aid cannot be handled just by the resources in the Kanto Plain, basic everyday commodities can be sufficiently secured from other areas through ground transport.

Many questions were received, but the panel discussion on crisis management and regional cooperation in island territories at the Okinawa Asia-Pacific Partnership Forum concluded at this point.

(Edited by Research Section)
II. Survey Report

Location of Okinawa
II. Survey Report: In Regards to the Survey on Okinawans’ Impression of China

In Regards to the Survey on Okinawans’ Impression of China

Akio Takahara
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Please go to page 149 for full research findings.

1. Impression of China

For Q1, there was an increase in people who answered “unfavorable impression” compared with the previous year. Considering the timing of this survey, this seems to be the impact of China’s establishment of an air defense identification zone.

A larger number of respondents listed historical issues, China’s military reinforcement and hegemonic action, and confrontation over the Senkaku Islands as the reasons for having such an unfavorable impression. The persisting confrontation over the Senkaku Islands seems to have raised Okinawans’ sensitivity on historical issues and other associated issues like China’s one-party reign, which resulted in the aggravated reaction.

When we observe the regions that listed the Senkaku confrontation as the reason for having an unfavorable impression, the Yaeyama region, which is where the Senkaku Islands are, has the highest percentage, followed by the Miyako region. A high percentage of people in the Miyako region have an unfavorable impression of China also. China should be made aware of this fact.

As for the information source on China and Japan-China relations, television accounts for a large number, similar to the rest of the country. The impact of television seems to be very significant in how people perceive China. From here, it is evident that the exchange between people in the television industry is crucial to improve the image of one another.

2. Impression of Taiwan and the U.S.

Okinawa’s impression of Taiwan (Q2) was not negatively affected by the fishing accord, and actually improved from the previous year. The sense of affinity toward Taiwan is increasing compared with China (Q6). This result might be related to the fact that the survey was done seven months after the agreement of the fishing accord. Other positive news might also have had an impact, such as the less tension between Japan and Taiwan over the Senkaku and the establishment of regular flights between Taipei and Naha by LCCs.

It is very interesting to see in Q5 that a higher percentage of respondents felt a sense of affinity toward the U.S. Perhaps last year’s result was affected by the deployment of Ospreys. It is also possible that an anti-Chinese sentiment had a counteraction.
3. Recognition of Japan-China Relations and Economic Exchange

For the question on the current importance of Japan-China relations (Q4), Okinawa has lower recognition of that importance, compared with the rest of Japan. Perhaps this is because the size of Okinawa’s trade and economic exchange with China is still small, but it could also imply that there is huge potential in Okinawa.

Some see Okinawa as having stronger economic ties than mainland Japan with China, but the reality does not seem to support that as a fact. For the question on the role of Okinawa (Q13), not a large percentage of people chose economic exchange as their answer. Since the Chinese economy is growing at a rapid pace, Okinawa should position itself to benefit from it more, but Okinawans do not seem to be aware of this opportunity.

4. Other Characteristics

A higher percentage of respondents compared with the previous year thought there would be a military conflict between Japan and China (Q8). The percentage for Okinawa is significantly higher than the rest of Japan, and this should be interpreted as Okinawa's sense of urgency for having the Senkaku Islands within the prefectural territory. Having U.S. military bases in the prefecture is perhaps making Okinawans more sensitive concerning military issues.

One of the biggest reasons for having an unfavorable impression toward the Chinese and Taiwanese is the issue of tourist manners. This is particularly evident in Yaeyama, where over 80% of the residents chose this answer. A survey in mainland Japan would not produce such a result. It goes to show how important tourism is for Okinawa. It is necessary to raise the awareness of the Chinese and Taiwanese on this issue.

5. Role and Challenges of Okinawa

On the question of Okinawa's expected role in Japan-China relations (Q12), 67% answered that Okinawa should seek to build a friendship. The fact that Okinawans are strongly aware of Okinawa's potential to play a role in improving Japan-China relations is noteworthy and should be valued. However, not many recognize Japan-China relations as being important, as was evident in Q4. While Okinawans believe that the prefecture should leverage its uniqueness and strengths to improve Japan-China relations, if they are asked to look at that relationship from a national perspective, less Okinawans recognize the importance compared to the rest of the country. It is difficult to interpret this result, but perhaps it reflects the current situation where the amount of actual association, interaction, and exchange is becoming smaller despite the historical and cultural ties.
6. Conclusion

Partially due to the timing of China's establishing the air defense identification zone, the result showed a higher percentage of people having an unfavorable impression toward China compared to the previous year.

Many more people believe that a military conflict will happen between Japan and China. Okinawa's geographical proximity to the site of confrontation is evident.

On the question of Okinawa's expected role in Japan-China relations, 67% answered that Okinawa should seek to build a friendship. Perhaps Okinawa is aware of its own ability to fulfill that role, but the level of its recognition on the importance of playing the role is not that high. A possible explanation is that although economic and cultural exchange with China is expanding, it has not made a large impact on the actual lives of Okinawans besides tourism.

Many interesting suggestions were made in the Survey on the International Exchanges, and it is important to invigorate exchanges in various areas, including economic exchange, which has an enormous upside.

Survey on the International Exchanges (see page 69)

This survey contains many specific suggestions that are very interesting. One way or another, Okinawa needs to promote itself more, but the ideas to promote Okinawa to inland China and facilitate mass media and blogger exchanges are quite insightful.

It is also a good idea to have regular meetings with Taiwan to discuss fisheries rights. In addition, I fully agree with the idea that exchanges that include Pacific nations would enable Okinawa to better excel in international exchange. For example, I would think that an academic exchange between Okinawan universities and the University of the South Pacific (an international institution for higher education co-established in 1969 by twelve Pacific island nations; located in Fiji) may be possible.

The suggestion about simultaneous interpreter training is quite convincing as well. It would be better for interpreters to handle not only Japanese and Chinese, but English also. People should learn English and Chinese to truly go global, and since Okinawa has U.S. military bases and is close to China and Taiwan, I believe that is the type of talent Okinawa should have more of. I also believe that forming a partnership with Fujian Province or Taiwan in developing exchanges with China is an apt idea.
In Regards to the Survey on Okinawans’ Impression of China
-Survey Results Concerning the Senkaku Issue-
Mamoru Akamine
Professor, the University of the Ryukyus

Please go to page 149 for full research findings.

This report extracts questions and answers concerning the Senkaku issue from the survey on Okinawans’ impression of China, conducted in 2013, to observe how Okinawans view the Senkaku issue.

1. Primary issues hindering the development of Japan-China relations

In 2013, in response to Q9: "What do you think are the main issues hindering the development of Japan-China relations?”, 68.4% of Okinawans raised territorial issues, particularly the Senkaku issue, as the main issue, with the nationwide figure as 72.3%. Many in Okinawa and the rest of the nation view the Senkaku issue as a main issue hindering the development of Japan-China relations. China’s maritime policy has been developed rapidly in the East and South China Seas, and China and Japan have been in confrontation over the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. Since the Japanese government nationalized the Senkaku Islands, Chinese vessels have repeatedly violated Japan’s territorial waters, and the Chinese government has unilaterally established an air defense identification zone, which has heightened the tension between Japan and China. In particular, since the Japanese government’s nationalization of the Senkaku Islands, some Chinese have vented their anger by resorting to violent means against Japanese companies, and others have boycotted Japanese products, which have had a significant effect both politically and economically. The effect still lingers as the number of tourists dropped tremendously and numerous cultural exchange events were canceled. The survey results illustrate this situation very clearly.

2. Do territorial issues exist?

The Senkaku sovereignty issue is a complicated and multi-layered dispute. The pre-1895 sense of ownership by China and post-1895 effective control by Japan in accordance with international laws (occupancy right) are at odds with one another, and more recently, Taiwan’s claim to traditional fisheries rights have made the situation even more complicated. Until now, the Japanese government has consistently claimed that the Senkaku Islands belong to Japan and there are no territorial issues. However, in response to Q15: "Do you think there are territorial issues between Japan and China?”, 65.2% of Okinawans said “issues exist,” and this figure was 62.7% nationwide. 19.4% of Okinawans answered “issues do not exist,” compared to 17.6% nationwide. These figures are significantly less than the
"issues exist" figures. It is evident from the survey results that the Japanese government's position is not being supported by its people, and that Okinawans and the Japanese in general believe that the Senkaku issue is developing into a serious territorial dispute.

3. Risk awareness

On that sense of crisis, in response to Q14: "In recent years, the confrontation between Japan and China over the Senkaku and surrounding islands is becoming heated. Do you think there will be a military conflict between the two nations?", 7.1% of Okinawans and 2.4% nationwide answered "I think it will arise within several years," whereas 43.0% of Okinawans and 21.3% nationwide answered "I think it will arise in the future." A gap is evident between the Okinawan and national figures. The figures illustrate Okinawans' high level of risk awareness from having dealt with many U.S. military bases over the years. The issues of Futenma AB's relocation to Henoko and the deployment of the Self-Defense Force to Yonaguni are only exacerbating Okinawans' concern over the U.S. military bases and the possibility of war—a concern that Okinawans live with every single day. Given that the Japan-U.S. alliance is a military alliance, there are still doubts about its effectiveness in preventing war, and the figures seem to show a gap between how people in Okinawa—where bases are a part of everyday life—see the situation, compared to the perception of people in mainland Japan.

4. Solution

In terms of solutions to the Senkaku issue, in response to Q15SQ: "How do you think this issue should be solved?", 10.8% of Okinawans chose "(the Japanese government) should reinforce Japan's effective control to protect its territory." This figure is very low even though this has consistently been the official position of the Japanese government. In fact, 43.0% of Okinawans said "the two nations should negotiate immediately and seek a peaceful solution," 11.5% chose "they should not hurry a solution but avoid accidental military confrontations first", 5.3% chose "(the issue) should be shelved for the long term, and for now we should aim for joint development of resources," and 26.3% selected "they should file the case with the International Court of Justice and resolve the issue according to international laws." The results for 43.0% who felt "the two nations should negotiate immediately and seek a peaceful solution," and the 26.3% who chose "they should file the case with the International Court of Justice and resolve the issue according to international laws" are very high in numbers and can be interpreted as a representation of Okinawans' wish for the government to stop denying the territorial dispute and change its policies to achieve a peaceful solution. 5.3% for "(the issue) should be shelved for the long term, and for now we should aim for joint development of resources" is not a high figure by any means, but there seems to be an underlying sentiment by Okinawans to make certain concessions to the Chinese side. It should be noted that some Okinawans seem to feel that making only a unilateral territorial claim will not lead to a solution.
5. Reasons why Okinawans have an unfavorable impression of China

Reasons for having an unfavorable impression of China: 65.1% of Okinawans and 53.2% nationwide chose "Because conflict over the Senkaku Islands is continuing". Although there is a gap between the two figures, both figures exceed 50% and this is extremely high. On the other hand, Taiwan is at odds with the Japanese government over the Senkaku issue as well, but in response to Q8: "What kind of impression do you have of Taiwan?", 17.2% chose "favorable impression" and 62.6% chose "somewhat favorable impression," which totals to 79.8%. Unlike Taiwan, which is known to be pro-Japan and made a donation to the quake-ravaged Tohoku restoration efforts immediately after the disaster, China has given a quite negative impression on the Japanese for the following reasons: China conducts anti-Japanese education; it harshly criticizes Japan on the issues of textbooks and perceptions of history; it has environmental pollution such as PM 2.5; and it demonstrates hegemonic behavior. Overall, the Japanese have an extremely unfavorable impression of China.

Needless to say, the media played a huge role in creating such an impression. This is evident in the responses (check all applicable choices) to Q5: "What is your primary source of information concerning China and Japan-China relations?", whereas 97.2% of Okinawans and 95.0% of Japan chose "Japanese news media," and 33.0% of Okinawans and 25.2% of Japan selected "Japanese TV drama, information programs, and films." It is safe to say that the image the Japanese has of China and its people are being created by mass media. In that sense, the responsibility of mass media is significant. Media coverage which agitates the sense of crisis excessively leads to positive evaluation on the reinforcement of the Japan-U.S. alliance to restrain China and the development of the Self-Defense Forces to Yonaguni Island. It also helps increase the opinions to support the containment policy toward China. In the meantime, the Air Self-Defense Force is concerned about possible contingencies in case of mutual scramble in the overlapping air defense identification zone.

For Okinawa, with all the bases, the Senkaku issue is a very serious. Considerations have to be made immediately to avoid any potential crisis. Perhaps it is inevitable that the Senkaku issue has contributed to the mounting anti-China sentiment and feelings, but this is by no means a favorable situation. Shelving the Senkaku issue will not solve it and will instead continue to cast a dark shadow upon the Japan-China relations.

According to the results of this survey, an overwhelming number of people wish for a peaceful resolution. Because the Senkaku Islands belong to Okinawa Prefecture and the prefecture has military bases, the Senkaku issue is a political issue that needs to be resolved with composure and prudence. The government surely understands that the Senkaku issue will not be resolved simply by denying its existence and firmly dismissing the claims of China and Taiwan. The survey results show that people have a strong desire for the government to seek a peaceful resolution.
II. Survey Report: Survey on the International Exchanges

Survey on the International Exchanges

1. **Purpose**
   To review the international exchanges records and Okinawa's role in promoting exchanges and to identify the prefectural functions to encourage further communication and mutual understanding in the future through interviewing those who have been involved in private exchanges between Okinawa and overseas.

2. **Subject**
   The survey of 2013 conducted interviews with individuals who belong to exchange groups based in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, and who work in the fields of business, culture and so on.

3. **Method**
   Interview

4. **Period**
   November to December 2013

**[List of Interviewees]**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Chairman Shibagun Agarie, Japan Okinawa Chinese Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Head Director Koji Kamimura, Kumesouseikai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Chairman Unsen Shimabukuro, Okinawa New Overseas Chinese Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Head Director Shoichi Uema and Deputy Head Director Wu Yuanghua, Jo Hoko no Michi wo Ayumo Kai (Association to Walk the Path of Xu Baoguang)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Branch Director Kenichi Uezato, Okinawa Branch, Japan-China Friendship Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Chairman Kunimoto Hayashi, Ryukyu Chinese Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Japan-Hong Kong Society in Okinawa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Journalist Yoshitaka Matsuda, Yaeyama Daily Newspaper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Yuki Izumikawa, Association for the Promotion of International Trade, Japan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chairman Shibagun Agarie,  
Japan Okinawa Chinese Association

The association was established in 1973 to become a bridge between China and Okinawa in the areas of economy, tourism, and culture. It promotes friendship between Japan and China, and also between the Japanese and Chinese in Okinawa, including students. It also handles some business on behalf of the Consulate General of the People's Republic of China in Fukuoka, provides Chinese translation and interpreting services, and runs Chinese language classes.

1. Current Status and Future of Exchange Activities

Every year, we participate in and support various types of friendship and exchange events. In 2013, we celebrated our 40th anniversary, and in March, we participated in and supported "Akemodoro," a cultural festival celebrating friendship among China, Japan, Amami, and Okinawa.

We would still like to keep on hosting the Japan-China friendship karaoke, which is an event we have held every year since 2004. The news of the Senkaku nationalization put that year's event at risk for a short while, but despite political tensions, many people wanted the event to be held, and in the end, it was held with the effort of supporters. The story was even featured in national news.

2. Role of Okinawa and Expectations for Okinawa Prefecture

Okinawa residents' history, culture, and living habits cannot be discussed without China as they are deeply intertwined. We feel that it is our important mission to be a bridge for exchanges between Japan and China and believe that Okinawa is in the most suitable location for this.

3. Other

The association organizes civil exchange activities in areas including culture and economy to promote friendship between Okinawa and China and serve as a bridge between them. Through these activities, the association promotes mutual understanding between Okinawa and China, encourages economic exchanges among businesses, and contributes to the economic development of the local community.

Currently, Japan and China are at odds with one another, but the people in those countries want to have a friendly relationship with their neighbor. It is precisely times like this, our association needs to step up and protect the bridge of friendship between Okinawa and China that our ancestors had built, like the courageous Ryukyuan emissary in the Age of Exploration. The association will continue to respect history and fulfill its current responsibilities to maintain peace and seek further development, and our goal is to usher in a new era of exploration with the Ryukyus and China as the main players.
Head Director Koji Kamimura, Kumesouseikai

The organization was established by the descendants of Kumesanjurokusei, who had traveled from China to the Ryukyus, in order to systematically manage associated facilities. It celebrates its 100th anniversary in 2014. The goals of Kumesouseikai are to raise the level of morals, manage facilities and execute rituals and events, develop human resources, and contribute to world peace.

1. Current Status and Future of Exchange Activities

In addition to providing support for international exchange between Naha City and Fuzhou City, the organization assists students from/to China, and holds training and seminars for the general public.

We also support motion picture filming and events held at Fukushuen.

Meirindo, a facility we manage, was the first ever school in Okinawa. We want to continue to educate people and do the things our ancestors had done.

2. Role of Okinawa and Expectations for Okinawa Prefecture

Okinawa has much deeper economic and cultural ties with China, compared with other prefectures, and this makes Okinawa suitable to be a bridge between Japan and China. Its historical background should not be wasted.

In the past, Okinawa had a relationship with China under a tributary system, and it has always sought to develop trade channels overseas. I want Okinawa to be a place that conveys messages of peace. Okinawa understands the long history of exchange and confrontation between China and Japan as a third party, and therefore should play a role in cultural exchange programs, etc.

It would be nice to be able to work with the prefecture to renovate Tensonbyo and Tenpigu and recreate Naminoue in its original form. I want it to be a tourism attraction that enables cultural exchange. Having the right facilities there will facilitate learning for children, and our tradition will get passed on.

3. Other

Kumesouseikai’s members have a strong sense of identity as Okinawans, unlike other Chinese people.

Kume Village has sent students to China for the past 500 years, and we have made efforts to promote this historical fact. Supporting motion picture filming is a part of that effort.

Although a few visitors have manner problems, our facilities draw a high interest from Chinese people, and many Chinese tourists actually visit them.
Chairman Unsen Shimabukuro,
Okinawa New Overseas Chinese Association

The purpose of the association is to build a network of local Chinese residents consisting primarily of those residing in Okinawa and promote civil exchange between Japan and China in various areas such as economy, culture, science and technology, and fine arts. It was established in 2010 and has 130 individual members, in addition to 23 corporate members that either do business targeting Chinese tourists or have a presence in China.

1. Current Status and Future of Exchange Activities
   We hold events like the Chinese New Year party and Chinese film festival, and regularly organize Japan-China karaoke competitions and sports competitions every year.
   We also organize a forum biennially with the support of the Consulate General or JETRO.
   Our current exchange activities are mainly in the areas of culture and arts, but we'd like to expand the scope to include golf gatherings and bridal projects—business activities whose impact is not temporary—that have reasonable economic effects.
   We have more young members compared with the Japan Okinawa Chinese Association, but we are not competing against each other, as we are both doing our best in the areas of our strength.
   We want to create a better image for the Chinese, too. We feel it is our mission to strengthen Japan-China relations as well.

2. Role of Okinawa and Expectations for Okinawa Prefecture
   We need to figure out better ways to promote Okinawa to attract more tourists. Perhaps Okinawa Prefecture and its municipal governments should cooperate to promote Okinawa to inland China and not just areas like Fuzhou, Beijing, and Shanghai.
   The level for hospitality toward Chinese visitors seems inconsistent. We do not feel passion on the Okinawa side in some cases.
   Perhaps there is a need to allocate more budgets for exchange initiatives to increase advertisements do and raise the awareness of corporations.

3. Other
   The way the Chinese think is different whether they were born before or after the Chinese economic reform. The younger generation tends to place more weight on economic and business exchanges rather than being sentimental about their homeland.
Jo Hoko no Michi wo Ayumo Kai  
(Association to Walk the Path of Xu Baoguang)

This association produced the documentary film *Xu Baoguang’s Ryukyus: The tributary system and the Ryukyus* in 2013. It was founded to revisit the footprints of Chinese envoy Xu Baoguang and engage in international friendship exchange activities. It supports students in China, hosts Chinese cuisine fairs, and tries to reenact "crown ship" dishes. The association has about 100 members.

1. Current Status and Future of Exchange Activities
   
   We hosted an event in February 2013 at Shikinaen where we prepared culinary "crown ship" delights from the documentary film *Xu Baoguang’s Ryukyus: The tributary system and the Ryukyus* for guests from Okinawa as well as outside the prefecture. The event was very well received. Currently, we are developing eight types of crown ship snacks with Japanese and Chinese researchers and would like to commercialize them in the future.

   The film on Xu Baoguang will be submitted to a film festival in Shanghai this June. The next film to be produced will target a younger audience with Xu Baoguang as the theme.

   We also plan to start a semimonthly radio project with the city of Wuxi, Jiangsu Province, China, in which we interview each other about the counterpart’s attractions. The association will continue to be involved in exchange activities in the areas of culture, arts, and education and is even developing a tour to relive the Royal cuisine, historical site, and dance from 300 years ago.

2. Role of Okinawa and Expectations for Okinawa Prefecture

   We have to recognize that in the past and present, Okinawa has been the Great Ryukyus, and that Okinawa should leverage the special place it holds for China from over 500 years of exchange.

   An environment/system is necessary to make traveling to Okinawa easier for the Chinese. To get more information out, perhaps we should engage with people in the media, municipal governments, and bloggers both in Okinawa and China and organize mutual visits. That should tell us the real story about China.

   In China, there is a culture to exchange commemorative gifts, and it would be nice if governments in Okinawa can start doing the same.

3. Other

   Much of the impression of China has been heavily influenced by the media, but it is not good for either side to have a negative impression of the other without actually engaging in an exchange.

   Xu Baoguang once wrote in his poem that the Ryukyus (Okinawa) is a cousin of China, and this idea is still valid to this day. I believe that historical and cultural ties are deeply rooted and cannot easily be severed.
Branch Director Kenichi Uezato, Okinawa Branch, Japan-China Friendship Association

The Japan-China Friendship Association was founded in 1950 to deepen mutual understanding and friendship between Japan and China and help achieve peace in Asia and the rest of the world. The Okinawa branch was established in 2005, and many of the members are Japanese with no roots in China. Mr. Uezato, the branch director, is an expert of Chinese literature and professor emeritus at the University of the Ryukyus.

1. Current Status and Future of Exchange Activities
   The association offers Chinese language and Tai Chi classes to members, and also provides short-term foreign student support in partnership with Xi’an Jiaotong University in China.
   Every year, we hold receptions with foreign students and local Chinese residents. This year, we held an event at Fukushuen to eat Chinese dumplings, and the event was very well received.
   Since the establishment of the association, we have been offering Japanese language lessons and livelihood support to Chinese repatriates.

2. Role of Okinawa and Expectations for Okinawa Prefecture
   Networks of sister prefectures/cities like Okinawa Prefecture and Fujian Province, Naha City and Fuzhou City, and Urasoe City and Quanzhou City must be used effectively. We should utilize the assets we’ve accumulated to deepen the civil exchange between Fujian and Okinawa.
   There is also a need to disseminate more information about Okinawa and Japan and get the Chinese to understand us more.
   The territorial issue may be handled by the governments, but as for the issue of fishing rights, we would like to see regular meetings and dialogues between Japan and Taiwan and try to find a solution carefully.
   China is important, of course, but Okinawa should actively seek exchanges with other Asian countries and countries in the Pacific to fully leverage its strengths in the context of international exchange. Success in this area will potentially be very fruitful.
   We would also like to see the revival simultaneous interpreter development program, once ran by the prefecture. It would be ideal for the prefecture to develop human resources in the areas such as history, culture, industry, medicine, and trade, and give young people opportunities to apply their abilities and skills.

3. Other
   The Japan-China Friendship Association publishes the Japan-China Friendship Newspaper (four times a month) and research magazine Seasonal China (four times a year). We also published a paper titled "The Senkaku issue and Okinawa."


Chairman Kunimoto Hayashi, Ryukyu Chinese Association

The purpose of the Ryukyu Chinese Association is to promote friendship among Taiwanese and Chinese in Okinawa and accelerate economic cooperation and cultural exchange. It was founded by Taiwanese immigrants who moved to Okinawa in the 50's and 60's as a way to deal with various negotiations to secure their livelihood after reversion.

1. Current Status and Future of Exchange Activities

We organize about 10 events a year including educational exchanges, sports exchanges, and exchanges between women's associations and chambers of commerce.

We are also involved in exchanges among businesses as well as official exchange projects of Taiwan and Okinawa Prefecture, rendering our support.

In February 2013, we held a lantern festival in Saion Square for the very first time. We want to make this a regular event and continue making efforts in other exchange activities.

2. Role of Okinawa and Expectations for Okinawa Prefecture

We would like Okinawa Prefecture to play a leading role in making exchange activities a success, like establishing a goodwill organization between Okinawa and Taiwan.

China will continue to be a great power. That is why we have to be interested in China. We need to change our mindset and make more of an effort in understanding China. It might be worth considering to partner with Taiwan to engage in exchange activities with Fujian and China, since Taiwan has very strong ties with Fujian.

Large corporation on mainland Japan are utilizing Naha Airport Cargo Terminal facilities, but Okinawan corporations have not been able to do the same. The current system should be improved so that it is easily accessible.

3. Other

The depreciating yen, 2020 Tokyo Olympics, and the addition of Japanese food to the world heritage have all contributed to the rising global interest in Japan. The number of foreign tourists to Japan is expected to increase over the next five years. Okinawa has to capitalize on this opportunity as well.

Okinawans’ impression of Taiwan was favorable according to the survey, but the impression of China was unfavorable. This is by no means a good result for Okinawa.

II. Survey Report: Survey on the International Exchanges

The Japan-Hong Kong Society in Okinawa

The association was established in 2008 with the purposes of deepening mutual understanding between Okinawa Prefecture and Hong Kong and promoting exchange and development in the areas of industry, economy, trade, and culture while collaborating with pertinent governmental authorities.

1. Current Status and Future of Exchange Activities
   We hold a seminar around the time of the Chinese New Year, inviting people from Hong Kong and Okinawa and those associated with the Hong Kong market.
   In May 2013, we participated in the Asian Forum held at Bankoku Shinryokan and exchanged opinions with participants from various Asian countries on the topic of business development in Asia.
   Because our office is located inside the chamber of commerce office, our activities are focused in the area of economic exchange. We want to develop products that have potential in the Hong Kong market, besides beer and awamori.

2. Role of Okinawa and Expectations for Okinawa Prefecture
   Okinawa and Hong Kong started to have economic ties relatively early. It is my understanding that the cooperative framework with the prefecture is established to a degree with the backing of Okinawa Products Associated Co., Ltd. We want to continue to develop it.

3. Other
   At the Asian Forum in May, it was suggested that the best way to minimize business risks in China is to set up a location in Hong Kong—the so called "one cushion" approach. I believe the role of Hong Kong is important, not only in the context of business in China, but also in other parts of Asia, also.
   Many large corporations including financial institutions already have offices in Hong Kong, and Hong Kong is currently trying to lure small to mid-sized businesses as well. The Hong Kong Trade Development Council is providing support in this matter, and we believe this is an excellent opportunity for Okinawa as well.
Journalist Yoshitaka Matsuda,
Yaeyama Daily Newspaper

He has been covering the connection between Yaeyama and Taiwan for years as a journalist of the Yaeyama Daily. He won the 2010 Shimbun Roren Journalist Award for his work in *Taiwan Evacuation—One Year and Eleven Months of Ryukyuan Refugees*. He also writes on various issues associated with Yaeyama and Taiwan.

1. Current Status and Future of Exchange Activities

   As a journalist, I have covered the connection between Yaeyama and Taiwan for years. I also coordinate regional exchange programs between Yaeyama and Taiwan.

   I want to propose and build a new type of tour, a study tour that features Taiwanese culture (water buffalo, pineapple, etc.) ingrained in Yaeyama. I would also like to run a similar tour in Taiwan and promote mutual understanding. I believe it is ideal for people to visit one another and gain a better understanding mutually.

2. Role of Okinawa and Expectations for Okinawa Prefecture

   I believe that the keyword for exchanges is Okinawa (Yaeyama) as a knot and a hub of the network. Because of its geography, it would be difficult for Okinawa to just do exchanges either with Japan, China, or Taiwan. Okinawa should consider what kind of role it could play as a place where the three parties meet.

   I believe Yaeyama needs a stable means of transportation. People have to go through Naha to get to Taiwan, and this inconvenience is hindering the exchange development. Lack of human resources needs to be addressed also.

3. Other

   The Yaeyama region is home to many immigrants including those from Taiwan and the Philippines. There may be conflicts at times, but the region seems to have the ability to settle and absorb them, like a sponge. This unique ability should be maintained and used to help the development of the region.
Yuki Izumikawa,
Association for the Promotion of International Trade, Japan

The association was established in 1954 with the purpose of promoting economic exchange with socialist countries. It runs various projects related to Chinese businesses and has a direct connection with the Chinese leadership. Mr. Izumikawa was born in Okinawa, and after completing the prefecture's simultaneous interpreter development program, he has been working for the association as an stuff member in charge of exchange activities. He was the interpreter for the association's representative in his meeting with then-Premier Wen Jiabao and then-Vice President Xi Jinping.

1. Current Status and Future of Exchange Activities

The association's activities are focused on economic exchange with China, and it has a wide network of connections from Chinese political leaders to private corporations.

Japan-China economic exchange is no longer limited to regular cargo trade and direct investment to China, but has expanded to include financial cooperation, intellectual property protection and enforcement, and Chinese businesses entering the Japanese market.

Political negations between Japan and China have slowed down exchange due to the Senkaku and history issues, and as a result, the numbers of Chinese government officials' visits and Chinese investment seminars in Japan have dropped. It is important to solve these issues in order to improve the relationship between the two countries.

Japan's and China's economies mutually complement each other at a high degree, and as long as we find a solution to the political issues, further development is expected.

2. Role of Okinawa and Expectations for Okinawa Prefecture

Since the Senkaku Islands belong to Okinawa Prefecture, Okinawa will likely incur the biggest damage should Japan and China clash. Okinawa needs to think about how best to avoid such a situation.

Themes and topics aside, I think organizing more events in Okinawa where politicians, government officials, and private entity leaders can come together and exchange their ideas will promote mutual understanding and drive Okinawa's economic development. To do this effectively, however, the prefecture needs to develop more human resources that understand China well and are highly proficient in Chinese.

3. Other

I am also involved in the activities of the association's Okinawa chapter, and I personally would like to actively contribute to the development of economic exchange between Okinawa and China.
II. Survey Report: Foreign Media Primary Survey

Foreign Media Primary Survey
Shino Hateruma
Researcher, Research Section, Regional Security Policy Division, Executive Office of the Governor

1. Introduction: Purposes and Implementation of Study
In January 2014, the Regional Security Policy Division conducted the foreign media basic research on regional security policy. It studied the contents of the top two newspapers in China, South Korea, and Taiwan, respectively, for the period of January 1, 1995 to December 31, 2013, and investigated how the U.S. military presence in Okinawa is perceived. Specifically, all articles containing the words "Okinawa" and "U.S. forces" in the target newspapers were extracted, and articles of significance and relevance were translated into Japanese for deeper analysis.

The purposes of this study are to understand how foreign media have covered Okinawa's regional security policy issues, including military bases issues, and to create a basic reference for policy-making and further studies.

2. Overview of Findings
The graphs on the following page show the chronological trends of the number of articles concerning U.S. forces in Okinawa in the last 18 years. The horizontal axis represents the year, and the vertical axis represents the number of articles. The top row is for newspapers in China, the middle row for South Korea, and the bottom row for Taiwan.

Among the six papers studied, the two in South Korea and Taiwan's China Times had comparatively low numbers of articles meeting the mentioned criteria. On the other hand, the two Chinese papers and Taiwan's Liberty Times published 20 or more articles per year, demonstrating their high interest in U.S. forces in Okinawa.

The paper that had the least number of articles on U.S. forces in Okinawa in the past 18 years was Taiwan's China Times with 179, while China's Xinmin Evening News Shanghai had the most with 401.

As an overall trend, these newspapers have covered topics such as Futenma base relocation and the realignment of U.S. forces, Okinawa Prefecture's gubernatorial elections and Nago City's mayoral elections, and various incidents/accidents involving U.S. servicemen. A number of articles was particularly high in the following periods: (1) 1995-96 when the rape of a school girl led to base relocation consultations within SACO, (2) 2009-10 when Japan and the U.S. agreed on the Guam relocation and the returning of bases south of Kadena, and (3) 2012 when the Ospreys were deployed to Futenma Air Station.

Difference in coverage was observed by country/region as well. The South Korean media tends to cover U.S. forces and bases in Okinawa in association with North Korea. The Chinese media is inclined to cover in detail Okinawa's elections and local movements, incidents involving U.S. servicemen, and improper remarks by Japanese and American government officials. The Taiwanese media's coverage tends to focus more on the Japan-U.S. defense partnership compared to other countries' media.

3. Perception of U.S. Forces in Okinawa

How do China, South Korea, and Taiwan see and perceive U.S. forces in Okinawa? South Korea is allied with the U.S. and Taiwan has received U.S. military support. It is important to point out that the newspapers in South Korea and Taiwan consider U.S. forces in Okinawa indispensable in ensuring their own security. This perception does not change throughout the study scope of 18 years.

For example, “training performed at bases in Okinawa is absolutely necessary to prepare ourselves for mountainous terrains in South Korea,” an explanation presented by the Marines, was quoted (Korea Joongang Daily, April 23, 1996). Another comment by the USMC Pacific Commander, “the mission of U.S. forces in Okinawa is to remove North Korea’s nuclear weapons rapidly in a contingency,” was quoted as well (Chosun Ilbo, May 24, 2010). The former article also explained what kind of operations the Third Marine Expeditionary Force deployed in Okinawa would conduct in South Korea.

As for Taiwan, the China Times argued that the framework of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and U.S. bases in Okinawa affected the entire region (China Times, October 30, 1995), and the Liberty Times even quoted a statement by the U.S. government: “USMC combat units in Okinawa are indispensable in restraining a
II. Survey Report: Foreign Media Primary Survey

contingency between China and Taiwan” (Liberty Times, July 1, 2005). It also presented a view that “considering the importance of the security treaty for Japan and the Asia-Pacific region, reduction of U.S. bases in Okinawa has its limits,” after the release of SACO’s final report in 1996 (Liberty Times, December 3, 1996).

For South Korea and Taiwan, which constantly face the possibility of a military conflict, U.S. military commitment is necessary and they consider the commitment to be guaranteed by the U.S. presence in Japan. Therefore, the downsizing of U.S. forces in Okinawa is not necessarily perceived in a positive light.

On the other hand, China seems to perceive U.S. forces in Okinawa as a link that connects Japan and the U.S. Regarding the Futenma relocation issue, a Chinese newspaper argued that a conflict between Japan and the U.S. resulted from Okinawa bases issues (People's Daily, September 13, 1996). It also regarded the Futenma base as a large channel that separates Japan and the U.S. (Xinmin Evening News Shanghai, October 27, 2005). China acknowledges that the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan is a stipulation in the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, and believes that the lack of consensus between the Japanese government and the local community on the U.S. base relocation issue could have an impact on Japan-U.S. relations. This perception is shared by Japanese media to a degree.

When the governments of Japan and the U.S. agreed to decouple the relocation of Marine troops to Guam from the construction of the Futenma Relocation Facility in February 2012, a Chinese newspaper argued that the Japan-U.S. alliance was aiming at China, given the military buildup on Guam and the enhanced bilateral security cooperation (People's Daily, February 9, 2012). In other words, China is concerned about the reinforcement of the bilateral security relationship despite U.S. force reductions in Okinawa.

4. For Further Research

Overall, it is worth noting that the countries/region in this study see U.S. bases in Okinawa as an important issue. South Korea and Taiwan consider them important as it would affect their own security. Meanwhile, China has not shared the same view. In fact, there is a growing tendency that Chinese media see U.S. bases in Okinawa as a means for Japan and the U.S. to counter China.

This study confirmed that Japan’s neighboring countries/region are interested in U.S. bases in Okinawa. Further study is needed to determine how their interests could be leveraged in Okinawa Prefecture’s policies. Moreover, it is important to check the content of media coverage on the current situations of Okinawa. Another possible step is to study the perceptions of U.S. forces in Okinawa held by political leaders in the countries/region.
II. Survey Report: Summary of the Foreign Media Primary Survey

Survey Overview

1. Survey Title:
   “Foreign Media Primary Survey”

2. Purpose:
   To collect basic information to understand how Okinawa's U.S. military base issues have been covered by foreign media.

3. Conducted by:

4. Subjects:
   Top two newspapers by circulation in China, South Korea, and Taiwan, respectively, were chosen.
   China: People's Daily and Xinmin Evening News Shanghai
   South Korea: Chosun Ilbo and Joongang Daily
   Taiwan: China Times and Liberty Times

5. Method:
   Created a title list of articles published after 1995 that contained two keywords, "Okinawa" and "U.S. forces," and translated important and relevant articles into Japanese.

*Survey results are not provided in English.
1. Survey Description and Method

• To check the status of Okinawa Prefecture’s crisis management initiatives, Okinawa Prefectural Government conducted a survey study (2013 Crisis and Contingencies Awareness Survey) by mail to find out how Okinawa residents think about crisis management and disaster prevention.
• The study was conducted on 3,135 males and females aged between 15 and 74 years that resided in the prefecture, randomly selected from November 21 to December 12, 2013.

2. Overview of Survey Results

• On average, 15.2% of the prefecture answered that they have seen a local regional disaster prevention plan.
• Among the important items in the Okinawa Prefecture disaster prevention plan, many Okinawa residents selected the following two as their preferred items of importance: "the distance from the mainland and the scattered nature of the outlying islands" (27.8%) and "disaster prevention measures in low-lying coastal areas with dense population."
• On average, 51.1% of the prefecture responded that they knew what to do in times of disaster, but only 3.1% actually practiced it.
• 12.2% of the prefecture were aware of plans to prevent man-made disasters, such as the incident/disaster section and the citizen protection plan within the disaster prevention plan.
• On average, 20.8% of the prefecture said they were prepared and disaster-ready. 55.3% said they were not but were planning to prepare.
• Subjects were asked to select three crisis events they feel concerned about the most from the list of crisis events that Okinawa may possibly face. The top five responses of the prefecture, on average, were the following: major typhoon (52.8%), major earthquake (46.2%), major tsunami (32%), military aircraft accident (22.2%), and infection (19.8%).
• Respondents chose major earthquake (18.5%) and major typhoon (14%) as the most dangerous crisis events, and these two stood out among others. Attack by foreign country (10.5%), major tsunami (10.1%), and military aircraft accident (7.1%) followed.
• As for means to gather information concerning crisis events (multiple answers permitted), TV ranked on top at 93.5%, followed by newspaper/magazine (65.7%) and radio (46.9%).
• 12.4% of the respondents knew what "self-help, mutual help, public help" meant, while 60.8% did not.
• In relation to "self-help, mutual help, public help," the study asked what the respondents thought were most important among "helping yourself and others" (self-help and mutual help), "measures by municipal (city and prefectural) government" (public help), and "measures by central government" (public help) for 29 crisis events.
II. Survey Report: Okinawa Residents Crisis and Contingencies Awareness Survey Overview

- The top five for "helping yourself and others" (self-help and mutual help) were: major earthquake (54.1%), major typhoon (47.8%), major tsunami (37.7%), long period of isolation (20.5%), and deterioration of public order (16.6%).
- The top five for "measures by municipal (city and prefectural) government" (public help) were: major typhoon (38.8%), major earthquake (38.2%), major tsunami (29.1%), major power outage (20.2%), and infection (19.1%).
- The top five for "measures by central government" (public help) were: major earthquake (37.2%), attack by foreign country (35%), major tsunami (22.4%), violation of territorial waters (20.9%), and terrorism (20.6%).
- 26.7% of the respondents left a comment in the comment field.

3. Observation of Researcher
- Crisis awareness of Okinawa residents differed by region. For example, military aircraft accident scored particularly higher in the central region of mainland Okinawa, and major tsunami scored particularly higher in Yaeyama (see Figure 1).
- The top 30 most frequently observed nouns in the respondent comments were extracted (Table 1). The table shows Okinawans' diverse interest on the topic of disaster prevention and crisis management.
- Although respondents have a comparatively high level of self-help and mutual help against natural disasters, their understanding of the disaster prevention Plan and disaster-readiness are insufficient.
- Considering all of the above, what is necessary is thorough education on disaster prevention that takes into account each region's disaster profile, and human resource development to make this happen.

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**Figure 1: Crisis Events Considered Serious by Okinawa Residents**

![Diagram showing crisis events considered serious by Okinawa residents]

Unit: %
II. Survey Report: Okinawa Residents Crisis and Contingencies Awareness Survey Overview

Table 1: Frequently Observed Words in Respondent Comment (Noun)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>52</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Prefecture</td>
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</tr>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Necessary</td>
<td>41</td>
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<td>5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Base</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>People</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Okinawans</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Disaster prevention</td>
<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Information</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>U.S. forces**</td>
<td>28</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Earthquake</td>
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<td>Response</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>Evacuation site</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>20</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*includes "case" (71 times)
**includes United States forces (twice)
Ⅲ. Research Report

Find out more about the research findings as the following website:
http://okinawa-institute.com/en
Study on Improving Okinawa Prefecture's Comprehensive Crisis Management

Hironobu Nakabayashi
Fellow, Research Section

Summary
Since 2011, Okinawa Prefecture has been reviewing the crisis management framework of the prefectural office as a "comprehensive crisis management study." The purpose of this paper is to discuss the concept of "comprehensive crisis management" in specific terms.

The current global trends in crisis management are all-hazards approach and safety/security culture.

Policy studies that take into account various social environment changes is sometimes called comprehensive policy studies to differentiate itself from the traditional policy studies; similarly, we can consider the new concept of crisis management that incorporates the current trends in crisis management as "comprehensive crisis management."

In this context, "comprehensive crisis management" can be defined as a crisis management that 1) has an all-inclusive approach (all-hazards approach) that can respond to as many crises or threats as possible; 2) is administered under an organizational culture (safety/security culture) in which the organization or individual's safety-first attitude is pervasive; 3) is controlled in such a way that pertinent entities in the public and private sectors can engage in mutual cooperation; and 4) is sustainable in its implementation.

If Okinawa Prefecture is to realize its own comprehensive crisis management, a safety/security culture would need to be established, and a sustainable improvement in safety is required in particular. These cannot be realized with a specific measure, and a "comprehensive" effort is needed—and in this sense, human resource development will become a key to securing a sustainable improvement in safety.

Keywords: comprehensive crisis management, all-hazards approach, safety/security culture, education and human resource development
III. Research Report: Study on Improving Okinawa Prefecture’s Comprehensive Crisis Management

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Full:

Summary:

Table of Contents

Introduction

1. Background of Okinawa Prefecture's comprehensive crisis management studies
   1·1. Overview of 2011 study findings
      i) Characteristics of Okinawa from the viewpoint of crisis management
      ii) Extraction of and countermeasures against primary potential crisis events
      iii) Issues and challenges
   1·2. Overview of 2012 study findings

2. Trends in crisis management: all-hazards and security culture
   2·1. All-hazards approach
   2·2. Security culture

3. Okinawa Prefecture’s Comprehensive Crisis Management
   3·1. “Comprehensive crisis management” as a new form of crisis management
   3·2. Trends in crisis management and comprehensive crisis management

4. Conclusion
Case Study: Boston Marathon Bombings
Hints for Okinawa's Crisis Management

Hironobu Nakabayashi
Fellow, Research Section

Summary
This paper introduces some characteristics of modern-day terrorism by studying the case of two bombings that occurred in Boston, Massachusetts, U.S.A. on April 15, 2013, the process leading up to the arrest of the suspects, and also gaining insights to Okinawa Prefecture's crisis management.

In this incident, two bombings near the finish line of the Boston Marathon killed three and injured over 260 people. Investigation identified two male suspects, one of whom was killed in a gunfight that took place beginning in the early morning of the 18th until the 19th, and the other suspect was arrested with severe injuries. One police officer was shot to death in the process.

The suspects were young immigrant brothers from Chechen; the elder brother who was killed is said to be the mastermind of the crime. The apprehended younger brother stated the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as the motive, and the incident seems to be an isolated case of a manifestation of Islamic radicalism gone too far.

Radicalization of youth and acts of terrorism by individuals as a result have become a global issue in recent years, and to deal with this, it is important to not just strengthen security measures but also build a social environment that prevents radicalization. This incident also sheds a spotlight on the need for counter-terrorism measures at large events.

In consideration of these viewpoints, Okinawa Prefecture should learn from the implications of this particular incident and focus on the following six measures: 1) implement training regularly, identify areas where the benefits of training can be applied, and apply appropriately; 2) enhance medical transportation systems and develop abilities of initial response medical personnel; 3) enhance emergency response capabilities at large events (evacuation planning and inter-organizational cooperation); 4) monitor suspicious objects at locations where people may gather and stay, including places around the course and evacuation spots; 5) strengthen measures to prevent the radicalization of youth (improvement of economic and social environment, sharing values like respect for basic human rights); and 6) spread information properly using social media and other methods.

Keywords: terrorism, lone wolf, radicalization (of youth), large event
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Summary:  
http://okinawa-institute.com/sites/default/files/research/No.2_概要版沖縄県危機管理・安全保障研究シリーズ.pdf

Table of Contents

Introduction

1. Overview of Boston Marathon bombings  
   1-1. Overview of incident (chronological events and extent of damage, etc.)  
   1-2. Characteristics and motive of suspects  
   1-3. Method of attack  
   1-4. Post-incident victim relief

2. Observation  
   2-1. Modern-day terrorism trends in the U.S. and Boston Marathon bombings  
   2-2. Acts of terror by lone wolves and radicalization of the individual

3. Insights to Okinawa Prefecture's crisis management  
   3-1. Ensuring safety and security at large events  
   3-2. Measures against the radicalization of youth  
   3-3. Appropriate information management

Conclusion
Study on the Special Secrecy Law
-Background, Overview and Issues-
Hironobu Nakabayashi
Fellow, Research Section

Summary
In discussions regarding a legal framework that governs Japan's foreign affairs and national security, it has often been pointed out that a legal framework needs to be developed to specially manage important information that concerns foreign affairs and national security.

In this context, the cabinet passed on October 25, 2013 the Act of Protection of Specified Secrets in a cabinet meeting.

The purpose of this legislation is to prevent leaks of information concerning Japan's national security, particularly those that need to be treated in secrecy (specified secrets) by designation, access restriction, or other necessary means.

Under this purpose, the legislation also introduces systems to designate and release specified secrets related to defense, foreign affairs, specific harmful action (spying, etc.), and terrorism prevention as well as an aptitude evaluation system for the handlers of such information. The legislation also calls for stricter punishment for information leaks.

The government claims this law is indispensable in order to reinforce intelligence cooperation with other countries and enable efficient information sharing within the National Security Council.

However, much of the legislation from the operational standpoint remains unclear: despite the fact that the law may restrict the citizens' right to know, the scope of specified secrets and the standard concerning the designation and release of specified secrets have not yet been developed. This has caused various concerns to be voiced.

There are four major concerns: 1) it is unclear what types of information will be deemed specified secret and what standard will be applied to determine the period of protection; 2) there is no system to check the appropriateness of specified secret designation; 3) consideration for the right to know and freedom of press is non-binding; and 4) the scope of acts subject to punishment is unclear.

Whether these concerns are legitimate is still unclear as it will be decided by an operating standard scheduled to be developed after the official passing of the legislation, but the legislation leaves much to be desired as it lacks an arbitration mechanism on the treatment of information and method of broadcasting. Additionally, the appeal system for the aptitude evaluation is insufficient.

Japan will remain effective; therefore, it is not expected to have immediate effects on any prefectural organization other than Okinawa Prefectural Police, which may become a handler of specified secrets.

However, depending on how the law is enforced, it may become difficult to gain information from the Okinawa Defense Bureau or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Okinawa Office. Studies and surveys done by the prefecture, municipality, media, and citizens’ group on the self-defense force, or the U.S. forces may also become subject to restriction, and there is a possibility that Okinawa's police officers, as a handler of specified secrets, may leak sensitive information.

While it is understandable that information related to national security needs to be managed with great care, the current legislation has many unresolved issues, and how it will be enforced remains unclear.

Information security cannot be realized just by designating secrets broadly. It is important to strike a fine balance in its enforcement.

Much of the criticism about this legislation targets not the legislation itself but rather the governance (security governance) of Japan’s national security.

In consideration of this, much is expected of politicians and concerned parties to appropriately design and enforce, while maintaining effectiveness, an operating standard that will be developed after Diet debates and the passing of the legislation.

Keywords: special secrecy law, aptitude evaluation, operating standard, security governance

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Full:
http://okinawa-institute.com/sites/default/files/research/ DEALINGS0.pdf

Table of Contents

Introduction

1. Overview of legislation
   1-1. Background of legislation
   1-2. Overview of legislation

2. Relationship with other policies
   2-1. How it relates to National Security Council (Japanese NSC)

3. Issues
   3-1. Legislation: criticism and issues
   3-2. Enforcement issues

4. Impact on Okinawa Prefecture

5. Observation: on the ideal form of information security
Study on the Opinion Poll on the Image of Japan in the United States Commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Hironobu Nakabayashi
Fellow, Research Section

Summary

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been polling Americans in the U.S. on the image of Japan every year since the 1960s.

The results of the 2013 Opinion Poll on the Image of Japan in the United States (hereinafter called the "2013 poll") that were released on December 19, 2013 showed that China has become the most important country in Asia in the eyes of the average American, and the number of people in favor of continuing the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty has decreased drastically.

Considering the results of the same polls since 2001, there is still a qualitative gap between the image of Japan and the image of China in the U.S. despite China passing Japan to become the most important country in Asia. For the most part, the relationship with Japan seems to be qualitatively better compared with the relationship with China.

However, it is worth noting that more experts are beginning to see Japan as less important, and this trend is continuing.

More polling and studies need to be done to explain the dramatic decrease in the number of people in favor of maintaining the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, but for the time being, the author studied the correlation coefficients with other responses.

As a result, in the general area, three elements were identified, and it is possible that one or a mix of these elements might possibly have affected the large drop in the number of people in favor of maintaining the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The three elements are: 1) less people support the strengthening of economic ties as a means to maintain a good U.S.-Japan relationship; 2) more people support cultural and people exchanges between the two nations as a means of maintaining a good relationship; and 3) more people believe that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was not contributing to the Asian region.

Similarly, the reason why more experts are not in favor of the U.S.-Japan alliance might be because of the drop in the number of people who do not appreciate Japan's reinforcement of its defense capabilities.

In consideration of all of the above, what Okinawa needs to do is to proactively disseminate information to the U.S. primarily through people exchange and educate Americans about Okinawa including its culture and history.

This type of initiative is indispensable in easing Okinawa's burden of U.S. military bases since it serves as a foundation for specific policies to materialize and supports their practical implementation.

Okinawa Prefecture has had various types of relationships with the U.S. from the pre-war days, but today we need to seek and push forward a more strategic form of exchange.

Keywords: opinion poll on the image of Japan in the United States 2013, most important country, people exchange

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Full:
http://okinawa-institute.com/sites/default/files/research/外務省による米国における対日世論調査に関する研究_0.pdf

Summary:

Table of Contents

Introduction

1. Overview of opinion poll
   1·1. Method of 2013 poll
   1·2. Overview of 2013 poll results

2. Perception of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the 2013 poll
   2·1. Perception of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the 2013 poll
   2·2. Perception of the media on the 2013 poll

3. Observation of the 2013 poll results
   3·1. Observation of the question on the most important partner in Asia
   3·2. Observation of the question on the maintenance of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty

4. Implications for Okinawa Prefecture
   4·1. Brief summary
   4·2. Implications for Okinawa Prefecture
A Case Study on the Relocation of U.S. Overseas Bases: Spain

Shino Hateruma
Researcher, Research Section

1. Purpose of This Research
This research attempts to clarify the background and process of relocating a United States (U.S.) base from Spain. The relocation was agreed to between the United States and Spain toward the end of the Cold War. This research focuses on a specific unit that used the base, the Tactical Fighter Wing. In the late 1980s, the Spanish Government began to call for the removal of a U.S. Air Force base at Torrejón, near Madrid, the capital of Spain, and a reduction of U.S. troops in Spain. The two countries started negotiations for a new defense contract, but the U.S. emphasized the importance of the base and refused Spanish demands. It was two years before the two governments agreed on a new contract, which led to the relocation of the Torrejón base. Despite their initial refusal, why and under what conditions did the U.S. decide to relocate the Torrejón base?

This research aims at identifying factors behind the U.S. decision to relocate its base in Spain by analyzing the international environment and U.S. perceptions of that environment. While recent literature on U.S. overseas bases tends to focus on the politics of host countries, this research will pay closer attention to the U.S. response and decision-making process. In addition, in investigating the process leading to relocation, this research compares the case of Spain with that of Okinawa, aiming at offering implications for Okinawa.

This case study consists of resource research. I outline the process and the outcome of the negotiations between the two countries using existing literature and newspaper articles. In order to examine factors which could have influenced the U.S. decision to relocate, I look at three dimensions: (1) military and security aspects, to survey the international environment and military balance at that time, (2) financial aspects, to shed light on the payment of relocation costs, and (3) political and social aspects, to see the political situation of the host country and its relations with the U.S. I also analyze the consequence of the relocation.

2. Summary of the Case
In July 1986, the United States and Spain started negotiations on the renewal of the bilateral defense agreement. The Spanish socialist party initially requested a reduction of all U.S. bases in Spain but eventually narrowed its demands down to the withdrawal of the Tactical Fighter Wing deployed at Torrejón. Meanwhile, the United States sought to convince Spain of the base’s importance by emphasizing its strategic location and role. Some countries voiced their willingness to accept the U.S. Air Force wing along with 72 F-16s. However, the U.S. and Italy reached a tentative agreement in February 1988 to redeploy all fighters to Italy.

The U.S. Department of Defense requested a budget for constructing a new base in Southern Italy but faced opposition from Congress. The U.S. thus called on
NATO to fund the relocation, and NATO accepted. At the end of 1988, the U.S. and Spain signed a new treaty which stipulated that the U.S. would withdraw its Tactical Fighter Wing from Spain within three years.

Meanwhile, the two countries faced difficulty negotiating target relocation site due to U.S. budget constraints and the local opposition in southern Italy, where the fighter wing was set to be relocated. Ultimately, it was determined that the fighter wing would be relocated to the existing Air Force base at Aviano in northern Italy. The U.S. completed its withdrawal from Torrejón in May 1992.

3. Findings and Analysis

At the time of these negotiations, from the late 1980s, the United States and the Soviet Union had started reducing their forces. Consequently, the Soviet nuclear threat decreased in Europe. However, in terms of conventional forces, excluding nuclear weapons, the balance of power still tilted in favor of the Soviet Union. In light of this situation, the U.S. demonstrated its will to reserve both conventional and nuclear forces.

The U.S. recognized the importance of the Torrejón base for its ability to employ tactical nuclear delivery systems in southern Europe and for its geographical advantage in terms of rear support for a potential attack against the Soviet Union. Although the negotiations with Spain came to a deadlock several times, since Italy agreed to host the wing of F-16s, the U.S. was comfortable complying with Spanish demands. This decision enabled the U.S. to maintain the wing with an attack capability in the region.

In terms of financial resources, détente between the U.S. and the Soviet fostered pressure from Congress to cut the defense budget, which made it difficult to fund the construction of an alternative base in Italy. As a solution, the U.S. was able to reduce the financial burden of relocation by splitting the cost with NATO, and settled on utilizing an existing base as an alternative for hosting its F-16s. In short, this relocation did not negatively impact the United States in terms of its military readiness, financial resources or foreign relations.

4. Implications for Okinawa

The case of Spain has two similarities to the present situation surrounding Okinawa: existing threats and U.S. budget constraints. Under these similar circumstances, it is interesting to note that the U.S. successfully relocated its capabilities to an existing base, and this was feasible militarily, financially and politically.

When considering base relocations, it is important to look at the capabilities of the specific unit deployed at the base in question. In the case of Spain, securing an alternative base for the tactical fighter wing in Torrejón was the key to breaking the deadlock in U.S.-Spain negotiations. In the case of Okinawa, it is necessary to understand where each unit is located, what roles each plays to contribute to the defense of Japan and the stability of the Asia Pacific region.
A Case Study on the Relocation of
U.S. Overseas Bases: The Philippines

Shino Hateruma
Researcher, Research Section

1. Purpose of This Research

This research attempts to clarify the background and process of relocating a United States (U.S.) base from the Philippines at the end of the Cold War. The U.S. military had used the Philippines to host two of its largest overseas Air Force and Navy bases for as long as 90 years. The United States and the Philippines started negotiating for the renewal of the military base agreement in September 1990. During these negotiations, the U.S. insisted on its ability to use the bases; however, the consequence was a full U.S. withdrawal from the Philippines. In fact, the relocation of several units had been under discussion and even taken place before bilateral negotiations commenced. Why and under what conditions did the U.S. decide to relocate its base?

This research aims to identify the factors behind the U.S. decision to relocate its base in the Philippines by analyzing the international environment and U.S. perceptions of that environment. While recent literature on U.S. overseas bases tends to focus on the politics of host countries, this research will pay closer attention to the U.S. response and decision-making process. In addition, in investigating the process leading to relocation, this research compares the case of the Philippines with that of Okinawa, aiming at offering implications for Okinawa.

This case study consists of resource research. I outline the process and the outcome of the negotiations between the two countries using existing literature and newspaper articles. Statistics on military power are utilized to examine the international environment during the period of the U.S.-Philippine negotiations. For U.S. perceptions of the international environment, I investigate official reports of the U.S. government and research institutions as well as Congressional records. Information on bases is collected from U.S. military factsheets.

2. Summary of the Case

The United States had used bases in the Philippines since the beginning of the 1900s. The two countries concluded a military base agreement in 1947 after Philippine independence. In the late 1980s, the Philippines underwent democratization, which was accompanied by an increased demand to return territory being used to host U.S. bases. Before the existing base agreement expired in 1991, the two countries began the review. The Philippines demanded that the sovereignty over the bases be returned and compensation increased. Meanwhile, the U.S. proposed a gradual reduction of its footprint on Clark Air Force Base and Subic Naval Base, along with an extension of base access for about 10 years. Following the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in June 1991, however, the U.S. promptly decided to return Clark Air Force Base, which was severely damaged in the disaster. Eventually, the two countries reached consensus on a 10-year extension of access to Subic Naval Base and $2.2 billion in U.S. aid to the Philippines,

resulting in the signing of a new bilateral treaty. However, the Philippine Senate rejected its ratification. The existing base agreement expired and the U.S. had to withdraw from Subic. It is important to note that this withdrawal meant diversified relocation. The U.S. successfully relocated the functions of bases in the Philippines to the continental U.S. and throughout the West Pacific.

3. Findings and Analysis

There are several important findings. First, the U.S.’s threat in Southeast Asia was diminishing during the period of these base negotiations, which enabled the U.S. to choose to withdraw from the Philippines. Second, the U.S. had considered the risk of potentially losing access to these bases even before negotiations began. Indeed, in the late 1980s, the U.S. Department of Defense and several think tanks published reports examining alternative sites for U.S. bases. Third, because discussion about the actual facilities themselves comprised the core of the negotiations, the U.S. was forced to consider how the base functions and capabilities would be maintained, not whether the units would be moved.

The following are the reasons why the U.S. decided to relocate its bases and withdraw its forces from the Philippines. First, the U.S. did not consider the bases necessary for its strategy. This is partly because U.S. perception of the Soviet Union as a threat was diminishing due to that country’s military withdrawal from Vietnam.

Second, relocation was possible under the conditions of the host country’s demand to return the bases, and the U.S.’s ability to secure alternative bases with minimum military capabilities. Loss of base access in the Philippines was a setback for the United States; however, the impact was mitigated by the available alternatives.

4. Implications for Okinawa

The significant difference between the cases of the Philippines and Okinawa is the international environment. In the case of the former, the Soviet threat was in a period of decline. In the case of Okinawa, however, today international relations are unstable because of the challenges posed by North Korea and China. Even a slight change in force deployment could bear consequences in such an environment. When examining base relocation, it is important to hold careful discussions about the impact on neighboring countries.

As for similarities, just as the U.S. had once examined the option of withdrawing from the Philippines, some American researchers have recently proposed to reduce the number of U.S. Marine Corps deployed in Okinawa. However, it is unclear to what extent that kind of examination of military drawdown actually influences base policy. Deeper investigation on the previous policy making is necessary.